
Class I'^iTnoi 

Book -'-Xl^ 



Copiglit]^". 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



AN INTRODUCTION TO 

THE STUDY OF 

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS 



SEWANEE THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY 



GENERAL EDITOR — The Rev. Arthur R. Gray, some- 
time Chaplain of the University of the South. 



THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, by the Rt. Rev. 
A. C. A. Hall, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Vermont 

"It is at once most comprehensive and most condensed, and its dealings with some 
of the difficult and important questions of our time, such as the Resurrection, the In- 
carnation, and especially the Atonement, is a remarkable piece of clear theological 
statement and logical argument." — Rt. Rev. W. C. Doane. 

THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, by the Very Rev. 
Samuel Hart, D.D., LL.D., Dean of Berkeley Divinity 
School. 

"It is admirably adapted to the uses of students of theology, and is, beyond com- 
parison, the best book of its kind for the reading of Churchmen in general." — Dr. 
George Hodges, Dean of the Episcopal Theological School. 

APOLOGETICS, by the General Editor. 

MANUAL OF EARLY ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY 
TO 476 A.D., by the Very Rev. Chas. L. Wells, Ph.D., 
Lecturer in History, McGill University, Montreal; some- 
time Dean of Christ Church Cathedral, New Orleans. 
(Shortly.) 

ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY from 476 a.d., by the 
Rev. Wilson Lloyd Bevan, Ph.D., Professor of History 
and Economics, University of the South. (In Preparation.) 

THE OLD TESTAMENT, by the Rev. Loring W. 
Batten, Ph.D., S.T.D., Professor of the Literature and 
Interpretation of the Old Testament, General Theological 
Seminary. (In Preparation.) 

THE NEW TESTAMENT, by Stuart L. Tyson, M.A. 
(Oxon.), Professor of New Testament Language and Inter- 
pretation, Theological Department, University of the South. 
(In Preparation.) 

ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, by the Rev. George Wil- 
liam Douglas, D.D., Canon of the Cathedral of St. John 
the Divine, New York. (In Preparation.) 

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. (To be arranged for.) 

#** In uniform volumes^ 12-mo. cloth^ printed on imported 
English paper ^ price $1.^0 per volume^ post prepaid. 



THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

of SEWANEE TENNESSEE 



SEWANEE THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY 

AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF 

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS 

BY 

ARTHUR R. GRAY 

SOMETIME CHAPLAIN OF SEWANEE 

WITH 

A CONCLUDING CHAPTER BY 
W. LLOYD BEVAN 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND ECONOMICS, SEWANEE 




AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH 
SEWANEE, TENNESSEE 






Copyright, 191 2 

By The University Press of 

Sewanee Tennessee 



I The LiBiaAEY 

I OF Congers 
f- ' " """ ' 



gCU3l4248 



EDITOR'S PREFACE 

THE object of this series is to provide for the 
clergy and laity of the Church as tatement, in 
convenient form, of its Doctrine, Discipline and 
Worship — as well as to meet the often expressed de- 
sire on the part of Examining Chaplains for text- 
books which they could recommend to Candidates 
for Holy Orders. 

To satisfy, on the one hand, the demand of general 
readers among the clergy and laity, the books have 
been provided with numerous references to larger 
works, making them introductory in their nature; 
and on the other hand, to make them valuable for use 
in canonical examinations, they have been arranged 
according to the Canons of the Church which deal 
with that matter. 

It is the earnest hope of the collaborators in this 
series that the impartial scholarship and unbiased at- 
titude adopted throughout, will commend themselves 
to Churchmen of all types, and that the books will 
therefore be accorded a general reception and adopted 
as far as possible as a norm for canonical examina- 
tions. The need of such a norm is well known to all. 

And finally a word to Examining Chaplains. They 
will find that the volumes are so arranged that it will 



EDITORS PREFACE 



be possible to adapt them to all kinds of students. 
The actual text itself should be taken as the minimum 
of requirement from the Candidate, and then, by 
reference on their part to the bibliographies at the 
end of each chapter, they can increase as they see fit 
the amount of learning to be demanded in each case. 
It has been the endeavor of the editor to make these 
bibliographies so comprehensive that Examining 
Chaplains will always find suitable parallel readings. 
If in any way the general public will be by this 
series encouraged to study the position of the 
Church, and if the canonical examinations in the 
different dioceses can be brought into greater har- 
mony one with another, our object will be accom- 
plished. 

Arthur R. Gray. 



INTRODUCTION 

THERE is much for which writers upon Apolo- 
getics have to apologize, and particularly those 
who endeavor to be brief. Even in extended treatises 
many things have to be left unsaid — left unsaid at the 
risk of being misunderstood. Much more does this 
apply to those who seek within a few pages to state 
their position. Upon almost every page something is 
stated which opens up a debatable territory so large 
that a separate volume would be needed to defend it. 
Whoever deals within a small compass with questions 
which treat of such fundamental conceptions as "time" 
or ''experience" or ''reality" must at many points ex- 
pose himself to severe criticism. Be this as it may, 
the object of the present essay is such that it involves 
these risks, and for better or worse they must be faced. 
It is only hoped that in the bibliographies which are 
provided at the end of each section the student will 
find material wherewith he can pursue at greater 
length the many large problems which by the nature 
of the case can in this book receive no more than pass- 
ing suggestion. 

Let the object of this treatise be clearly understood, 
however, and much misunderstanding can be avoided. 
In the first place it is laid down that spiritual things 
are spiritually discerned, and that therefore material 
argumentation is in the last resort in vain. Its only 
value is to bolster up a belief which has begun in the 



vi. INTRODUCTION 

region of the spirit. This is a vitally necessary point, 
and if this essay can do no more than make plain the 
fact that a proper atmosphere is an indispensable ele- 
ment in Apologetics it will largely have made its case. 
This is the subject to which the first part is devoted. 
It seeks to clear away the clouds and start the student 
in the proper spirit. 

Then in the second place, and in the second part, an 
endeavor is made to distinguish between what is and 
what is not important, and to get down to first princi- 
ples. The purpose of Part Two is to force the issue 
back to the fundamental dilemma between Naturalism 
and Idealism, and from that point to build. If a man's 
interpretation of Hfe is naturalistic then alL further 
argument upon things religious is in vain. If, how- 
ever, he is an Idealist, then from that point on it is 
merely a question of the preferable interpretation of 
Idealism. Most argumentation upon things religious 
is beside the point, for the simple reason that the dis- 
putants argue from different points of view, and by no 
alchemy of thought could they possibly come to an 
agreement. It is to an enlargement of this that a con- 
siderable portion of Part Two is devoted. As for Part 
Three, the simple statement therein contained of the 
argument from history needs no introduction or ex- 
planation. 

Finally, a few words must be said in explanation 
of the very evident fact that this book, which purports 
to be a "text-book," is in reality no more than a series 
of lectures written in the phraseology of the lecturer. 
The fact of the matter is that experience has proven 



INTRODUCTION 



to the writer the practical impossibility of writing a 
technical text-book upon this subject. It is well 
enough to do so in other fields of work, but the effec- 
tive teaching of Apologetics is largely dependent upon 
the personality of the teacher. If the student is really 
to benefit from this study it will be only as he is stim- 
ulated by his lecturer to independent thought, and it is 
hard to see how this can be done by recitations out of 
a formal text-book. The most that can be done is to 
give the student certain things to read, and then to 
enlarge upon them in lectures and through discussion 
— not necessarily upon what the student has read, but 
upon the ideas that his reading has produced. 

It is to try and meet this difficult situation that this 
book has been cast in the form in which it is presented. 
Its object is not to solve problems for the student so 
much as to direct his thoughts so that he may of his 
own efforts come to a satisfactory conclusion. Along 
with this has gone the desire to present the subject 
in such an elementary way that it may be comprehen- 
sible to all. 

Owing to the migratory existence led by the 
author it has been impossible for him to get sufficient 
time in a good library to work up the last chapter and 
the bibliographies. This work has been kindly done 
by W. L. Bevan, Professor of History in the Univer- 
sity of the South, to whom the author is indebted not 
only for this work, but for encouragement and advice 
at all times. 

A. R. G. 

The Transfiguration, 1911. 



CONTENTS 

PART ONE 

VITAL APOLOGETICS 

Chapter I. The Fact of Faith i 

Chapter II. The Essence of Faith lo 

Chapter III, The Practical Value of Faith .... 27 

Chapter IV. The Final Value of Faith 38 

Bibliography for Vital Apologetics 51 

PART TWO 

PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

Introduction 55 

Chapter I. The Fundamental Problem: The Antith- 
eses, Naturalism and Idealism ... 60 
Chapter 1 1. The Insufficiency of Naturalism ... 79 

Chapter III. Phases of Naturalism 114 

Chapter IV. The Sufficiency of Idealism 123 

Chapter V. The Interpretation of Idealism .... 144 

Chapter VI. Human Personality 165 

Chapter VII. Divine Personality 175 

Appendix on the Problem of Evil 195 

Bibliography for Philosophical Apologetics . . 201 



PART THREE 

HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

Chapter I. The Scope of the Subject 207 

Chapter II. The Historicity of the Gospel Narrative . 216 

Bibliography for Historical Apologetics ... 235 

Appendix to Bibliographies 236 



GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The following books are recommended to beginners for col- 
lateral reading: 

Turton, W. M.— "Truth of Christianity." 

Harris, C— "Pro Fide." 

(These books, although far from exhaustive, have perhaps 
been the most popular among modern elementary 
works.) 

Bruce, A. B. — "Apologetics, or Christianity Defensively 
Stated." 

Sheldon, H. C. — "History of Unbelief in the Nineteenth 
Century." 

Clarke, W. N.— "The Christian Doctrine of God." 

Harrison, A. J. — "The Church in Relation to Sceptics." 

Illingworth, J. R. — "Reason and Revelation." 

Tyrrell, G.— "The Faith of the Millions." 

Schultz, H.— "Outlines of Christian Apologetics." 



PART I. 

VITAL APOLOGETICS. 

Chapter I. The Fact of Faith. 
Chapter II. The Essence of Faith. 
Chapter III. The Practical Value of Faith. 
Chapter IV. The Final Value of Faith. 



'' That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of 
men^ but in the power of God.'' —I. Cor. ii : 5. 



AN INTRODUCTION TO 

THE STUDY OF 

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS 

CHAPTER I. 

THE FACT OF FAITH 

"I hungered and thirsted not after those first works of 
Thine, but after Thee, Thyself, the Truth. . . . Yet they 

still sat before me in their dishes glittering fantasies 

Taking them to be Thee, I fed thereon; not eagerly, for 
Thou didst not taste in them as Thou wert in Thyself; for 
Thou wert not those empty fictions, nor was I nourished by 
them, but rather became more empty." — St. Augustine's Con- 
fessions. 

IN matters apologetic when we are fearless and 
thorough, and when we are not blinded by the glit- 
ter of this world's logic, we come in time to realize 
that the only argument which is germane to the sub- 
ject, and which possesses immediate and final, rather 
than mediate and temporary, value, is the argument 
from the fact of Christian Faith. It alone of all the 
numerous facts which can be adduced in behalf of the 
truth of Christianity is unanswerable; and it is to the 
elucidation and enlargement of this statement that the 
first division of this book will be devoted. 

Whenever one examines into the history of Chris- 
tian Evidences he discovers that the faith, considered 



VITAL APOLOGETICS 



as a system, has too long been handicapped by the fail- 
ure of its defenders to realize this fact, that the only 
argument on its behalf, which is really germane to the 
subject, is the argument from life. One of the great- 
est of the benefits which has come from the modern 
study of psychology is to be found in the way in which 
it has taught students of religion in their apologetic 
endeavors to fall back upon the facts of the Christian's 
experience. 

To state the matter concisely, we might say that 
there are two ways of defending one's belief; the first, 
by argument and analogy and intellectual processes 
generally; the second by exhibiting what Christ has 
done and can do for men; and then by appealing 
upon the grounds of temporal expediency and eternal 
efficiency to man's sense of his own needs. The one 
method is purely philosophical, the other homiletical. 
The one seeks to persuade the mind, the other the 
heart and will. Now in the past the former of these 
methods has almost exclusively occupied the field. 
Apologetics generally have dealt only with intellec- 
tual problems, while the fact of the Christian life, 
and the conclusions which are to be drawn from that 
fact have largely been left alone. 

In this introduction to the subject of Apologetics it 
is desired primarily to point out that this practice char- 
acteristic of the past has been most unsatisfactory, and 
that a vast amount of the difficulty which is encoun- 
tered by the Church to-day can be traced back to the 
mistaken methods of the defenders of her faith. 

In the first place, as a result of presenting Chris- 



THE FACT OF FAITH 



tianity from the intellectual point of view — as a result 
of arguing on its behalf with philosophy only — a part 
of the world has been led into supposing that it is 
an intellectual system. It is a question of attitude 
and resultant atmosphere. The attitude which one 
adopts, more than the words he uses, influences 
the reader or listener. Accordingly, when one as- 
sumes the logician's position in defending Christianity 
he suggests to his audience, irresistibly, the idea that 
his creed is a matter of the intellect only. Now, it is 
to be remembered that the Religion of the Lord Jesus 
is other worldly, and other worldliness is the necessary 
attitude which the disciple must adopt. St. Paul in- 
sists vehemently upon this in his Corinthian letters^, 
and perhaps he struck the keynote of Christian argu- 
mentation when he told his flock that he had come to 
them without any of the gifts of oratory or rhetoric^ 
because he wanted their faith to stand "not in the wis- 
dom of men, but in the power of God." This idea, sa 
insistently put in the first two chapters of the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, expresses exactly what we 
are trying to state here : that faith must be grounded 
not upon argument but upon life. 

In a book upon such a subject as this it is necessary 
for two reasons that we begin with this statement of 
the primary importance of life rather than of logic. In 
the first place because, as has already been stated, the 
argument from life is and can only be the vital and 
appropriate argument ; and in the second place, because 
when one commences a study of this kind it is abso- 
lutely necessary that the question be approached from 



VITAL APOLOGETICS 



the proper point of view. It is this second reason 
which deals with what has been termed the matter of 
attitude and resultant atmosphere. Unless we begin 
by recognizing the supremacy of the spirit; unless we 
begin by realizing that our faith can and should stand 
not in the wisdom of man but in the power of God — 
unless we thus begin the study of Apologetics all 
further efforts will be worse than vain. They will 
be worse than vain, because we shall move in the 
wrong kind of an atmosphere — the kind of an atmos- 
phere which is utterly hostile and destructive to real 
faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. 

We cannot any longer, then, afford to generate an 
exclusively intellectual atmosphere in our apologetic 
writings. In the olden days when this was done con- 
ditions of enlightenment were such that it was not 
necessarily disastrous. But in these days men demand 
that argument be fitted absolutely to the case, and di- 
gressions are driven from the court. And it is well 
that this is so. It is well that we work back to first 
principles and defend our position in the truly apos- 
tolic and vital way — defend it by exhibiting the re- 
sults of faith in the Christian creed. The kingdoms 
of this world can never be converted into the King- 
dom of Christ by soldier bishops or by learned ped- 
agogues. They both misrepresent the Manger Child. 
It is only by holy living and holy dying that men and 
women are to be convinced. It is only as men see our 
"light shine before them" with brilliance, that they 
■will come to realize that we stand in the true and last- 



THE FACT OF FAITH 



ing light, and that they will be brought to glorify The 
Father which is in Heaven. 

It is not against a misunderstanding of the Gospel 
that we speak, but against a misrepresentation; a mis- 
representation which brings about a misunderstanding, 
and which causes many who apply to apologetic writ- 
ings for help to imagine that Christianity is something 
quite different from that which it really is.^ 

Christians are born ''not of the will of man, nor of 
the will of the flesh, but of God," and it is in God's 
language of Life that we must first address those who 
seek confirmation for their faith. We must do this, 
lest, using man's language only, a wrong impression 
be made and many fall into the error of thinking that 
Christianity is a theory — just as is Socialism. 

It is essential therefore in commencing the study 
of Apologetics that we put first that which is first; 



^ An illustration in another field of what is meant by a false 
atmosphere is to be found in the recent Bampton lectures of 
Peile and Hobhouse. Compare "The Reproach of Christian- 
ity," by the former, and 'The Church and the World in Idea 
and History," by the latter. In these books we see how 
the junction of the forces of the Church and State resulted 
in a disastrous misrepresentation, and allowed the world to 
believe that they were of the same essence. We might para- 
phrase that celebrated remark, which forms the text as it 
were to Mr. Hobhouse's volume, that the world got into 
the Church with Constantine, and that the Church has never 
since been able to get rid of it, by saying that what St. Paul 
called "the wisdom of this world" got into Apologetics with 
the early writers and that Apologetics has hardly been able 
to get rid of it since. 



VITAL APOLOGETICS 



and that before we make use, as we shall, of philos- 
ophy and logic, we emphasize the fact of faith. ^ 

And now it is well that we see that this pri- 
macy of faith over reason is not only spiritually pref- 
erable, but intellectually necessary. Religious convic- 
tions are not demonstrable, and the existence of the 
objects which are worshiped by the man of faith are 
not capable of empirical proof. Let us look into this 
matter. 

We cannot, as the old Hebrew knew so well, "by 
searching find out God." Could we, then revelation 
would be gratuitous, and a new conception of God 
would become necessary; and may we not say, the 
truth of the Incarnation would have to be restated 
and perhaps excused ? Bold as men may be, and great 
as is their ingenuity, it is yet impossible to pierce 
"through Nature to God." ^ We break through what 
Browning would call the benevolent embarrassments 
of Nature to an ideal; to an idea of God, but that 
idea is not the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It 



*An abundant supply of material upon the subject with 
which we are dealing can be found in such a book as Calde- 
cott's "Philosophy of Religion;" also in A. W. Benn's "His- 
tory of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century." In such 
books we find in its fullness this false interpretation of the 
apologetic atmosphere with which we are finding fault. At- 
tention should be called also to the books of "Evidences" and 
"Natural Religion" which were published so freely in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 

^John Fiske's "Through Nature to God." 



THE FACT OF FAITH 



is a glittering and resplendent ideal, a creature of the 
poet's sublimest fancy, a joyous companion for sum- 
mer skies and placid seas; perhaps even a comforting 
conception in times of darkness; but it is not the In- 
finite Father to whom we address our prayers; and 
it is for toiling and sweating and suffering humanity 
so fantastic and so far removed as to be almost worth- 
less.* Now poetry has without doubt much to do with 
religion.^ The rhythm of holiness is an aspect not to 
be neglected. But when their eyes grow dim with 
toil or with trouble or with time, men need bulky facts ! 
Facts which cannot, by the nature of the case, be ap- 
prehended by any piercings of nature or by any flights 
of the imagination; facts which can only be obtained 
through revelation.^ They that are whole may for 
the time being need no physician; amusement and di- 



*If the New Religion advocated by former President 
Eliot of Harvard deserves any mention at all, we might say 
that in what has just been said is summed up the final ob- 
jection to his theory. We would also include under the same 
kind of a condemnation such ethereal impracticabilities as Dr. 
Adler's "Ethical Culture" and Mr. Frederic Harrison's "Re- 
ligion of Humanity." 

^ Compare a very interesting article on the relation of 
Religion to Poetry by H. S. Nash in the American Journal of 
Theological Study. See also for a naturalistic examination 
of the same, Professor Santayana's "Religion and Poetry." 

® By revelation we mean that which has been progressive 
and continuous. Compare Canon Alexander's 1910 St. Asaph's 
Lectures : "On the Promise of the Spirit." 



VITAL APOLOGETICS 



version, aesthetic or intellectual, may be all that they 
require, and for such the poet's dream and the new 
religion-maker's god will do — for a time. But to all 
men, almost without exception, there comes a day 
when fne creations of fine-spun fancy fail to suffice; 
when they need something to lean upon; something 
that their hands can handle and that their eyes can 
see; something which is not only poetical, but practi- 
cal ; and when that day does come, there comes also an 
awakening to the meaning and need of revelation; a 
realization of the insufficiency of poetry. It is then 
to be remembered that the divine idea which the poet 
puts before us is not the God whom we desire, and 
that by no process of the intellect can man "find God." 
Since, then, by searching we cannot find the Al- 
mighty, and since it must therefore follow He can 
only be sufficiently found through revelation, we lay 
down, as the basis upon which the apologist has to 
build, that revelation which comes with life: The 
Life, as first revealed in Palestine some nineteen hun- 
dred years ago, and, in the second place, the Life as 
now men endeavor to exhibit it as they follow in the 
Master's steps. Life can alone prove Life, and Chris- 
tianity is not a theory, but Life. Like alone demon- 
strates like ! To be in order one must argue for Chris- 
tianity with Christianity! To compel the exacting 
world to listen, we must speak to the point before we 
discourse upon matters of mediate applicability only; 
and to do this we must begin as we have, and lay as 
the basis of our Apologetic the revealed part of faith. 



THE FACT OF FAITH 



Christianity is Faith, and therefore the one and the 
only argument for it is to be found in Faith as illus- 
trated. Christianity is Life^ and therefore lives alone 
can testify to its truth/ 



''For illustrations read such biographies as those of Cole- 
ridge Patteson and James Hannington, Forbes Robinson's 
letters, and the two recent books of Harold Begbie, "Twice 
Born Men" and "Souls in Action." 



CHAPTER 11. 
THE ESSENCE OF FAITH. 

IT will be objected to what has been affirmed in the 
first chapter that the position adopted is agnostic ; 
that despite all we have said about our wholesome at- 
mosphere the attitude assumed is destructive to rea- 
son. We are told that if we lay, as the basis of be- 
lief, faith, and thereby exclude logic and philosophy, 
we join ourselves to the skeptics in an apotheosis of 
unreason. This is an objection which is to be ex- 
pected, and we must therefore, in order to meet it the 
better, take up more thoroughly the problem of the 
value of inductive and deductive reasoning in things 
religious. In doing this it conveniently comes to pass 
that we introduce ourselves to the real point at issue, 
and to that question which is of greatest importance 
for an entire understanding of the matter — the es- 
sence of faith. 

Wherein lies the wisdom of St. Paul in calling 
his Creed "the foolishness of this world" ? This ques- 
tion cannot better be answered than by considering 
some of the attempts which have been made to base 
religion upon logical processes.^ The English phi- 



^We shall endeavor later on to develop the fact that in 
religion will be found a fusion of reason and emotion and 
will. But it is to be noticed that at this point we are dealing 
specifically with Christianity; which, if we may say so, is more 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 11 

losopher, John Locke, for example, argued: I exist. 
There must be a cause for me; that Cause is God. 
Again, the great Bishop Butler, whose "Analogy" stood 
for years as a mighty bulwark of the Faith, said: 
There is in me a sense of moral obligation; obligation 
implies law and lawgiver, that Lawgiver is God. Or 
again, to come down to modern times, John Caird 
puts it thus : My self-conscious Spirit, and the world 
over against it, are in irreconcilable opposition so far 
as thought is concerned, unless I believe there is a 
Supreme Spirit.^ Now these types of theistic argu- 
ment are capable of superb expression; and, as one 
reads the splendid expositions of Butler, or the ap- 
pealing passages of Caird, he is well-nigh carried up 
to Heaven in spite of himself. But the big fact is that 
he is not, and that no man has ever been so carried into 
the Heaven of Heavens; he is not transported to the 
Right Hand of God. Analogy, considerations of the 
moral law and its categorical imperative, conclusions 
forced upon us through the concept of causation — 
these carry men perhaps beyond the little world of 
the materialists, but they do not transport them into 
the presence of Him to Whom men address their 
prayers. They yield to us a Power which we spell 
with a capital P, or a God to Whom we may, for want 



than religion, inasmuch as it is Life, Life is perfected re- 
ligion and the Apologist has to recognize the difference be- 
tween religion and perfected religion. 

^ Compare for an enlargement of this, Caldecott, "Philos- 
ophy of Religion," page 7. 



12 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

of a better term, apply the epithet^ "Personal."^ But 
the Father of Love is not reached through any such 
approach. The vital point is touched when we hear 
an unanimous "No" to the question: Can you pray 
to the Being thus apprehended? It is all, we discover 
after consideration, a question of experience, and we 
have ventured to quote these masters of argumenta- 
tive theism, because the testimony of mankind dem- 
onstrates that with all their ability and with all their 
precision they have none the less failed to bring the 
world with their arguments nearer to God. He to 
Whom men address their prayers is reached, as the 
universal testimony of believers will acclaim, by means 
of another way ; a way which is super-argumentative — 
by means of faith. 

What then is faith? What is this other way for 
really finding the Father? Newman came in his an- 
swer to this question nearer to the truth than did most 
of his critics. While others were laboring to eluci- 
date the reasonableness of the Christian Faith, he 
boldly braved all accusations of agnosticism, and said : 
It cannot be elucidated ! it is a fact ! a fact of "assent" ! 
The assent, he contends, is not an act of the reason, 
but of what he terms "the illative sense." By this so- 
called illative sense he means: the whole personality, 
will, emotion, and intellect, all acting in perfectly ad- 
justed and balanced harmony. When a man as a 



^ Cf. Campbell Eraser's definition of Divine Personality 
in his "Philosophy of Theism," page 251, second edition. 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 13 

human being with all of his faculties in correct ad- 
justment assents to a proposition, he then performs 
an act of faith.* It is an act which cannot be ex- 
plained, any more than it can be explained why this 
man should fall in love with that woman; it cannot 
be logically defined ; it is merely a fact, the fact of life ; 
and the world is made up of just such incomprehen- 
sible and incontrovertible living facts. A living thing 
cannot be dissected and remain living; no more can 
a living faith be defined. There are certain facts 
which we must not attempt to bring within the circum- 
ference of thought.^ Is this agnosticism? So then 
is the plan by which we direct all of our doings. 

An assent not controlled by reason then is New- 
man's definition of faith; blind, materially and mun- 
danely speaking it may be, but far-sighted it is, and 
God-sighted, spiritually speaking, and we contend that 
this is the commencement of a correct analysis of 
faith — that it puts half of the truth before us and as 
such is serviceable. Half of the truth? We cannot 
rest content with that, so let us go farther and seek 



*The reader is referred heartily to a most suggestive book 
by J. Huntley Skrine, entitled "What is Faith?" In it will be 
found a delightful presentation of a thesis which is nearly 
identical with the position assumed here. Mr. Skrine de- 
fines faith as "life," and life as "losing life," and thereby 
develops the philosophy of Christian epistemology. It is a 
regret that the writer has been unable to see the text of the 
Bampton Lectures by the same author, which are being de- 
livered as this goes to press. 

^Cf. J. H. Newman's "Grammar of Assent," in loco. 



14 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

the whole; let us do so lest remaining at this half-way 
house we be dragged down with Newman and made 
to bow before an idol of authority. Let us see whether 
constructive thought cannot come into play and make 
faith possible to the thorough thinker as well as to 
such as prefer not to, or cannot, think. Let us see 
whether a man cannot acquire peace of mind as well 
as peace of soul in believing. 

Peace of mind requires that we find something to 
which we may turn in order to check up, as it were, 
the product of the first act of faith. The position in 
which we have put ourselves should be clearly under- 
stood. It has been asserted that our faith in God is, 
to begin with, inexplicable and independent of dis- 
cursive reason. It becomes us, therefore, if we would 
appeal to mature minds, to expose the reasonableness 
of this act of unreason. Faith we have affirmed to be 
an attitude which commences to exist outside of the 
region of logical thought, and we must proceed to in- 
quire whether it, despite such a strange beginning, 
cannot in the end be justified within that same region. 
That cannot be unreasonable which ends reasonably, 
and we should now advance and explain how this blind 
assent of ours is, when properly carried out, an act of 
the highest reasonableness. 

Newman, in searching for an excuse for his atti- 
tude, turned to an infallible authority — or at least he 
resorted to a theory of authority, and thus relieved 
himself, through this medium, of further perplexities. 
Such a method as this without doubt finally dethrones 
reason. But such an extremity we do not believe to 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 15 

be necessary, and we hold that a personal assent to 
an undemonstrable truth is possible which will yet 
be guiltless of Newman's lapse into skepticism. We 
need — and this is our answer to those who affirm that 
our position necessarily ends in an appeal to an exter- 
nal authority — we need no final court of appeal without, 
since we have such a resort within us, to the which 
we can turn without loss of dignity or privilege and 
find a confirmation for our faith. We can of our- 
selves, as free individuals, "check up" the truth of the 
things to which we assented blindly in the beginning; 
and that by means of which we can do this is expe- 
rience. Experience than which there is no higher 
reason! Experience which is reason! The most con- 
vinced of unbelievers, as well as the most earnest of be- 
lievers, are ready to join with us in the affirmation.® 
We lay down, therefore, as that which completes and 
justifies faith, experience. To experience, as to reason, 
the patient man turns, and in the light of its decision 
completes the act of faith. Now it is to be noted that 
experience as the fulfiller and verifier of faith can be 
made use of in two ways. One may study, in the first 
place, the pages of history and come, through a con- 
sideration of the events of the past, to a conclusion 
of undeniable value. Or again, one can study the ex- 
perience of his own life and with the accumulating 
years accumulate conviction. With regard to the first 
form of studying experience, we can say that it is a 



'A definition of experience will be found later on in the 
chapter on 'The Sufficiency of Idealism." 



16 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

method employed by students of all kinds. A certain 
economic theory is under investigation, for example. 
The investigator, before assenting to its value, turns 
to the history of humanity, looks across its centuries, 
and in large measure is influenced in his decision, for 
or against the theory in question, by what he finds 
upon the pages of humanity's experience. Or again, 
it may be the scientist who is investigating that which 
is given to him as fact, and he turns in the first place 
to the records of his predecessors to see whether with 
them the fact as given agrees. The whole world thus 
makes use of experience to verify what is given to it. 

And then in the second place with regard to the use 
of experience in our own lives for the purpose of ac- 
cumulating conviction: this is not a process in any 
way peculiar to the student of faith. Our days from 
sunrise to sunset and our lives from birth to death 
are occupied with this process. We test each day the 
theories which are put before us by our teachers; we 
test each day the very truths told us by our parents; 
and the opinions we have, if they be opinions which 
are earnest, are such as have been forced upon us by 
the sequence of events through which we have passed. 

It is in this same way that we check up the value of 
the truths which are told us upon our mothers' knees, 
as well as those facts to which we have begun by 
blindly assenting — the facts of the Christian Faith. 
We can and we do subject them to a similar process 
of investigation. Those who pass through the period 
of maturity, and those who emerge from honest bat- 
tles with doubt, and those who are able from their 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 17 

hearts to say their Creed, are such as have made this 
use of experience. As the years roll by, and as with 
them, comes the "inevitable yoke," and as men weary 
of the flatness and fatigue of this confused world, and 
in agony lift up their eyes to the tranquil hills ; as we 
are driven to search for the truth beyond the truths 
which we have already possessed; and as we are 
forced to question the value of everything which we 
once accepted without question — as we go through 
this wilderness of wonderment, then those who remain 
Christians and fearlessly repeat their Creed, are those 
who have experienced for themselves the truth of it 
all, and who have come to that conviction and that 
knowledge of which they stood in need. They have, 
in a word, completed the act of faith. 

This process by means of which men fulfill and 
check up their credo varies with the individual, and 
in a book upon Apologetics it is vitally necessary that 
we call attention to these variations. It is only as we 
allow the variety of provings and fulfillings that we 
can be Christian philosophers; in fact it is only as we 
postulate the divers ways in which men complete their 
convictions that we can take our stand upon the plat- 
form of experience. Let us, therefore, indicate some 
of the various methods. 

Some will come to a realization of the truth of their 
Creed as they journey along the simple path of right- 
eous endeavor; others will find its finality in its ca- 
pacity to glorify and make worth while the dullness 
of the daily round, in its ability to act as the miracu- 
lous supplier of human needs; others, and for such 



18 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

this volume and all such books upon Apologetics are 
primarily written, will find the truth of that to which 
they have given assent, after they have studied phi- 
losophy. 

Or to put it in another way: some, after the first 
unreasoning assent of their youth, in the experi- 
ences of life, in its prosaic ups and downs, in its 
sorrows and joys and appointments and disappoint- 
ments, find out unconsciously and gradually yet de- 
cisively and definitely that the truths taught them 
about the Lord Jesus are absolutely true for them. 
They find that their lives are made endurable only in 
proportion as they yield to the fact of the Incarna- 
tion. Such we would say fulfill and verify their faith 
automatically. Then others to whom such simple veri- 
fication is denied, to whom the demand comes that 
they "track suggestion to its inmost cell"; others find 
the eternal verity of their Creeds and thus complete 
the act of faith, not until they have in a desperation 
of doubt examined everything from the philosophical 
point of view. These study psychology and logic and 
anthropology and all of the branches of learning, seek- 
ing with the questioning Athenians to discover whether 
these things are so. From this class many — far more 
than the world is wont to admit — come to the truth 
triumphantly, and not a few of the staunchest sup- 
porters of the Church are they who have checked up 
their one-time blind faith with the reason and the 
logic of the world. It is, we say, to the latter class 
that this volume is primarily addressed. A book upon 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 19 

Apologetics is in the last resort useful only for the 
purpose of suggesting to such as are disturbed lines 
of thought in the pursuance of which they may justify 
the blind assent with which they have had to begin. 

One more remark must be made for the purpose of 
clearing up what was left unsaid when we were as- 
serting that faith is, in its conception, supernatural, 
or call it, if you will, blind. It is very probable that 
some will contend that this is not a fact ; that there are 
many who were never taught Christianity on their 
mothers' knees, but rather came to it after much time 
spent in profound thought. St. Augustine and his 
conversion, for example, or the early Apologist, Justin 
Martyr, may be cited as men who did not begin blind- 
ly. What is to be said to this objection? And the 
answer is as simple as it is serious: that, despite ap^ 
pearances and despite assertions to the contrary, faith 
must be, in its beginnings, blind; that much as a man- 
may have studied philosophy, and many as the miles 
may be over which he has wandered in search of the 
truth, and honestly as he may think that logic or phi- 
losophy has brought him to his conclusion, still, nev- 
ertheless, reflection and study have not been the origi- 
nators of his belief. His first assent like all beginnings 
of belief came not from the "will of the flesh," but 
from the unknown listings of the spirit. The fire may 
have been laid by philosophy, and the wood or the 
coals, by intellectual endeavor, made ready for the 
flame, but the spark was kindled by the spirit. We 
do not merely assert this because it is a fact stated in 



20 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

the Bible, but because the universal testimony of man- 
kind affirms it to be so.'^ 

Once again it is to be asked is not this position 
which we have assumed an impossible one? Can we 
in this era of human ingenuity, and in this time when 
by the might of their minds men are subduing even 
the air; can we beheve in this day of telescopic and 
microscopic science that men accept blindly the most 
important thing in life? For if religion is anything 
at all it is the most important of things. And once 
again we say, yes ! We compromise our worldly wis- 
dom and do it gladly, and this time we defend our 
position with two counter statements. 

In the first place, if we examine the matter, we find 
that the only way in which we can live at all is by 
obeying the beckonings of blind faith. In everything 
that we do, whether it be social or economic or scien- 
tific or political, we must if we would advance, ven- 
ture forth each day into uncharted seas. The exist- 
ence of every human activity, to say nothing of the 
freshness and vigor of man's mind, depends upon the 
making each day of a new experiment, upon the act- 



^ It must be granted that this brings up an obscure and dif- 
ficult problem, the most difficult problem with which the stu- 
dent has to deal, inasmuch as it is a personal problem, and 
because it is so intimate that, like our profoundest prayers, 
it is inexpressible, and data upon it are unobtainable. We 
may merely make so bold as to assert categorically that what 
has been stated is the truth. (Compare: Royce's "Philosopliy 
of Loyalty" and how therein he makes a similar implication.) 
Cf. pp. 20, 31, and 46. 



TEE ESSENCE OF FAITH 21 

ings of faith. If men held back and never took the 
step into the unknown, if they never acted upon the 
principle that there were grounds for holding this or 
that undemonstrable theory which lay at the basis of 
the day's programme, then would they never succeed 
in anything; then would they, for that matter, never 
have emerged from brutality and ignorance. The 
glory and the power of mankind come from its in- 
difference to darkness and its unwavering belief in its 
prognostications. The credentials of science ^ are 
identical with those of theology, and the process and 
the methods of the two are to a large extent the same. 
Ultimately both depend upon finding something which' 
corresponds to that in the existence of which men 
have in the beginning put their blind faith. This is 
the first reason for our willingness to admit that we 
begin blindly in our search for the truth.^ 



® Cf. J. P. Cooke's "Credentials of Science." 

® On this readiness of mankind to trust its intuitions — 
to trust in the "probability" of its hypothesis, as Bishop Butler 
would have expressed it — we append two very suggestive quo- 
tations written by men of utterly different temperaments and 
points of view. The first by Gladstone, a high Churchman, 
the second by Prof. Royce, of Harvard, a man as broad in 
his theology as it is possible to be. "For Doubt," says Mr. 
Gladstone, "I have a sincere respect, but Doubt and Skepti- 
cism are different things. I contend that the skeptic is of 
all men on earth the most inconsistent and irrational. He 
uses a plea against religion which he never uses against any- 
thing he wants to do or any idea he wants to embrace — viz., 
the want of demonstrative evidence. Every day and all day 
long he is acting on evidence not demonstrative : he eats 



22 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

Then there is a second reason for our not being 
ashamed of the origin of our assent, and that is, that 
we are forced thus to act by the conditions of exist- 
ence. As a matter of fact we do nothing in this world 
unless we have to. We follow the line of least re- 
sistance. While this might be taken to indicate lazi- 
ness, it can, if properly interpreted, be seen to be an 
evidence of intensest activity. In matters of religious 
thought, paradoxical as it may sound, the line of least 
resistance is in reality the hardest of lines to follow. 
Necessity has ever been the mother of conviction, and 
we take gladly only such things as are forced upon us 
by our aesthetic or our political or our social needs. 
The truths of Christianity are in this manner forced 



the dish he likes without certainty that it is not poisoned; he 
rides the horse he likes without certainty that the animal will 
not break his neck; he sends out of the house a servant he 
suspects without demonstration of guilt; he marries the 
woman he likes with no absolute knowledge that she loves 
him ; he embraces the political opinion that he likes, perhaps 
without any study at all, certainly without demonstrative 
evidence of its truth. But when he comes to religion he is 
seized with a great intellectual scrupulosity, and demands as 
a pre-condition of homage to God what everywhere else he 
dispenses with, and then ends with thinking himself more 
rational than other people." (Compare "Religious Corre- 
spondence of W. E. Gladstone," vol. II., pp. 'j'j and 78.) Prof. 
Royce, on the other hand, expresses it in this way : "The world 
of doubt has passed before us, a huge mass of inexplicable 
facts. Here and there we find a connection ; we hope that 
we shall soon find more connection ; but still the vast plan, 
if indeed there be a plan, we search for in vain. But now 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 23 

Upon us — upon those of us who are in experience seek- 
ing their verification — by the insistent demands of hu- 
man personality. Below the mutterings of logic, and 
below the mouthings of philosophy, and far below the 
hesitations of worldly wisdom, thunders the diapason 
of human needs. We do not pause to question the 
vintage of a wine when it is needed to save a life. All 
we know and all that we want and need to know is 
the all-demonstrating fact that it does save life. And 
so it is with Christianity. We do not hesitate when 
one points out to us that it involves us in inconsisten- 
cies; we do not balk over the logical impossibility of 
the Timeless One revealing Himself in time; we do 
not question the Infinite's ability to stoop to finiteness 



strangely enough, all this doubt affects in no wise the willing 
trustfulness of our devotion to the interests, not only of com- 
mon life, but also of science. The doubt confuses us only 
when we talk of religion. That the world as a whole is dark, 
nobody admits more cheerfully than does the modern scientific 
man, when he looks to his science for all his religious consola- 
tion. For he seeks no consolation save what the phenomena as 
such furnish. But his philosophical doubt about the ultimate 
foundation of science is no check to his scientific ambition. 
He believes in science just as ardently as if he did not in the 
very first breath of each new philosophical dispute declare that 
the real world is unknowable." Again, "Why is it that the 
doubtfulness and the contradictions of the real world seem to 
everybody to throw a cloud upon religion, even when it is 
not supernatural religion, but to have no significance whatever 
for the bases of science?" Or again, "Shall the world be in- 
different to one set of our ideals and not to another?" 
(Compare 'The Religious Aspect of Philosophy," pp. 293-4.) 



24 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

and to limit Himself to the range of the Palestinian 
hills; we do not hesitate to accept these things when 
lives are to be made joyous and when souls are to be 
saved. All that we need and want to know is that 
faith in the Lord does save and does make joyous. 
What we cry for is a panacea which will make men 
consciously contented.^^ 

It behooves the Christian Apologist, therefore, to 
make it plain that Christianity does thus satisfy these 
deepest of human needs; that it is capable of giving 
men the one thing which above everything else they 
desire ; that it does bring to them that which more than 
health, or wealth, or power, or popularity creates an 
infinite peace. 

Perhaps at this point it will be objected that our as- 
sumption that the world's deepest demand is for peace, 
is one which cannot be maintained. Such a position 
is often assumed by those who deny that humanity 
really needs Christlike joy and contentment. They 
despise what seems to them the supineness of the calm 
of the joyful Christian. To those who thus criticize 
our point of view we can have but little to say. Their 
outlook upon life is so different from ours. It is per- 
fectly possible, of course, to claim that the kind of 
contentment which Christianity brings is not the kind 
that the world actually wants. Other kinds of peace 
have been offered by other teachers. Many have been 
the cults and creeds presented to an ever patient 



^** Compare James's "Varieties of Religious Experience," 
and Begbie's "Twice Born Men." 



THE ESSENCE OF FAITH 25 

world,^^ but between them and our faith the gulf is 
great. They represent values strange to the Chris- 
tian, and for want of understanding, and because the 
question is not one open to argument, he leaves it 
alone. As we see life, however, and as we understand 
humanity, we believe that the peace which is found in 
the Cross is the only one which can satisfy. That is 
all there is to be said. It is a question of one's estimate 
of humanity. 

And thus having outlined what is to be understood by 
by faith, how it is an attitude which begins blindly 
and then gradually finds its fulfillment and justifica- 
tion in experience, having done this let us turn to a 
consideration of great importance, the value of faith. 



"It is to be recognized that there are certain forms of phi- 
losophy which find a justification for life quite different from 
that on which the Christian relies. There is, in the first place, 
"a sort of natural Hedonism, not with any reflective conscious- 
ness of pleasure as its end, but bent upon activity just for the 
sake of the exuberance which activity brings. It belongs to 
the child life of the race, having in it the naivetd of childhood, 
and it cannot be perpetuated into the years of race maturity," 
This is the same as the philosophy of the Cyrenaics, teachers 
who taught that the value of sensations was in proportion 
to their power to yield pleasure. The measure of human life 
was therefore sensuous enjoyment "Let us eat and drink, 
for to-morrow we die," such is one justification of living. 
Now there is no argument against this form of philosophy 
and the Apologist is willing to let it live or die on its merits. 

Another justification of life is that which we might call 
^stheticism, "the quest of delicate perfumes, of subtle 
harmonies of tone and color, luxuries of fine indulgence. It 
may even take a properly ethical cast, urging a world ideal of 



VITAL APOLOGETICS 



In order to do this we shall take up in the next 
chapter the problem of how and why faith in Christ 
brings to men as nothing else can an everlasting peace. 
We shall ignore the fact that some do not desire the 
kind of peace which thus results, since Christians can- 
not take as final their attitude, and we shall proceed on 
the assumption that the world actually wants the con- 
tentment which comes with religious faith, and then 
endeavor to show that the Gospel of the Lord Jesus 
best provides this eternally and infinitely desir- 
able end. If we can show this we shall have revealed 
the value of faith. 



the life beautiful for the sake of its aesthetic appeal." This 
interpretation of the meaning of life we are again willing to 
leave to justify itself. We would merely affirm that we are 
confident that it is a psychological impossibility with such a 
system of values for men to develop the volitional side of 
their nature, and, in the long run, to accomplish anything of 
solid worth. We would point to history for the condemnation 
of ^stheticism. It must, however, be admitted that this is 
the most dangerous enemy which the Christian has to face, 
and that of all the phases of thought now prevalent, none 
make a more insinuating appeal to the world. 

And there is a third justification suggested for life to be 
found in Nietzsche's philosophy of self-assertion. He 
would have it that there is enough excuse for living to be 
found in measuring one's strength against the world. To this 
again there is no sufficient reply, save to say that we are 
content to abide by the judgment of humanity as to whether 
self-assertion is to be compared to self-denial as a factor 
in race progress. We cannot argue for the infinite value of 
self-sacrifice. 



CHAPTER III. 
THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF FAITH. 

THE practical value of faith, or, as we might say, 
its credential, lies in the fact, as we have stated 
in the previous chapter, that it can provide as nothing 
else can the gladness and contentment which men de- 
sire. Why is this so? What is there in the Gospel 
which particularly appeals to men? What has it to 
offer which is so precious and so incomparably sweet? 
What is there in men which makes acceptance of the 
Christian's Creed for them the most desirable of all 
attitudes ? 

This question can be answered in various ways, but 
for our present purposes we cannot do better than to 
point to the overwhelming fact of forgiveness. By 
forgiveness we mean more than the passive reception 
of a remission from debt or sin. We mean readjust- 
ment and continuing readjustment; the becoming the 
subject as well as the object of man's and God's love. 
Forgiveness ! That is the be all and the end all of the 
Gospel's practical value for men. That is what makes 
it the infinite panacea, and which gives it not only its 
uniqueness but its finality. It is forgiveness to the 
uttermost, "until seventy times seven," which differ- 
entiates the Gospel from all other religions, from all 
other proposed aids to life — for that is what the relig- 
ions of the world are from the practical point of view. 

The Lord Jesus taught no new morality. In many 



28 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

respects He but repeated the aphorisms of the sages of 
the East. Iti most ways He merely emphasized and 
certified to an old code. But He did one thing, and He 
illustrated one thing, which completed and made useful 
all earlier moral codes, when He told His followers to 
forgive their enemies. We are apt to overlook the im- 
portance of this addition to the world's ethical formu- 
lae. We are apt to say that that was all that Christ ad- 
ded to the teachings of Confucius, as if it were a small 
addition — while as a matter of fact the addition was of 
inestimable importance and made possible as well as 
absolutely valuable for the first time the teachings of 
the sages of the world. Without those words "your 
enemy," added to the ordinance to love, all moralizing 
had been in vain. With them they were completed 
and competent to lead men towards the Throne of 
God. They form, as it were, the keystone without 
which all of the moralizings of the world had been to 
no purpose. Now this forgiveness is the boon which 
the Gospel brings and the gift which makes it the sole 
satisfier of the wants of the world. Let us see how 
this is so, and how the world's want of it is expressed. 
We need not occupy space here with the statement 
that the sinner desires forgiveness and that the world 
is full of such weary souls.^ It is too well known that 



^ The author is inclined to agree with the position adopted 
in the anonymous volume recently published under the title 
"Absente Reo/' to the effect that consciousness of sin is not 
always a prerequisite for righteous endeavor and for an 
earnest Christian life. 



THE PRA CTICAL VALUE OE EAITH 29 

those who feel the burden of their transgressions to 
bear heavily upon them fly for relief to the Cross. 
What we wish to stress here is a wider fact — a fact not 
of individuals but of society; of society political and 
social, economic and ecclesiastical. 

After centuries of development and eras of evolu- 
tion humanity has at last reached the stage of cooper- 
ation. Strife and envy still abound, but the world has 
awakened thoroughly to a realization of their futility. 
This condition of the modern world is supremely im- 
portant. The value of the Gospel of forgiveness can 
be more fully appreciated than ever before, now that 
the old adage of individualism and cut-throat com- 
petition is passing away; now that men have reached 
the more rational and more humane attitude of desir- 
ing unity. Though the world still believes in individ- 
ual effort and opportunity and rights, and though it 
still believes in strenuous competition and in friction 
and in differences of opinion, it believes in them in a 
different way from that in which it used to, since it 
calls in unmistakable accents in these days for a com- 
petition which shall be fair, and for a difference of 
opinion which shall be kindly, and for a rivalry which 
shall be righteous. More than ever before we under- 
stand the necessity of there being difference in char- 
acter and occupation and inclination ; more than ever 
before we believe in individuality ; but, and here is the 
point, the modern man insists that individuality must 
be such as to allow for quietness and comfort. In 
other words, the modern problem par excellence and 
the loud cry of the world, is for something which shall 



30 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

make possible the maintenance of peace and prosperity 
together with competition and idiosyncrasy. How can 
this be done? The Gospel affirms, by forgiveness. 

But let us illustrate. Socialism is the most signifi- 
cant movement of the day among those who are not 
primarily interested in the progress of the Christian 
Faith. Millions of men and women are seeking a solu- 
tion to the social problem — the problem of inequality 
and maladjustment. To Karl Marx or to the more 
modern type of the evolutionist school they are turn- 
ing for suggestions. The Socialistic parties in Ger- 
many and France and England and Spain and Italy 
are forces of considerable importance; the less well- 
defined but like-intentioned masses in Russia and the 
Balkans and Persia and Turkey; and the still less 
formal but equally interested masses in the far East; 
all these people are voicing articulately for the first 
time in the world's history the human need for peace 
and joy. The foundations of society are at last per- 
ceived to be out of joint; poverty, suffering, crime, in- 
equality, brutality, selfishness, despair, greed, squalor 
— all of these abound, and the world realizes it at last 
and wants relief. How can it be obtained? The So- 
cialist says by the creation of the Social State gov- 
erned according to Socialistic laws. But as we read 
the proposals for the Socialistic State and examine its 
programme, we realize at once that with it something 
is radically wrong. What is it? 

It is that these theorists perceiving two unalterable 
facts err in their opinions as to how they are to be 
faced. These facts are: first, that no two men in all 



THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF FAITH 31 

this world are alike ; the second that there are but few 
occupations open to men. In the first place we have 
been made, each with our own interpretation of Hfe; 
and we each have our own estimate of its values. No 
two men place the same things upon the same level. 
Each has his own scale, and his own sense of propor- 
tion. Then in the second place this situation is made 
serious by the fact that with all our differences we are 
shut up, as it were, in a little room, and in this little 
room, which we call the world, there are but few ways 
of occupying ourselves — of passing the time. Vary as 
we may in oui predilections and inclinations, we have 
yet to set about the same kinds of tasks. Thousands 
have to do the same thing, and yet none are agreed as 
to how it should be done. Now, given this situation, 
what is to be expected? 

Is not this the psychology of Socialism: that men 
have at length come to realize this dilemma, and with 
the best of intentions are seeking to solve it; that 
they have at last realized that in the first place no two 
men are made alike, and in the second that millions 
of them must be occupied in doing the same thing in 
the same place? That is the contretemps which the 
Socialists are seeking to solve. But the trouble arises 
and a radical error is made when they endeavor to meet 
this problem with laws and resolutions — for laws can- 
not alter these two facts, and nothing which tries to 
overlook them or to minimize their seriousness will 
ever help the world. 

The Social problem then is : How can men of differ- 
ent ideas and hopes and fears and ambitions set about 



32 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

a similar task without there resulting a disastrous con- 
fusion? We affirm that this problem is alone solved 
by the Gospel of forgiveness; and that the fact that 
men are seeking the answer evidences to the fact 
that they are ignorantly seeking this only possible an- 
swer — that they are seeking the Gospel. 

When one seeks seriously for a solution to this 
fearful problem he discovers that forgiveness pre- 
sents the only possibility of relief. If the world 
would only learn how to practice it, and accept 
Him who exemplified it as their Leader, then would 
their struggles for existence be made endurable, 
and the social want of the world, as well as its 
economic want, be satisfied. This is the solution 
to these problems. For what does forgiveness mean 
but a readiness to cooperate despite differences, 
and a gladness forever to readjust, and continu- 
ally upon the basis of these readjustments to re- 
commence? If my neighbor offends me, or if his en- 
deavors cause us to collide, then the only possibility 
of peaceful cooperation between us lies in our pos- 
sessing the ability to forgive. Such a situation as is 
created by the combination of like occupations with 
unlike opinions can only be met by men with divine 
forgiveness in their hearts. 

Some people tell us that the trouble with all co- 
operative theories is that they will not work until hu- 
man nature be changed. Again others tell us that the 
Kingdom of God cannot come until human nature 
be seriously altered. But therein lies a deep fallacy, 
a fallacy brought about by an inability to understand 



THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF FAITH 33 

the meaning of humanity; for there is no necessity 
to change human nature. God would not have it done. 
Men were made to possess pecuharities, and they 
would not be men were they not different the one 
from the other, and did they not compete and vie with 
each other. These things must stand, and we must 
acquiesce in there being radical differences between 
this man and that. We have to accept the fact that 
this one can make money or music, and that that one 
is financially incompetent or tone deaf; there will al- 
ways be some who are robust and some who are sickly ; 
some rich and some poor; some popular and some 
hated. For these conditions we must prepare our- 
selves and not blunder into idle talk about the chang- 
ing of human nature. For such a reversal of God's 
method there is no need. Men are made to vie and 
dispute with each other in order that out of their dis- 
putes and differences they may emerge perfectly char- 
itable and kindly. 

And herein we see from our practical point of view 
the significance of the gospel message and the mean- 
ing of the Life of Christ. For from it we can see how 
that if we but follow in His steps, and forgive in every 
thought and act — forgive even those who differ most 
from us and with whom we come into most violent 
collision — that then the possibility of solving the 
world's problem is made clear. So our contention 
would be that there is in the extent of the Socialistic 
movement abundant evidence that the world wants 
Christianity, and that the economic and political move- 
ments of the day testify to this fact. If the upheavals 



34 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

in Europe mean anything, and if the growing unrest 
the world over is significant, it means and signifies that 
the people are dissatisfied, and that they are demand- 
ing a solution to the present impossible conditions ; and 
further the form of their demand, and the form of the 
theories which they are enunciating, reveals that un- 
wittingly they are clamoring for the solution which 
Christianity provides. The demand for liberty along 
with fulfilled individuality; the demand that all men 
be allowed to have a chance, along with the demand 
for the preservation of idiosyncratic human nature, 
is equivalent to the demand for the Gospel. 

But it is not only in Socialistic movements that we 
find symptoms of this kind — wherever we turn we find 
an unrest and a disturbance which point towards a 
need of the Gospel. In the world of economic science, 
or in that of ecclesiastical organization, everywhere 
men are demanding those things which can alone be 
obtained through an acceptance of the principles of 
Christ. Above all in the religious world we are hear- 
ing each day of new attempts to foster the process of 
unification. Church Unity Leagues, World's Mission- 
ary Congresses, what are they but signs of the Chris- 
tians' desire for unity? But how can such a combina- 
tion be obtained so long as men of all parties are de- 
claring that they cannot give up their essentials ? We 
answer that cooperation can at least be reached only 
through the practice of forgiveness; that men will 
ever hold to their divine right to differ in their philos- 
ophy of clothes and of forms, and that they will con- 
tinue to have different predilections, and that with 



THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF FAITH 35 

those ever-present sources of argument and friction 
no progress can be made until the real essence of the 
Gospel is appropriated. 

To turn in another direction and investigate the 
modern religious problem but brings us face to face 
with a similar result. More emphatically in the re- 
ligious world than in any other is the demand heard 
for faith in the Divine Master. It is not only a ques- 
tion of explicit appeals, but implicitly and unwittingly 
men are calling for the Saviour on all sides. As has 
been brought out by Fr. Figgis in his "Gospel and 
Human Needs," the times are preeminently religious,. 
and men are no longer asking whether they shall be 
religious or not, but rather to which religion shall they 
subscribe. So loud is the call for religion, and so in- 
adequately has the Church been responding to it, that 
new forms of faith are springing up on all sides of us,, 
and their promulgators find an astonishing demand 
for them as they hawk them through the streets. Cu- 
riously enough these modern Creeds seem most to» 
prosper in quarters of the world which men had come 
to believe to be essentially irreligious. At all events 
their spread shows how feverishly the people are de- 
manding spiritual sustenance. 

But are these demands implicit demands for the 
Gospel? That is the question which is of moment 
to us, and we can answer in the affirmative, since 
the form of the new religions is such as to sug- 
gest that what is ultimately desired is not this or 
that temporarily acceptable makeshift, but the eter- 
nally satisfying Gospel. As we watch the processes 



36 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

and products of these ethical culture societies, or heal- 
ing associations, or bands for aesthetic endeavor, we 
find again and again details which reveal their de- 
pendence upon the Christian idea. One will provide 
a hagiology, another will stress authority, another 
will lay emphasis upon toleration, and so one might 
proceed and enumerate the many ways in which new 
religions all reveal their endeavor to approximate to 
the Christian ideal. Thus in many directions we see 
the workings of the anima naturaliter Christiana. 
Though Christians be misunderstood, they can confi- 
dently and quietly watch these strange performances, 
since they perceive two things. In the first place that 
they are to be explained by the fact that Christianity 
having "put ideas" into the minds of men has failed 
to live up to her profession; and secondly they reflect 
the need for Christ Himself, and must invariably lead 
back to Him. 

As yet we have been dealing with faith in the Gos- 
pel as a supplier of human needs from the worldly or 
utilitarian point of view only. Were we to stop there, 
were we to present faith as a thing of material benefit 
only, then we should utterly betray the Cause. The 
danger of regarding Christianity as something which 
will supply our material wants has been most clearly 
expressed in a modern noveP wherein is portrayed the 
despair to which men are ultimately brought if they 
fail to grasp the fact that the real worth of Christian- 
ity is other-worldly. Our affections cannot be set on 



Selma Lagerlof's "The Miracles of Anti-Christ." 



THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF FAITH 37 

things below. We cannot allow ourselves to estimate 
the value of a thing by its capacity to provide us with 
material comfort. That is the basic error of Social- 
ism. The Socialist works upon the theory that a man's 
life consists in the abundance of things that he has, 
and Socialism is an endeavor to make a proper dis- 
tribution of things throughout the world. We must 
not fall into any such error here, and while we have 
for the purpose of presenting fully our subject de- 
veloped the utilitarian value of faith in Christ, it is 
more incumbent upon us to state and dilate upon its 
Heavenly and eternal value. 



CHAPTER IV. 
THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH. 

WE must now revert to the line of thought with 
which we began, since the moment we speak of 
final values and final things, we have left behind us the 
region of practical experience and demonstration and 
have entered into the realm of the absolute. As long as 
men remain within the territory of empiricism, just so 
long can they make use of the world's wisdom and its 
methods of argument. But these weapons must be 
abandoned the moment the idea of finality comes into 
view, since finality is but another term for infinity, and 
infinity is, as such, beyond experience. We find our- 
selves, therefore, once again compelled to speak in the 
language of the spirit, and this is so because in re- 
ligion and in discussions about religion, as it is with 
life and discussion thereof, the beginnings and the 
ends are wrapt in mystery. The whence and the 
whither of life are not subjects for scientific examina- 
tion. As we began by postulating blind faith we must 
end by postulating a value which we cannot see. The 
Christian life begins we know not how, and its end, 
its final value, is but a leap into the lands beyond the 
eyes of man — 

"When that which drew from out the boundless deep 
"Turns again home." 

Where the boundless deep is, how we first emerged 
from it, why we endeavor to win back to it again 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 39 

we cannot prove. We deal with these problems of 
whence and whither, and we speculate about them, in 
philosophical Apologetics under the so-called cosmo- 
logical and teleological forms of thought. Philosoph- 
ical Apologetics is primarily concerned with this mat- 
ter and with it we shall deal in the next division of 
this book. For the present we are to consider the end 
or value of faith from an homiletical rather than from 
a philosophical point of view, since we are to treat the 
problem as a final problem, and such admit only of 
homiletical treatment. 

When we ask what is the final value of faith, it is 
evident that we are by implication asking : What is its 
subject, and towards what is it directed? So long as 
we were content to discuss its utilitarian values we 
were asking merely how it advanced man, how he as 
a mortal being is benefited by it. Such a question 
deals with relative and demonstrable truths, with a 
visible process rather than with an invisible product, 
since we can show and the world will acquiesce in our 
statements that man is aided by religious faith.^ But 
when we ask for the absolute value of the life of Faith 
it is an end that we are seeking, the end. Having thus 
cleared the way we can now proceed with the problem. 

It will be evident to all who consider the question 
closely that any speculation upon the ultimate worth 
of faith compels us to discuss that in which the faith 



^ See a most suggestive article on the "Belief in God and 
Immortality as Factors in Race Progress," in the Hihhert 
Journal, October, 1910. 



40 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

is placed. As we have already stated, the value of be- 
lief in anything is contingent upon the value of that 
in which the belief is placed. This is a point often 
overlooked in philosophical discussions, and entirely 
overlooked by many promulgators of systems. While 
it would not be well at this point to elaborate the 
claims of the Christian's faith over other proposed 
objects which are set up to be worshipped, we must 
endeavor to point out wherein we believe that as an 
object in which to believe the Christian Trinity pos- 
sesses infinite and final value. In a word, the justifi- 
cation and the ultimate argument for Christianity are 
to be found in the fact of the Triune Personality of 
God. Let us look into this matter and with reverence 
investigate its significance. Let us see wherein faith 
is made worth while, where it becomes of absolute 
worth, if placed in the Triune God. 

In the first place, it is necessary for us to agree 
that a man must have faith in something. Plan- 
ning and purposing, in fact all human endeavor, would 
be utterly impossible did not one have a creed of some 
sort. There are creeds many because of the varieties 
of human nature and the many kinds of purposes. 
Some creeds are relatively commendable, while others 
are not to be commended at all. This man labors night 
and day because he believes in Power, and that it will 
slake his thirst — his strange and incomprehensible 
thirst. Others direct their lives upon the theory, con- 
sciously or unconsciously, that the hunger which 
gnaws at their vitals and which cannot be satisfied by 
bread alone, can be satisfied by pleasure of one variety 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 41 

or another. Now these are but illustrations of forms 
of faith in accordance with which men turn to the 
right hand or to the left. The most complete agnostic 
possesses a creed, which is nothing but the creed of un- 
certainty; since having taken as his basis the unde- 
monstrableness of certain things, in accordance with 
that theory he directs his goings, and faith is the di- 
recting of one's life by a theory. And then there is 
the faith of the Mohammedan, or of the Hindu, or of 
the Buddhist, and they are one and all but manifes- 
tations of the fact that man must have a final object 
before him in relation to which, as a final object, he 
can think and act. Now it is incumbent upon us to 
show two things. First, that this attitude of man is a 
result of and depends upon the fact of freedom; and, 
second, that freedom being granted, the object of our 
faith will be characterized by our estimate of person- 
ality. 

Take first, then, what we are so bold as to call the 
fact of freedom. If there be no such thing as free- 
dom of the will, if we are no more than "permanent 
possibilities of sensation," ^ if it be no more than a kind 
of automatic telephone central that directs the inter- 
changes between the afferent and efferent nerve activ- 
ities; if in a word there is no such thing as that which 
we call human personality; then this universal human 
attitude which we call ''having faith" is all a blunder, 
and confidence in any kind of a God, or working to- 
wards any kind of an end, is but wasted time. But if 
we be more than a mobile sensational process, if we be 



Cf. John Stuart Mill. 



42 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

permanent possibilities of perfection, if we can make 
and mould our lives, and if we be potentially im- 
measurable and divine, then is faith natural and neces- 
sary. 

But what right have we, after all, to dream that we 
are different from leaves blown before the autumn 
winds? We cannot prove that our wills are free, 
nor can we make claim from experience that we are 
in the true sense of the words originators and 
creators. In this dilemma, which is as old as the race, 
we do not find ourselves dismayed, since from the depth 
of our being we assert that we do not need to demon- 
strate this fact of facts, that it has proven itself through 
the ages. We insist that any endeavor to interpret 
experience, such as is seen in the efforts of most mod- 
ern philosophers, is in itself equivalent to an accept- 
ance of freedom. That I agree or disagree with my 
neighbor, or that you disagree with me in my present 
statement upon the significance of the labors of 
thought, is in itself nothing less than a statement that 
we reject mechanism and accept personality. 

We would, however, be most ready at this point 
to admit that demonstration is not to be consid- 
ered, perhaps not desired, and boldly we take as our 
battle cry the freedom of the will. But it is to be rec- 
ognized that it is a matter of mystery, inasmuch as 
it is a final thing, one which in its very essence cannot 
be encompassed by thought. This is the first postulate 
we have to make; the second is that given personality 
and the necessity of faith, the solution of the problem 
is to be found in faith in the Christian's God. 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 43 

It is all a question of how we are to approach the 
problem of life so as to account for the significance 
of human personality. From the point of view from 
which we are now looking, the eternal query is: 
What is life and why are we here, and what is the 
purpose of the powers with which we are endowed? 
To this question we would assert that there is no 
answer which can be given short of the Christian's 
answer. God is as necessary to men, if they be free, 
as the sunlight is to the flowers. The perfect person 
is for the imperfect indispensable. This is the ulti- 
mate human need. Why it is so is not the question; 
we cannot explain this necessity unless we explain 
personality.^ All that we know is that as marvelous 
combinations of emotions and volitions and reasonings 
we find it otherwise impossible to believe — ^we, that is, 
who are followers of the Christ — that we are the climax 
of creation; we cannot accept any explanation of the 
universe which would leave us looking into empty 
skies; which would leave us free creators in a world 
which had no governor who was equally or more free. 
For what would freedom be to us, and what would per- 
sonality be if behind the veil, behind the winds and 
the waves and the laughters and the sorrows of life 
there were nothing but an emotionless, motiveless and 
reasonless machine? Would we not at once be thrust 
into those depths of despair wherein the Greeks toiled ? 

These questioners throw us by suggestion into the 



'The problem of personality will be dealt with in the chap- 
ter upon that subject in the next division. 



44 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

arena of dispute as to the superiority of the Christian 
interpretation over that given by other reHgions. 
Without going deeply into the subject, we would mere- 
ly point out that in proportion to our appreciation of 
the meaning of personality, and in proportion to the de- 
gree to which we devolop the idea, and in proportion to 
the amount to which we endeavor to make use of our 
powers, is the response which we make to the ques- 
tion as to the nature of God. It would seem to be a 
psychological impossibility — again we speak as Chris- 
tians — for beings that beHeved in their freedom to rest 
content with a conception of God which fell short of 
the Christian Trinity. Not only would it seem im- 
possible, but the history of other faiths would 
seem to testify to this. The despair of the Greeks, 
the indifference of the Oriental, the aimlessness 
of the Brahman and the Buddhist, the fataHsm 
of the Mohammedan ; are not all these concordant wit- 
nesses to the effect produced upon the spirit of man by 
an insufficient idea of the divinity? Can we not attrib- 
ute the inertness of the children of the far East, wheth- 
er they be Confucians or Zoroastrians, to the fact that 
their idea of the being which they conceive to be above 
them is insufficient for human needs? If man is to plan 
and purpose, and if in his plans and purposings he is 
to develop to its highest capacity his freedom, then ac- 
cording to the testimony of racial experience — accord- 
ing to the superior development which we witness in 
Christian lands — according to the standard set by 
Christian personality, we affirm that he must think of 
the Being that is above him and upon whom he de- 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 45 

pends in the terms of the Christian Creed. Just as it 
would be impossible for us to beUeve ourselves to be 
free in the midst of a mechanical universe, so it would 
be insufficient for us in the presence of the facts of 
anthropology and ethnology to conceive of the Crea- 
tor and the Sustainer of the universe in terms less 
comprehensive than what we call for convenience the 
Trinity. 

Then the further question arises : What do we mean 
by human persons? What do we find in human per- 
sonality that makes demands so stupendous? We find 
(repeating what has already been said), that what- 
ever personality signifies, certainly its significance 
seems best to have been appreciated and appropriated 
by those who believe in the Lord Jesus. Just as men 
of all kinds and characters agree in their approbation 
of the character of Christ, and just as high and low, 
rich and poor, benefactors and malefactors are as one 
in their approval of saintly character, just so we hold 
does humanity testify to its convictions that the real 
Christian has most perfectly applied and developed 
the freedom with which he is endowed. Then, in re- 
gard to the essence of human personality, and what 
there is in it which would point specifically towards 
the Trinity as its proper response, we can say now, 
in anticipation of what will have to be said when we 
deal with the problem in another place, that man's 
peculiar combination of freedom, emotions, and intel- 
lect would seem to point to what the doctrine of the 
Trinity teaches. 

There is, indeed, a certain type of critic as to whose 



46 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

objections a word must be said in passing. Such objec- 
tors are those who curiously assert that this whole 
problem of the opposition between personality and 
mechanism is for them meaningless. Meaningless, in- 
asmuch as they perceive no irreconcilable conflict; 
meaningless, because they see no reason why they 
should not be contented with a reign of law, even 
though it signify the obliteration of their freedom. 
They proclaim that it is all a question of common 
sense; that it is all a matter of accepting gladly the 
conditions which the Universal Power imposes. This 
position when analyzed, in brief, amounts to this: 
that A claims that freedom of the will is for him su- 
perfluous, and that he is above the discouragements 
which others find in the statement that men are as 
Hmited in their words and deeds as are flowers in their 
growth and fragrance; that in both cases all is sub- 
ject to the driving of an unknown, unappreciated force. 
Now what is to be replied to this very common af- 
firmation? Frankly, nothing is to be said; at least, 
so long as one remains within the regions of discur- 
sive thought, no adequate reply can be made to this 
statement. However, a very decided response is 
made by the convinced Christian, who, dismissing 
the impossibility of combating this position from the 
logical point of view, assumes the attitude of the 
spiritual warrior and declares that what is at stake is 
no less than the meaning and value of personality. 
It is only from this point of view that anything can be 
answered to those who declare their readiness to re- 
nounce their God-given freedom and become crea- 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 47 

tures of a blind, irresistible force. Against this con- 
tention the Christian asserts that he who is willing to 
renounce his freedom is either ignorant of his capaci- 
ties, or else has never through usage learned their ir- 
resistible worth. 

He who has hearkened to the voice of conscience 
within him, and who has experienced the glory of 
righteous endeavor, knows what freedom means and 
appreciates its splendor — knows and appreciates these 
things too much to surrender his belief in such trans- 
cendent possessions. 

From such a point of view it is that we state that 
peace and contentment belong only to those who have 
"put on" Christ. From this position we say that the 
peace of God comes only to those who believe in Him 
as the end of all their purposes and deeds. Such a 
peace we mean as came to Augustine or Luther or 
Loyola; such as comes in these days to thousands of 
men and women; such a peace as alone makes life 
worth while — this it is which certifies to the final value 
of what we mean by a human personality. 

But, it is asked once more, are such beings as Luther 
and Loyola normal human beings, or are they mere- 
ly specimens for the psychological laboratory? That 
is a question which depends upon one's point of view 
rather than upon one's logic. The Christian is 
not afraid to take his stand upon the ground 
that his Master represents normality, and in lesser 
degree he is not afraid to hold up as the best speci- 
mens of humanity those who have endeavored to fol- 
low in His steps. Such are not intellectuals; they are 



48 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

not aesthetes; nor are they Aurelian moralists. Many 
flaws in their characters can without doubt be found, 
and they are far from perfect; but they are whole- 
some, and represent the type to which all may con- 
form. They are intelligent without being too prone 
to depend upon reasoning power; they are emo- 
tional but they do not require too much sense stimu- 
lus; they are wilful without being headstrong; they 
keep these three elements of their personality in such 
proportion that as all round men they can develop. 
They find in the Christian God the prototype of which 
they are but faint and feeble suggestions. In Him 
they find the assurance that they have not been given 
their gifts to no purpose, and that there is a reason 
and a comfortable justification for their existence. 
God, being a God in Whom love and will and reason 
are separate and yet inseparable, three in one and one 
in three, provides for these normal human beings the 
solution to the problem of their personality. With His 
existence made sure, all of the mysteries and the un- 
quenchable questionings of life are at least by sugges- 
tion cleared up. The joys and griefs and the aspira- 
tions and the hopes and the intimations and the ideas 
which crowd these little lives of ours become tolerable 
and helpful only upon this hypothesis. 

That, therefore, is what men must have ; that is their 
final need: a Being, belief in Whom will assure them 
that their experiences are not all in vain and that their 
failures and successes are not all empty and meaning- 
less. That is what they must have if life is to be worth 
while, and that is what they do receive when they 



THE FINAL VALUE OF FAITH 49 

place their faith in the Father of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ. This is the statement which in the last resort 
we render as Christians as the absolute argument for 
faith. In the words of St. Paul it is thoroughly ex- 
pressed. He speaks of the "adoption" which we have 
received; the adoption which through the revelation 
of the Spirit has been made certain to us; the adop- 
tion of which the Psalmist was dreaming when he 
cried, "My heart hath talked of Thee," and he says: 
"But we have received the spirit of adoption, whereby 
we cry, Abba, Father ! " And this same Spirit helps 
us when we are in need and when we are hard set to 
justify our belief. For it "bears witness with our 
spirit that we are the children of God" ; aye, and more 
than this is revealed to us, "for if we are children, then 
are we heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ." 
That is the assurance which we have, and that is the 
final argument for faith — the fact that we know that 
our personality means more than likeness and more 
than kinship, since we are heirs. 

Summary. 

Thus we conclude this introduction to Apologetics. 
It has been written, as has been frequently stated, in 
order to prepare the proper atmosphere; in order that 
the student of this subject might begin in the proper 
mood, and with a proper estimate of the value of its 
various aspects. 

For, however we may reason, and however we may 
plan, in the beginning our belief comes from the un- 

5 



50 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

known; and we are awakened to the consciousness of 
God not by any of this world's alarms or arguments. 

To many this would suggest the doctrine of con- 
version so feverishly preached in the last century, and 
still over-emphasized in many places to-day. If this 
be the doctrine of conversion, then by it we must abide. 
One thing, however, should be said, and that is that 
we cannot hold to a conversion that is necessarily 
sudden. Men may be blinded by the light as they 
travel along roads to Damascus, and in many instances, 
specially in such as are described in Harold Begbie's 
"Twice Born Men," a new life is begun in the twin- 
kling of an eye; but we should be most strenuous in 
rejecting any theory which declared that all conver- 
sions are consciously sudden. Without doubt the 
change as occurring in time must be a momentary af- 
fair, and thus far it is sudden. But we affirm that in 
the long run the best illustrations and the vast major- 
ity are those which have seemed to come gradually — 
that is, those in which by a long and painful process 
men have by degrees appropriated and made actual 
what in the beginning was unrealized and unappro- 
priated. This accords with our position in regard to 
the nature of faith. Its beginning is blind and per- 
haps unrealized — its completion and verification is the 
product of experience. 

So let us now commence the study of Apologetics 
proper with a full understanding of its place and pro- 
priety. Let us take up logic and philosophy and his- 
tory as we take up life — in order that in them we may 
find that which will enlarge the boundaries of our 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 51 

vision, and deepen the certainty of our convictions, 
and assist us to reach that goal towards which we have 
without their aid begun to journey. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR VITAL APOLOGETICS. 

The following books are recommended for collateral read- 
ing in Vital Apologetics : 

Westcott, B. R— "The Revelation of the Risen Lord." 
Skrine, J. H.— "What is Faith?" 
Skrine, J. H. — "Creed and the Creeds." 
Figgis, J. N. — "The Gospel and Human Needs." 
Pascal. — "Thoughts." 
Newman, J. H. — "Grammar of Assent." 
Newman, J. H. — "Apologia Pro Vita Sua." 
von Hiigel, F. — "The Mystical Element in Religion." 
Bremond, H. — "The Secret of Newman." 
Begbie, H. — "Souls in Action." 
Begbie, H.— "Twice Born Men." 
James, W. — "Varieties of Religious Experience." 
Inge, W. R. — "Christian Mysticism." 
Nash, H. S.— "The Atoning Life." 
Peile, J. H.— "The Reproach of the Gospel." 
Hermann, W.— "Faith and Morals." 

Hermann, W. — "The Communion of the Christian with 
God." 
"Theologia Germanica." 
^ Kempis — "The Imitation of Christ." 
St. Augustine — "Confessions." 
Henry de Suso. — "Autobiography." 
Sabatier, P. — "Life of Francis of Assisi." 
Fenelon — "Maxims of the Saints." 
Jones, R. M.— "Studies in Mystical Religion." 
Underbill, E. — "Mysticism." 
Allen, A. V. G.— "Life of Phillips Brooks." 
Mason, A. J. — "Life of Bishop Wilkinson." 



52 VITAL APOLOGETICS 

Dawson, E. C. — "Life of Bishop Hannington." 

Page, J.— "Life of Bishop Patteson." 

Sinker, R. — "Memorials of Ian Keith Falconer." 

Myers, J. B.— "Life of William Gary." 

Martyn, H. — "Journals and Letters." 

Blaikie, W. G. — "Life of David Livingstone." 

Blunt, W. — "Life of General Gordon." 

Tyrrell, G. — "Lex Orandi." 

Tyrrell, G. — "Lex Credendi." 

Robinson, F. — "Letters to His Friends." 

Eucken, R.— "Life of the Spirit." 

Coe, G. A.— "The Spiritual Life." 

Hyde, W. de W.— "Self Measurement." 

Hyde, W. de W. — "Sin and Its Forgiveness." 

King, H. C. — "Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life." 

Petre, M. D.— "The Soul's Orbit, or Man's Journey to God." 

Wimmer, R.— "My Struggle for Life." 



PART 11. 

PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS. 

Introduction. 

Chapter I. The Fundamental Problem: The An- 
titheses: Naturalism and Idealism. 

Chapter IL The Insufficiency of Naturalism. 

Chapter III. Phases of Naturalism. 

Chapter IV. The Sufficiency of Idealism. 

Chapter V. The Interpretation of Idealism. 



"For now we see through a glass y darkly; but then 
face to face.'' — I Cor. xiii: 12. 



PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS. 
INTRODUCTION. 

WE must now undertake to justify in the world 
of thought the assertions which have been made 
in the first part. While for the convinced Christian 
the foregoing statements are and must be satisfactory, 
he should nevertheless desire to bring his faith into line 
with the world's reason and to present it as a reason- 
able thing. In order to avoid the necessity of expla- 
nation or recapitulation later on, it will be best for us 
to characterize our method of thought at once. Those 
who are familiar with philosophical movements will 
have recognized in all that has been said a readiness 
to follow the method of Pragmatism, and as we have 
begun in the region of the spirit with Pragmatism, so 
shall we continue in the region of philosophy to be 
pragmatical. Now Pragmatism denotes that very 
ancient kind of reasoning which subjects every- 
thing to experience, and to experiencing for proof. 
Taken in its unqualified sense, Pragmatism means 
that truth and utility are identical; and that 
the life of a man is a ceaseless effort after 
the attainments of certain practical results; and 
that what we call "truths" are simply the values 
which emerge in this pursuit. An axiom is a postulate 
— a proposition, which we find to demand acceptance 
if we would be successful in our efforts. For example, 
"a straight line is the shortest distance between two 



56 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

points." This is an axiom which we find in experi- 
ence to be convenient for us to accept, and so we ac- 
cept it, not because it contains any absolute truth — 
there is no absolute truth the follower of Professor 
James would aver — but because it is practical to do so. 
The old English proverb which says, "The proof of 
the pudding is in the eating," is a crude but effectual 
way of stating the principle of Pragmatism. That 
which is good and valuable and worth while and real, 
is merely that which in the passing of the ages pro- 
duces all that is expected or required of it. 

Now it is the Christian Apologist's claim that there 
are degrees of Pragmatism, and that there is what we 
may call Christian Pragmatism, and in these days it is 
well for us to admit our dependence upon and in- 
debtedness to this form of thought. It is hard to 
see how in the twentieth century we can escape the 
demand for authentication through experience. We 
demand it in every phase of life, and as we have shown 
in the first section we demand it with infinite per- 
sistence in religion. We walk about in worlds not 
understood with but one fixed idea in our minds, 
which is that our needs must be satisfied. The pos- 
iting of Christianity as that which satisfies human 
needs, and as that which supplies the necessary com- 
plement to the powers of personality, is in itself pre- 
eminently a pragmatic position!^ If we differentiate 
between Christian Pragmatism and the Pragmatism 



^ On this subject the reader is referred at length to the 
writings of Ritschl. 



INTRODUCTION 57 



of the schools we need not fear to place ourselves un- 
der the auspices of this form of philosophy. 

But let us indicate at the outset what we consider 
to be the difference between these two kinds of 
thought. The one, technical Pragmatism, commences 
with nothing and conceives the pursuit of truth as a 
ceaseless searching for practical results. To begin 
with, it asserts, we have nothing given; no God, no 
infinite value, no final fact, no absolute truth or beauty 
or goodness. We begin in a world with nothing, and 
that with which we end is all we can ever have. If 
we end, as a result of our life experience, with certain 
ideas of truth and beauty and goodness, then those 
ideas have no value apart from the use which they 
have been to us in our pursuance of the daily round. 
They were not in the beginning. They merely 
emerged as utilities for the furtherance of human 
life. In a word, nothing is absolute, and everything is 
relative, and worth only its practical efficiency. This 
is what is called Pragmatism proper. 

On the other hand, Christian Pragmatism would be- 
gin with God and absolute truth as infinite values, and 
then having wiped the slate clean, as it were, proceed 
through a diagnosis of fife and of experience to work 
its way back to these ultimates. This will be our meth- 
od. We shall in large measure rely upon the compul- 
sion of human needs, but it must be distinctly under- 
stood that we repudiate the position that we have to 
start from nothing, and that we have no Absolute with 
which to begin. Protagoras, the contemporary of 
Plato, first enunciated the theory that "man was the 



58 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

measure of all things," and though many would in a 
mood of skeptical opportunism accept this as truth, we, 
on our part, hold (quite independent of the Christian 
revelation which would in itself compel us to hold it) 
that there is something permanent in this world of 
change; that flux is not of the essence of all things; 
but that on the contrary it would be impossible for 
us to reason at all did we not have something perma- 
nent with which to begin, some rock on which to stand. 
As Dr. Inge has said, "Human needs may, as the prag- 
matist tells us, be the dynamic of all speculation; but 
one of the greatest of human needs is to be something 
more than a pragmatist."^ 

This greatest of human needs to which Dr. Inge 
appeals is the knowledge and the conviction that inde- 
pendent of these experiences of ours, and beyond the 
world of change and decay there abides an Eternal. 
This is the human need. More insistent it is than the 
need for daily bread, since it is a prerequisite to the 
life of thought. Unless we have the assurance that 
an Eternal exists independent of our little provings 
we could not so much as begin to plan and purpose. 
The present is not an opportune moment to discuss 
this point and therefore we must content ourselves 
with asserting that the greatest of human needs is 
the presupposition that certain absolute values exist. 
Christian Pragmatism would commence then with pos- 
iting, as a fundamental, that the existence of God — 



^ W. R. Inge : Lecture on the Philosophy of Eucken, re- 
ported in the Guardian for October 7, 1910. 



INTRODUCTION 59 

or whatever term we may choose to employ — and 
the Eternity of an Absolute Power are absolute facts ; 
it would do so asserting that these facts are testified 
to by universal experience, and by the law of utility, 
and by the measure of man's necessity. 

What the nature of that Power is, and how we are 
to characterize it, it is the business of Philosophical 
Apologetics to develop. 

Browning's definition of knowledge would seem to 

cover this position. 

"To know 
"Rather consists in opening out a way 
"Whence the imprisoned splendor may escape, 
"Than in effecting entry for a light 
"Supposed to be without. Watch narrowly 
"The demonstration of a truth, its birth, 
"And you trace back the effluence to its spring 
"And source within us." 

Such a position as this is good psychology, since as 
we showed in the first place we must begin with blind 
faith in an end ; and blind faith in an end postulates a 
beginning independent of experience. Philosophical 
Apologetics is simply the endeavor to find in thought 
experience, in life-long reasoning, the real worth and 
value of the presupposition with which we are bound 
to begin. If there were no beginning before us, then 
it would be an impossibility for us to imagine the pos- 
sibility of an end. And so, having begun with the as- 
sumption that God exists, let us for the present erase 
it from our minds, and subject our faith to reasoning, 
and seek for the justification and authentication of 
the belief with which we recklessly begin. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM. 
The Antitheses : Naturalism and Idealism. 

TO avoid the necessity of having to refer back 
for elucidation, it is well to begin at the begin- 
ning and build from the bottom up by stating just 
what philosophy is. It is the attempt of man to ex- 
plain what he believes to be the significance of life. 
It is his endeavor to put into words the meaning of 
that "cosmic adventure" which we call a human life. 
Philosophical systems are the explanations which dif- 
ferent individuals have from time to time given of 
this problem of existence. Philosophy is not, how- 
ever, confined to heavy, unreadable volumes, as some 
of the best and most availing that has ever been writ- 
ten is unsystematic and in the form of poetry or es- 
says, or even novels. The enigma of human life is so 
all-overshadowing, that every serious word which men 
utter is in a sense philosophical. 

But what is this problem and this enigma over which 
so many great minds have labored so carefully, and 
into which men delve whenever they think or speak 
in earnest? It is the problem presented to them by 
the contrast which the world presents; the contrast 
between life and death, between ambitions and reali- 
zations, between causes and effects, between joys and 
sorrows, between thunder and sunshine, between per- 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 61 

manence and transitoriness. As we press onward 
from day to day our path is ever and again crossed 
by shadows which disturb us and at times so darken 
the way as to make us pause and endeavor to take a 
reckoning. 

Now this taking of a reckoning is the phil- 
osophical activity. As it has been put/ all our pre- 
possessions and inclinations are being continually set 
at naught by a ''sunset touch," or by "some one's 
death," or by a ''chorus-ending from Euripides," or by 
"a fancy from a flower-bell." These and such like, 
small though may be their superficial import, make us 
pause and ask : What does this mean ? Why was that 
man taken and another left? What is there in the 
splendor of that sunset which disturbs me? What 
fancy is it that persuades me that something imperish- 
able lies within the beauty of the flower-bell? From 
whence is it that there comes echoing back to me vis- 
ions and unsounded depths of sadness from those lines 
in Euripides? What is the meaning of those intima- 
tions which we receive from the changes and change- 
fulness of life? We find that everything which should 
be in our eyes important is in reality unimportant, and 
we find that that which, according to the world's 
system of evaluation is precious, is in reality worth- 
less; that no gold or silver or laughter or luxury 
avails after a sun is set, or once the dreaded change 
has come. Why is this? 

Such as these were the questions which set men to 



^ Browning's "Bishop Blougram's Apology." 



62 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

theorizing and which gave the impulse to the Greeks 
who long ago inaugurated Western philosophy- and 
these are the problems which still incite men to con- 
structive thinking, and out of which emerges what 
we call philosophy. Now it behooves us, if we would 
understand what confronts the Apologist, to see how 
these questionings have from time to time been an- 
swered, since by doing this we can best get to the 
heart of the matter in which we are interested. 

Broadly speaking, these questions have evoked one 
of two kinds of a reply. We can reduce all systems 
of thought, however varied and however diverse their 
superstructures, to one of two general divisions. The- 
ories of the universe, and explanations of the meaning 
of change and transitoriness, must be either idealistic 
or naturalistic. These are the antitheses of thought, 
the Ebal and Gerizim of the philosophical world. 
Proverbially, but improperly, these opposite tenden- 
cies are called Aristotelian and Platonic, and men say 
that one must be a follower of one or the other of 
these masters of thought. What is meant is merely 
that one must be either analytical or synthetic, natu- 
ralistic or idealistic. It would be a wearisome tale to 
tell of the development of these lines of thought, but 
it is necessary, in order to get a basis from which to 
begin, that we understand what they signify. 



''For the influence of Grecian philosophy upon Western 
thought, see Caird's "Evolution of Theology in the Greek 
Philosophers," Allen's "Continuity of Christian Thought," 
Hatch, Bampton Lectures. 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 63 

The problem then before us is to see, how as men 
have labored with the problems which confronted 
them, and how as they have endeavored to explain 
what 'humanity' means, and what its place is; to see 
how, as they have reduced the conclusions to which 
they come to formulae, they have arrived at one of two 
conclusions, which are : either that behind the chang- 
ing phenomena of life there is a reality, or else that 
there is not. 

What we need as a basis, in order to appreciate the 
problems which confront the Apologist, is to know 
that thinkers declare, either that below and about us 
are Everlasting Arms, or that there is nothing to sup- 
port us except the muscles which we ourselves can 
develop. These are the two schools of thought to 
which men give allegiance. 

Take it in another way: one party assumes (and 
the fact that on both sides it is no more and no less 
than an assumption that is made, is a fact of tremen- 
dous importance), one party assumes that despite the 
transitoriness of everything which the senses can dis- 
cover, and despite the impossibility of finding any- 
thing which is imperishable and abiding, there is, 
nevertheless, an eternal and imperishable reality — an 
Absolute which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, 
nor hath been revealed unto the heart of man," — 
an Absolute to which they can resort for comfort. 
Then on the other hand others assume that there is 
no reality behind this world of fitful appearances. 
They assert that beyond the flickering lights which 
flame and die out, and behind the noise and hubbub 



64 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

of life,, there is nothing. In a word, apart from sense 
experience all is emptiness; and despite the hungry 
imaginings, and the suggestions which come to us 
from earth and sea and sky, and the thoughts which 
well up in our minds as we study; that despite these 
ideas which we have in such abundance, there is yet 
nothing to warrant them and they are vain. 

Now these two attitudes represent the poles of 
thought — the antitheses to which men turn as they 
study the world-problem according as their disposi- 
tions drive them ; and these two poles we call broadly 
Idealism and Naturalism. Let us for convenience re- 
duce them to definition by saying that Idealism is that 
form of thought which assumes that before and be- 
neath phenomena there is a reality and an Absolute 
upon which all experience depends for its value; and 
that Naturalism is that form of thought which as- 
sumes that there is no reality beyond experience, and 
that its sole value lies in its momentary capacity to 
satisfy. 

From what has been said before there should be no 
difficulty in perceiving the meaning of these two ele- 
mental forms of constructive thought,^ and we are 



' By constructive thought is to be understood that form of 
thinking which is occupied in the building of an hypothesis or 
theory. When one considers a proposition and examines into 
its merits, he is analyzing, and the results of his thought pro- 
duce no new conclusion. But when one takes the data of ex- 
perience, and from them builds by synthesis a theory, he is 
building constructively. 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 65 

therefore prepared further to enlarge upon their sig- 
nificance. Let us do so by an illustration. The world 
must be supplied with theories, just as it must be sup- 
plied with food. Without them men's minds would 
starve just as would their bodies if they were given 
nothing to eat. For this purpose pioneers must go 
abroad, and must sail out into the seas of speculative 
thought and bring back with them, as the result of 
their commerce, bread for the brains of mankind. The 
progress and the prosperity and the serenity of the 
race depend upon the prowess of these navigators into 
the unknown. We have so little here below to fortify 
and comfort us, and so few possibilities of happiness 
are open to us — apart from those which come with 
the use of the imagination — we are so dependent upon 
the ideas and the dreams and the hopes and the hints 
which are brought to us from beyond the range of 
sense perception, that did not discoverers bring home 
to us from time to time tales of things beyond the far 
horizon, we would be stunted and starved by the bleak 
monotony of life. But the fact is that we do have 
tales brought to us, and we do have our lives made 
bright by reports which pioneers bring to us about a 
land where there is no change and decay, and where 
the things which we love endure. Now it is — and 
this is good psychology — from these pictures of a 
permanent life, and from these "intimations of immor- 
tality" that we acquire the strength and the confidence 
which enable us to press forward. The only thing 
which saves us from the boredom and the flatness of 
the sense life is this intelligence of a something which 
6 



66 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

can give value and worth-while-ness to our otherwise 
worthless three-score years — of sensations. 

Now the two schools of thought about which we 
are thinking reveal their deepest and their most signifi- 
cant antagonism when they are asked, what is the 
value of these hopes and expectations which we gath- 
er from them who traffic in the unknown seas? When 
pressed — and it is necessary for us to realize that it is 
only when pressed that men render their actual and 
final convictions; half of the trouble in philosophy, 
and most of the difficulty in the region of religious 
thought, comes from not pressing the point — when 
pressed and forced to give an estimate of the value of 
these things, which few dare deny to be the things 
which make our lives worth while, we receive from 
the Naturalist an answer something like this: ''AH 
these so-called bits of intelligence which purport to 
have been brought to us from an extra-empirical world 
are in the last resort valueless. They may indeed be 
harmless if not taken too seriously, but in the end, in- 
asmuch as there can be nothing outside of sense expe- 
rience, the less we allow ourselves to depend on them, 
or to be led by them, the better." On the other hand, 
the Idealist says: "Since we assume that there is a 
reality beyond the reach of our eyes and ears, then 
the more intimations that can be brought to us of this 
kind the better. The fuller the intelligence which is 
brought to us by the pioneers, the more carefully must 
we examine it, and if we will but study carefully all 
that is presented to us, then just so much the larger be- 
come our lives, and so much the better our chance of 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 67 

acquiring some ownership and of taking some part in 
the things which are real.* In other words, the Nat- 
uralist, when true to his colors, should absolutely deny 
the value of all flights of the imaginative or specula- 
tive faculty, and discourage by implication all efforts 
to penetrate beyond the realm of sense; while the 
Idealist enthusiastically encourages such attempts.^ 

Here then we have the basic difference between 
these two forms of thought. The Naturalist says, ''Be 
content to remain within your coaling radius; do not 
seek to sail into unknown seas;" while the Idealist 
says, ''Do not confine yourself to the short voyages 
for which your coal bunkers provide, but set your sails, 
and shake yourself free from servitude to machinery, 
and trusting to the winds of heaven, push off into the 
uncharted oceans; push off, and do not dream of 
turning back until you can bring with you food for 
the minds and souls of the hungry millions." These 
are, willy nilly, the antipodes of thought to which a 
man must turn, and these are the principles on which 
all the world's philosophical theories are built. 

It must be evident by now that to be religious, or 
rather to accept a religious interpretation of the world. 



* On the value of the imaginative faculties, see C. C. Ever- 
ett's "Poetry, Comedy and Duty." 

'An interesting illustration of the difference between these 
two attitudes is seen in the contrast between the mockery and 
the earnest interest exhibited by the Naturalist on the one 
hand and the Idealist on the other in problems of psychical 
research. 



68 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

such as the Christian interpretation, one must be an 
Idealist. While equally, it should be plain that if the 
whole truth is in the Naturalist's position, then there is 
no place in this world for any kind of a religious creed. 
We have then come to a turning point. Naturalism as 
such precludes all possibility of Christianity. Some 
form of Idealism is its necessary presupposition. It is 
needful, therefore, to follow the logical sequence, and 
before advancing further to examine this position of 
the Naturalist in order to find out what its worth is, 
since so long as it remains across our path as an ab- 
solute negation of the value of any fact which is not 
testified to by the senses, all of our investigations into 
the nature of religion will be futile. 

Naturalism. 

Naturalism is almost as old as philosophy. Whilst 
many of the earliest of the Greek thinkers were naive 
Idealists, it was not long before, under the lead of 
Democritus, another contemporary of Plato, there 
arose a school which adopted as its standard the state- 
ment that matter was everything and mind nothing. In 
its earlier stages, before an understanding of the rela- 
tion between experience and the five senses had become 
clear. Naturalism was merely a crude statement to the 
eflfect that matter was everything. Hence in its earlier 
forms, and in fact up until recent times, as we shall 
show later on, we call Naturalism "Materialism." It 
-consisted of a blank denial of the existence of anything 
"beyond sensation or which was deducible from sen- 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 69 

sation. It is further convenient to note that in its 
early forms MateriaHsm did not find favor. 

Conditions in the early days were such that free- 
dom of thought was dangerous. Just as in the Middle 
Ages men would hardly have dared to defy the doc- 
trines of the Church, so in classical antiquity the 
temper and the customs and the rights of the people 
were such as to keep all but small groups from pro- 
nounced unbelief.^ 

So long as a people have not advanced beyond the 
emotional ^ stage, development in the region of specu- 
lative thought would be difficult, and belief in the spirit 
world would be normal. Such was the condition 
which prevailed in that part of the world which we 
call Western until the sixteenth century. The theo- 
rizings of the Greeks, of the Sophists and Skeptics, 
and of the Epicureans and Stoics, as well as of their 
later disciples, and of the so-called Nominalists of the 
Middle Ages; the theorizings of all these fathers of 
Naturalism were not popular and obtained no wide 
acceptance. The Renaissance and the Reformation 
first broke the ground and cleared the way for the 
pronounced Materialism of the eighteenth century. 



* For the study of the struggle of peoples to free them- 
selves from the tyranny of custom and ecclesiasticism in 
the world of thought, compare Robertson, "History of 
Freethought ;" Lecky, "History of European Thought;" Benn, 
"History of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century," etc. 

' It must be clearly understood that in this and in all other 
instances the word "emotion" or "emotional" is used in the 
old-fashioned sense. 



70 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

By that time ecclesiastical authority had so waned, and 
education and enlightenment had so enlarged, that 
it was no longer possible to hinder the progress of 
free thought, and we find, therefore, in France and in 
Germany and in England, systems of Naturalism com- 
ing into serious vogue.^ 

The French Revolution, though primarily political 
and social, came as the culmination of this movement, 
and we find there the influence of such men as d' Alem- 
bert, Diderot, Holbach and Voltaire culminating in 
the wild and frenzied worship of the Goddess of Rea- 
son. This was the commencement of the temporary 
triumph of Materialism. Men gloried in their animal 
nature and scorned all suggestions of divine sonship. 
Now the importance of this movement consists in the 
fact that for the first time men openly defied authority 
and convention, and laboriously set at naught the 
tenets of Idealism. It is unwise ever to ascribe causes 
to historical events, but we can at least call attention 
to the fact that this open apostasy in France went 
without public rebuke or punishment, and we can sug- 
gest that inasmuch as it was allowed thus to go un- 
rebuked, it brought to pass the result that the flood- 
gates of materialistic thought were once and for all 
opened wide, ^ so that it became possible for the first 



^For a useful summary of these developments compare 
Farrar's lectures on the "History of Interpretation," and 
Nash's "History of Higher Criticism." 

® This is a general statement which holds good, despite the 
several prosecutions which occurred in England in the early 
nineteenth century. 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 71 

time to publish without fear of hindrance any and all 
kinds of materialistic literature. 

We have thus far glanced at the history of the ori- 
gin and rise of modern Naturalism, since an under- 
standing thereof throws light on the present situation. 
The problem which confronts us to-day must be con- 
sidered in relation to its rise, if we are to deal wisely 
and fairly with it. To put it concisely, the situation 
of the moment is the natural result of two factors : The 
first, the sudden freedom which was given to men in 
matters speculative; the second, the stupendous ad- 
vance which, as a result of the new-found freedom, 
was made in the world of research. The wall of pub- 
lic opinion and ecclesiastical prejudice having been 
broken down almost in a night, men rushed into the 
breach tumultuously, and as they are always apt to do 
when they gain a sudden victory, they went too far. A 
tidal wave of Materialism developed which may be said 
to have reached its culmination in the seventies of the 
last century. Criticism became skepticism and skepti- 
cism turned to negation. This movement became so 
general that, as a learned man (Bishop Creighton) 
tells us, it took real courage for a cultivated man to 
admit that he believed in anything beyond the range 
of sense experience. 

The nineteenth century became thus preeminently a 
century of revolt against Idealism; of the apotheosis 
of the senses ; of empiricism. Beginning in the thirties 
and forties, the movement, inspired by the economic, 
political and scientific advances (to which we owe so 
much) began to grow. Its significance, and the con- 



72 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

elusions to which it would lead^ were not at first ap- 
preciated. If ever there was an awakening, a period 
of orientation; if ever men searched out their hearts, 
and if ever sincerity came into full bloom it came with 
this movement. If, therefore, we call the nineteenth 
century preeminently a century of Materialism, we 
must call it also, preeminently the century of sincer- 
ity. Men no longer allowed their religion to be hol- 
low and perfunctory. They tested every thought and 
every doctrine and every hypothesis and every tradi- 
tion. Tennyson's saying, that honest doubt was bet- 
ter than half the creeds, epitomizes the intellectual 
atmosphere of the time. In history men began to 
doubt long accepted statements ; in biology they exam- 
ined and then rejected the theories of their teachers; 
in economics they started new schools, and literary 
criticism questioned the long-accepted texts of the 
classics. Everything which had been believed to be 
certain and fixed was subjected to an examination. 
What wonder that in this ''boom" of empiricism mat- 
ters went too far, and that the writers of books fell 
over on to the wrong side ; what wonder that the world 
of thought was revolutionized and demoralized.^^ 



^"No study is more interesting than that of the gradual de- 
velopment of critical thought in the nineteenth century. At 
first but a few small voices were heard, such for example as 
that of Francis Newman in his "Theism, Doctrinal and Prac- 
tical," or of Blanco White, whose life presents an excellent 
picture of the beginnings of the movement in an individual 
instance. But gradually the numbers increased, and while the 
virulence diminished, yet the general tone deepened, until by 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 73 

It was this period of recapitulation and destruction 
which prepared the way for the problem with which 
the Christian Apologist has now to deal. This is an 
important point, since it relieves us of the necessity 
of dealing with such obsolete forms of unbelief as 
Atheism or Deism or Polytheism. Such have long 
since been relegated to the same ash heap whereon 
are strewn the theories of the divine right of kings 
or the verbal inspiration of Holy Writ, as well as those 
folk-lore tales of ancient Rome which men used to 
accept as history. That to which we have to attend, 
as a result of the purging process which occupied the 
major part of the nineteenth century, is Empiricism, 
or, as we must now begin to call it. Naturalism. We 
are concerned, in other words, with that modern con- 
dition — the natural result of the last hundred years — 
in which men say that they will accept as true only 
those things which can be scientifically proven. What 
has to be faced by the Apologist is the concise problem 



1870 we have a loud chorus of protesting voices asserting their 
independence of traditional belief. We would refer generally 
to such writers as George Eliot, A. H. Clough, J. A. Froude, 
Ernest Renan, Matthew Arnold, Harriet Martineau, Her- 
bert Spencer, T. H. Huxley; with these may be asso- 
ciated, in order to illustrate the tendency of the times, such 
writers as Jowett, H. B. Wilson, Rowland Williams, Bishop 
Colenso, Mark Pattison. But this whole subject is too large 
to be more than hinted at, and the reader is heartily urged 
to examine such books as A. W. Benn's ''History of English 
Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century," or for a profounder 
study, J. T. Merz's "History of European Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century." 



74 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

as to whether it is reasonable to accept anything which 
cannot pass the physical tests applied by modern sci- 
ence. The problem, in a word, is that of the choice 
between scientific Naturalism and Idealism. If we 
would begin at the bottom and ask the question which 
is vital to-day, we must begin here. 

Now it is most important that this issue should be 
made perfectly plain, since it is not commonly recog- 
nized or acknowledged. As a matter of fact, despite 
the real simplicity of the issue, it becomes at times a 
complicated question in which the elements are as 
follows: first, many who reject the claims of religion 
claim to be Idealists; second, they indignantly deny 
that they are Materialists, upon the implied basis that 
thoroughgoing Empiricism and Idealism are compat- 
ible; thirdly, they style themselves Naturalists (and 
this is what we have been working towards for some 
time), and by Naturalism they seem to mean an Em- 
piricism which yet allows validity to the creations of 
the imagination. 

It is necessary at this point for us to digress at 
some length in order to make it evident, by its reduc- 
tion to its lowest terms, that the position we have been 
describing is untenable, inasmuch as it is an endeavor 
to bring together the antipodes of thought. Men 
and women of to-day who boast themselves to be 
free-thinkers, such as the Agnostics, or the Ethical 
Culturists, or the Positivists, or the New Religionists, 
or such like — Christians who assert that they recite 
the creed ''with reservations"; all of these proclaim 
themselves to be the Idealists of the world par excel- 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 75 

lence. In fact the word Naturalism would seem to 
have been taken in order to act as a slogan which 
would not, as does Materialism, become a prima facie 
rejection of Idealism as such. The adherents of this 
phase of thought do in many instances actually claim 
for themselves the exclusive right to use the term Ideal- 
ist, asserting that Christians with their anthropomor- 
phic God and their Sacraments and their insistence on 
organization are in reality the Materialists. This is no 
idle protest, since from their point of view, and with 
their conception of the faith of the religious man, it 
appears that they have some right to their position. 
But the only way in which this assertion can be 
met is to expose the impossibility of mating Idealism 
with Naturalism. Despite their sublimated form of 
religion — their aestheticism, or their Hedonism, or 
their humanitarianism, it is not too much to say that 
their position is a logical contradiction. 

What then is the basis upon which the Naturalist 
believes, implicitly or explicitly, in his Idealism? It 
is this: he would say that his patronage of the arts, 
and his interest in cosmic theories is a sufficient basis 
upon which to take his stand. 

When we ask, once again, what these two schools 
of antipathetic thought imply, and reduce them to their 
lowest terms, we find that the Naturalist possesses no 
logical or scientific right to this position. For exam- 
ple. Idealism implies that there is a meaning to life, 
and a significance to experience, and that the labors 
of the imaginative faculty are not utterly in vain. It 
implies that human life is a sign and a sacrament of 



76 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

something higher, and that sense experience is but 
the shell. Idealism can mean no less than the belief 
that sense data are not our last resort. Any use made 
of the imaginative faculties stultifies itself unless this 
possibility of a significance in its products be allowed. 
Such is the essence of Idealism. On the other hand, 
Naturalism, in whatever form one chooses to take it, 
depends ultimately upon the assumption, or the thesis, 
that there is no significance in any of the ideas which 
result from the use of the imagination. Logically, it 
means, so far as we are concerned, that we have no 
right to hearken to any information save that which 
comes to us through the senses; and hence, irresist- 
ibly hence, that which comes to us in any other 
way, artistic ideals, or poetic intimations, or aspira- 
tions, or cosmic emotions — that these ought not to be 
regarded as valid guides. Logically, there is no place 
in the mind of him who says that the natural channels 
are the only legitimate channels for creations of the 
imaginative faculty. All of this would seem to be too 
self-evident to deserve mention, but it so happens that 
modern Naturalists seek to escape this dilemma, and 
that of all the dreamers, and of all the devotees to 
Idealism, these same pseudo-empiricists unwittingly 
are the worst. 

But now the question must be asked, What are these 
thinkers if they are not Idealists? They surely have 
their communion with the unseen world, and draw 
largely upon other than sense channels of information. 
What are they then? They are one of two things: 
either they are not what they claim to be; or they are 



THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 77 

pure emotionalists, or Pantheists, or Pagans; believ- 
ing in nothing, and yet parasites who luxuriate in the 
thrills which come from contemplating the length and 
the breadth and the width of the world.^^ 

One of the problems then which confronts the Chris- 
tian Apologist is that of pseudo-Naturalism. It is the 
outcome of the turmoil of the last century, and of 
the upsetting of so many minds by a too hasty accept- 
ance of the conclusions reached by the extremists of 
that period. We frequently meet men and women who 
assert that they can allow no element in their creed 
which is supernatural — which is not empirically de- 
monstrable. They posit physical experience as the 
basis of their belief ; to psychical experience they deny 
a hearing; on revelation they turn with a snarl. The 
so-called supernatural is for them superstition, and 
yet they claim the right to be called Idealists, and re- 
pudiate the term Materialist. We can only ask them 
to be consistent. We must drive them either to an 
absolute rejection of their traffic in ideas, or else to 
an admission that they are, in truth, in fundamental 
agreement with the basic principle upon which relig- 
ion rests — the principle of supernaturalism. It is most 
desirable in dealing v/ith this type of mind to clear 
away these misrepresentations of the fundamental 
facts. If the many who continue to assert their alle- 
giance to the religious interpretation of the world can 
only be brought to understand that this is a logical 
impossibility upon the Naturalistic hypothesis, it will 



" Compare the chapter on Phases of Naturalism. 



78 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

be possible to discuss the matter with some hope of a 
result, but so long as a man tries to hold to these two 
fundamentally antagonistic propositions: first, that 
the world is susceptible of religious interpretation; 
secondly, that no information is valid except it comes 
through sense channels — so long as a man holds to 
these two assertions, which are mutually exclusive, ar- 
gument and discussion are to no purpose. 

From this digression into which we have been led we 
must now return to the subject proper, that of the 
choice between Idealism and Naturalism. We have 
endeavored to show that the study of Philosophy 
brings a man to this dilemma: that he has to choose 
between these two schools of thought, and that 
as he chooses, he is either religious or non-religious. 
But as has already been pointed out, before one can 
consider the possibility of religion, it is necessary to 
deal with the problem of its impossibility — it is incum- 
bent upon us to ask why we should not be Naturalists, 
and why we should not go through life upon the hy- 
pothesis that there is nothing beyond sense data, and 
why we should not affirm that existence is no more 
than an endeavor to work within the boundaries of 
the five senses. This is the first problem in Philosoph- 
ical Apologetics, so to it let us turn. 



CHAPTER 11. 
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NATURALISM. 

WE are to inquire now whether or no we must re- 
sign all of our religious aspirations and yield to 
the interpretation of the Universe given by the Natural- 
ist. Until we have disposed of this question all further 
philosophizing and all Apologetics will be futile. 
Must we then accept as truth the interpretation of 
those who say that the only value which belongs to 
experience is its momentary capacity to satisfy ? Must 
we admit that this is the basis upon which all life is 
to be interpreted? 

On hearing this question there at once rushes into 
our minds the thought that as a matter of fact there 
is no room in a discussion of philosophy for so much 
even as a mention of Naturalism, since, as such, the 
Naturalist cannot be a philosopher. Further, we real- 
ize that he has no right to use this word "interpre- 
tation," since it implies and calls into the argument 
more than his hypothesis allows for. Let us enlarge 
upon these thoughts and gain therefrom an apprecia- 
tion of the issues which are at stake. 

The Naturalist, it is to be repeated, would tell us 
that the true interpretation of life is to be found in 
that theory which would reduce the value of expe- 
rience to its momentary capacity to satisfy. To this it 
is to be at once replied, by way of opening up the ar- 



80 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

gument and laying bare the issue at stake, that he who 
would allow to experience no other value than its mo- 
mentary capacity to please has no right to speak of 
"interpreting" life, inasmuch as to "interpret" is to 
deal with a subject in a way denied the Naturalist by 
his first premise. To "interpret" means to treat a 
thing as if it were more than a mechanical object; it 
means to deal with it as if there were something about 
it which was not patent to sense experience. To "in- 
terpret" a thing means to draw out from it a meaning, 
and to approach it in this way is to assume that there 
is some mysterious unity about it — that it is a "whole" 
— by which we mean an organized something which 
is beyond the range of sense verification. For exam- 
ple, I interpret the life about me or the world in which 
I move, and when I do so the result is quite different 
from the result I would have reached had I treated it 
as if it were but a piece of mechanism. In one case I 
arrive at an undemonstrable hypothesis, in the other 
at a demonstrable formula. 

In other words, interpretation is a philosophical ac- 
tivity, and from such an activity the Naturalist who al- 
lows no hidden meaning is debarred. The Idealist 
alone can interpret, since he begins by assuming an 
hidden unity within the object, and to interpret is 
merely to seek for this unity. Put it in another way : 
Philosophy by interpretation deals with "wholes" as 
organized aggregations, while science deals with them 
as collections of parts. To the one, "whole" means 
something spiritual, to the other it signifies but a mean- 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 81 

ingless bundle of parts. Now avowedly Naturalism 
is not by its hypothesis competent to deal with 
or to consider such things as an ideaUstic "whole/^ 
since being an idea it is not and cannot be a 
matter of experience. We experience an ocean or 
a tree, but not the ''world." What is "world," for 
example, but a term or idea used by us to express or 
interpret the unity of which these oceans and forests 
are but parts? There is but one explanation for our 
ever desiring to make use of interpretation, and that is 
the assumed presence of something which is beyond 
the range of our senses. A single object as long as it 
is an object of sensation — that is to say, as long as it 
is a single object — is not a thing calling for interpre- 
tation. But the moment it becomes in our minds re- 
lated to other objects — that is to say, the moment it 
becomes part of a whole — it acquires an element of 
mystery. Anything in relation to anything else is 
mysterious, since a relation is not a thing which can 
be experienced, but is rather a creation of the inter- 
preter only. Now we assert that as a system which 
is not concerned with the mysterious, but with the 
non-mysterious; as a system which deals only with 
matters of experiencable fact, Naturalism has no right 
to deal in interpretation. 

We have allowed ourselves to become involved in 
this difficult subject because it was necessary that we 
be led into a discussion which it suggests. We have 
opened the way to a point which is of vital importance 
by thus questioning the Naturalist's right to indulge 



82 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

in interpretations. The point is the difference between 
abstract and concrete reasoning.^ 

There are two ways in which we may consider 
things, either in their relationedness to the rest of the 
world, or in their out-of-relationedness. We may 
be either synthetic or analytic. We may study, for 
example, a flower by the wayside in these opposite 
ways: first, we may examine it in its relation to the 
universe; and when we do so, we think of the soil 
which produced it, and of the ages which produced the 
soil; of the geological and geographical conditions 
which are involved; of the climate of the locality, and 
of its atmospheric peculiarities; of the glacial activi- 
ties which in the first instance produced the soil ; of the 
sun which warms it, or of the snow which fer- 
tilizes it; of the people who planted it, and why they 
planted here and not there; hence we are led to dis- 
cuss their aesthetic ambitions, and their love for 
the beautiful. Thus we can continue to pursue the 
investigation until we have brought that little flower 
into relation with the heavens and with the earth and 
with the hearts of men, and this is what we call con- 
crete or synthetic thinking; thinking of a thing in the 
plenitude of its relationedness. 

But, on the other hand, we may study a flower in an 
abstract or analytic way. Instead of seeing or seeking 
its relations, we seek its isolation. We try to dis- 
cover what it is as differentiated from the world which 
it helps to glorify; and so we separate it from its sur- 



^ Compare Illingworth's "Reason and Revelation. 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 83 

roundings, and we take it from the plant which nur- 
tured it, and we shake the dust from off it, and we 
carry it into our laboratories, and we dissect it, and 
we try to think of it only as it is there separated from 
everything in heaven and earth. With the botanist 
we reduce it to its lowest terms, and we discover the 
peculiarities which it possesses and which make it dif- 
ferent from, not only the trees and rocks, but from 
that neighboring flower which looks so much like it. 
This is the abstract way of examining a thing. It is 
the process by which we abstract the flower from its 
environment. 

Now these two modes of thought represent the 
fundamental processes involved in philosophical 
thinking on the one hand, and scientific or em- 
pirical on the other, and the point to be made un- 
mistakable is that Naturalism bases its entire right to 
existence, and makes its appeal to the world upon the 
ground that it thinks abstractly, or scientifically. This 
must be clearly grasped. The entire argument of the 
Naturalist resides in his rejection of the concrete 
method of thought. 

But we must make this plain by examining Nat- 
uralism. If the student will read any book upon the 
subject he will find that the Naturalist constructs a 
Universe! Now it is in this very constructive act 
that he makes an irretrievable blunder. He be- 
gins with his premise that the only data to be accepted? 
are those which are proven to be genuine in sense 
experience. So far he cannot be criticised, but he be- 
gins to blunder when he commences his generaliza- 



84 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

tions; when he begins postulating a complete and ex- 
tra-empirical Universe; when he constructs, not only 
sidereal systems — no one can object to that; when he 
builds not only nebular hypotheses — no one can ob- 
ject to that; but when he goes beyond these generali- 
zations and creates with his materials a complete 
cosmos — a whole — a whole which is not an observ- 
able object; and when he thus makes something which 
is not empirically verifiable he betrays his own cause 
and fails in his mission. 

Or perhaps it will become clearer what we are after 
if we put it in a negative way. The Naturalist in 
his building operations so fills the universe as to ex- 
clude everything which is not a part of his process. 
Now there is no difference between denying a thing 
openly and excluding it from one's system. There is 
no difference between affirming the sufficiency of one's 
materials and denying the efficiency — if not invalid- 
ity — of what one refuses to use. If I claim to be able 
to create a complete cosmos with matter and motion, 
then I do what is equivalent to rejecting all mind and 
spirit, and this is what the Naturalist does. He dog- 
matically — that is the crucial point — he dogmatically 
excludes from the universe which he creates every- 
thing which is not what he calls ''natural" — Natural- 
ism means that everything is natural — and he purports 
to account for, aye, more, to create out of natural mate- 
rials, a complete universe. This is where he commits 
the unpardonable philosophic sin — the sin of endeav- 
oring to build that which is super-natural out of nat- 
ural materials. For, if what has been said above be 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 85 

understood, it must be evident that a universe as a 
"whole" is something which is as such beyond expe- 
rience — it is an idea, and as such is beyond the limits 
allowed to the adherent of empiricism. 

And yet the Naturalist seeks to gain or to give a 
conception of this same philosophical "whole," and 
this very step lays him open to censure. If he would be 
content to remain within natural limits, and not seek 
or claim to construct his "whole," his position would 
not be open to this criticism; but the moment he puts 
the suffix "ism" to his theory he stands convicted of a 
logical and a philosophical contradiction. 

This is, then, the philosophical objection to the sys- 
tem which goes under the name of Naturalism. It at- 
tempts to do what its premises forbid. It is by its 
hypothesis non-philosophical, and yet it pretends to 
philosophical conclusions. It has the right only to 
treat of "parts," and combinations of "parts," but it 
goes about the making of a "whole." It becomes 
discontented with its confines, and strikes out into 
those unknown regions into which it has, ex-hypoth- 
esis, no right to venture. It exceeds its charter rights. 
If it allowed a possible validity to that which 
"wholes" suggest, whether they be microcosmic or 
macrocosmic, then would we be unable to assail it as 
we do. But its fundamental thesis prevents it from 
becoming an ''ism," and blocks the path to any but 
combinations and collections of parts. 

If to this it be replied that it does not care to ex- 
ceed its limits; if it be contended that it is content to 
remain within its limits, and does not seek to create 



86 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

an "universal" or a "whole;" if, in other words, it 
yield its right to dogmatize about the complete cos- 
mos; then we answer immediately that it has no right 
to exclude from the universe the so-called supernat- 
ural, since if it cannot, and does not pretend to deal 
with the whole, then it has no right to say what must 
be excluded. Its jurisdiction holds only over the ter- 
ritory it claims to rule; if it grant that there may be 
more, then it has no right to say what may or what 
may not go towards the creation of that whole. 

But it may be answered that the Naturalist mere- 
ly says that no one has the right to dogmatize 
or to deal with that part of the whole which lies be- 
yond the region of experience. If this is said, if our 
friend who believes in empirical knowledge only yields 
to the argument against his treating of "wholes" upon 
the condition that no one else be allowed to treat of 
them ; if he thus denies to all the right of speculating 
about that which goes towards the completion of this 
universe, of which, according to the length of time we 
are allowed here, we can know only a part; then we 
reply that he has forsaken his positive naturalism 
and assumed the role of a negative agnostic. Now 
Agnosticism is another matter, and one with which we 
shall deal later on (see page 105), so let us turn to a 
side issue which this subject has suggested. 

Religion and Science. 

At this point, parenthetically (for it deserves only 
parenthetic notice), we may take up that most popular 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 87 

discussion of the relation between religion and science ; 
a problem which in proportion to its popularity has 
been fertile in puerilities. The saying goes that re- 
ligion -and science are opposed the one to the other, 
and, as a matter of fact, the time has not yet passed 
when well informed people still think that this is so, 
and fulminate accordingly against science. 

In the middle of the last century when the thorough 
and widespread investigation of which we have spoken 
was at its height, party lines were by the exigencies 
of the situation tightly drawn, and these same exigen- 
cies were responsible for the vast misunderstanding of 
this matter. It was not unnatural in the days when 
scientists were revelling in the splendor of their 
new discoveries, and when new knowledge and new 
ideas were drenching a dried-up world, that men 
should have lost their equilibrium, and in the heat of 
controversy, and under the spell of an amazing situa- 
tion, should have been led into thinking that religion 
and science were antagonistic the one to the other. Cer- 
tain it is that the prejudices on the one side and the 
preconceived opinions on the other became so intense 
that the partisans of these two subjects did themselves 
the gross injustice of anathematizing each other. 
Now, however, that the heat of the controversy has 
passed away, and that we are no longer blinded by a 
multitude of novelties, we are able to see that in re- 
ality there is no opposition between religion and 
science, but that they are, on the contrary, related to 
each other as parent to child. 

To say that the study of the ways of God is inim- 



PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 



ical to the study of the atom or the star, is just as 
preposterous as it would be to say that the man who 
studies race history is opposed to the man who studies 
physiological psychology. The one is studying an 
universal concept, the other a particular thing; the 
one is interested in the whole of humanity, the other 
in a part. But let us illustrate : Two men are watch- 
ing a regiment march down the street, one of them is 
interested in the fit of the uniform of a friend there in 
the front rank; he looks at the coat with its rows of 
glittering buttons; he looks at the cap with the insig- 
nia on the front of it; he looks at the shoulders and 
wonders when cross-bars may be there ; and so watch- 
ing this individual he forgets the marching regiment 
of which his friend is but a member, and his thoughts 
are concentrated upon the individual in whom he is 
interested, and upon whose character and future he 
speculates. As for the other spectator, he is not inter- 
ested in any individual. The regiment, with its swing- 
ing stride and its great momentum and its purpose 
to reach the front; the regiment as a whole, starting 
out into an uncertain future, with one aim and one 
end in view; the regiment marching towards one far 
off patriotic event; that is what the other spectator 
sees. Shall we say that these two spectators are op- 
posed to each other? Shall we not rather say that 
the one is interested in a detail, and can see naught 
else, while the other is interested in a national move- 
ment? 

Such is the relation between the students of religion 
and science. Science is interested in specialization, re- 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 89 

ligion in generalization; science abstracts things from 
their environment, religion tries to get the concrete 
view of them as parts of the environment; science 
segregates, religion aggregates; science is for detail, 
religion for wholesale; science for indexes of life, re- 
ligion for its whole vast story; science distributes into 
their several spheres as many of the facts in regard 
to existence as it can collect, and writes down for- 
mulae; religion collects, and from its collections sug- 
gests thoughts upon "wholes" of existence; science 
sees a pile of atoms, religion sees the majestic moun- 
tain with its peaks pointing toward the sky. So there- 
fore instead of dealing with antagonistic theories, we 
are dealing merely with opposite aspects of Hfe; as- 
pects, which complement each other, and of their very 
nature cannot contradict. On the contrary, religion 
incorporates and swallows up science as the world's 
poetry engulfs the dictionary. Into the poem can be 
brought — and will be when God's poem, the perfect 
poem, is written — all of the words in the world; but 
the words when put into that poem will mean far 
more than they can ever mean in their defined dis- 
tinctness in the lexicon. The publishers of a diction- 
ary tell us that they have collected 317,000 words — 
barren, helpless, useless words — ^but the words in a 
poem cannot be added; or rather if they were its 
writer would not advertise their number as a recom- 
mendation of its grandeur. The poem is a whole, and 
as such it is above enumeration, and in it the lower 
reaches of life are left behind, and we mount from 



90 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

out of the land of analytical calculation and definition 
into the glorious abode of God. 

Once again, science is interested in telling us such 
things as the number of words in a poem, while the 
theologian dwells only upon the poem idea. Science 
is the concordance and religion is the Bible idea. They 
are in nowise antipathetic; the bigger and better the 
concordance the better off humanity. It is impossi- 
ble for us to have too large a concordance, but we 
never dream that the concordance is an equivalent to 
the Bible, or that the sum of its words is an equiva- 
lent to the poem. The one is mechanical and beyond 
question most helpful to the student; the other is liv- 
ing and feeds us with the bread of life. 

Now, as a matter of fact, the scholar in his investi- 
gation into the details of his subject is supported and 
nourished by the inspiration which comes from those 
who regard life from the opposite point of view. What 
scientist, for example, could endure the monotony of 
his occupation; what investigator could stand the 
humdrum life of the laboratory, had he not such ideals 
and such wholes as the thought of "utility" or "truth" 
to encourage him? The theologian and the scientist 
are friends and not enemies, and though they work 
for ends which are utterly different, yet their inspira- 
tion comes from the same source — the desire to help 
and to benefit mankind. And so realizing this we no 
longer commit the blunder of thinking that science 
and religion are opposed to each other. We see on 
the contrary that they are mutually helpful, and that 
the more the one prospers the better for the other. 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 91 

In the light of what we have said let us sum up our 
exposition of the philosophical objection to NaturaUsm. 
It all amounts to this: by reason of its programme 
and fundamental intention Naturalism, as such — as an 
"ism," as a theory about a ''whole" — ^has no right to 
exist. The Naturalist is the renegade scientist who, 
beginning honestly, wearies of the confines of his 
work; wearies of the sense boundary by which he is 
hemmed in and seeks for wider fields of operation. 
Thus it is that he gives up his proper trade of analyz- 
ing, he leaves his last, and starts synthesizing, and lo! 
he to whom philosophy is by its very programme non- 
sensical, becomes a philosopher ! He has betrayed his 
birthright and does not deserve consideration! The 
moment a man adopts a cosmic theory and seeks to 
encompass the utmost bounds of the universe with his 
definitions, and at the same time holds to the finality 
of empiricism, in that moment he loses his claim to 
the confidence of the philosophic world. 

The Scientific Objection of Naturalism. 

In the last subdivision we endeavored to make plain 
why we believe ourselves to be justified as philoso- 
phers in rejecting the naturalistic interpretation of 
life. Let us now be more aggressive, and carrying the 
assault into the enemy's country, find flaws in his ar- 
gument from the scientific point of view. 

Upon a subject of this kind we have to speak most 
carefully, since if we venture too far, we shall become 
too deeply involved to make extrication possible with- 
in such limits as are allowed by a book of this length. 



92 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

However, to a certain depth we must venture if we 
would make our re-examination of the matter worth 
while. Let us therefore begin by stating just what 
the naturalistic hypothesis, from the scientific point of 
view, is. Briefly it is^ that the universe can be com- 
pletely explained by natural processes, and that the 
whole range of animate experience and inanimate ex- 
istence can be brought within chemical and mathemat- 
ical definition and description. It is asserted that given 
the chemical formulae for the various elements (hydro- 
gen, oxygen, chlorine, etc.) ; and given the laws of en- 
ergy according to which bodies are attracted or re- 
pelled; that given these laws and facts of matter 
and motion in everything from a star to a 
soul, it would be possible to explain the cosmic 
process; to explain the movements and the varia- 
tions of each and every object from the revolutions 
of the planets down to the strangest of experiences 
through which human personalities may pass; to ex- 
plain why Halley's comet returned in 1909, and why 
Napoleon miscalculated at Waterloo. It is claimed 
that all that is required is a sufficiency of data in 
order that the whole movement of the universe may 
be set down in the mathematical formula. It is ad- 
mitted, to be sure, that we cannot, or at least that we 
probably never shall, collect sufficient data to enable 
us actually to explain all of these things ; and it is ad- 
mitted that there will always be large lacunae in our 
knowledge; but granting the limitations to which as 
short-lived mortals we are subject, it is nevertheless 
asserted that if we could amass the facts, and if we 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 93 

could have the different data of heredity and environ- 
ment, then it would be possible to explain the past, 
as well as to foretell the future. 

In a word, all is matter and motion, and as the Ger- 
man Materialist put it, ''the brain secretes thought as 
the liver secretes bile." Thoughts and purposes are 
like the autumn leaves which are driven before the 
winds, which winds themselves result from certain 
conditions of atmospheric pressure. All is subject 
to law, and freedom is an empty dream. The universe 
is no more incomprehensible than a glass of water; 
it differs only in degree; both can be reduced in the 
end to a mathematical and chemical formula. 

Such from the scientific point of view is the Natur- 
alistic hypothesis. We have necessarily repeated 
much that was said in characterizing it in the pre- 
vious section, but we cannot get this matter too dis- 
tinctly before us. 

Now what shall be said to these pretensions of th€ 
chemist and mathematician? We have endeavored, to 
begin with, to make it plain that with science religion 
has no quarrel whatever. We have extended this and 
said that the more the mathematician and the chemist 
discover, the better for the theologian. With empir- 
ical eft'ort religion is in deepest harmony, as should be 
abundantly clear from all that has gone before. In 
fact this essay largely bases, on the values derived 
from experience, its argument for faith. As a mat- 
ter of fact, it is just because of this that it takes up 
the cudgels in order to dispute the claims of Natural- 



94 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

ism; since being solicitous for the welfare of science 
it resents the unscientific actions of the Naturalist. 

It might be put in this way: accuracy is the watch- 
word of empirical science, and accurate it must be in 
all its work. But it is impossible for it to be utterly- 
accurate in all of its generalizations, and yet, it insists 
on treating them as if they were exact. To illustrate : ^ 
chemical laws which are the data wherewith the Nat- 
uralist works, come from experimentation. Now in 
every experiment it is of necessity — and for labo- 
ratory purposes— assumed that certain things are what 
they are not. The scales, the measures, the atmos- 
pheric pressure, the eyes of the student, the touch, 
the ears, and the sense of smell or the sense of taste 
of the investigator — these are all assumed to be nor- 
mal, while as a matter of fact they never are normal. 
The scales are not competent to give at all times the 
same result; consistent atmospheric pressure cannot 
be obtained; the senses of the experimenter are af- 
fected by a thousand little things. The simple truth 
is that in the simplest experiments identical results 
are, because of this variability of the means employed, 
seldom obtained. So our chemist makes a large num- 
ber of experiments, and adding up all of his results 
gives us as his conclusion, the average. We have then 
in our text-books for the weight of an atom of oxygen 
the average result of countless experiments. This is 



^For an enlargement of this subject see Ward: "Natural- 
ism and Agnosticism." A. J. Balfour: "Foundations of Be- 
lief." J. P. Cooke: "Credentials of Science." 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 95 

perfectly proper, and forms, as experience proves, for 
special scientific purposes a reliable working basis. 
All the achievements of science have resulted from 
these approximate figures, and with them the worst 
bigot can find no fault. 

The difficulty comes in when this approximate fig- 
ure, that is sufficient and successful for intensive ab- 
stract and analytical work, is used too much for ex- 
tensive, concrete, or synthetic work ; when not content 
with a few laws in regard to the workings of certain 
of the forces and materials in this world, the Natural- 
ist seeks to reach out beyond the confines of the earth 
and construct through chemical dynamics a universe. 
This is a serious difficulty. It is one of degree rather 
than of kind; the fault coming when one exceeds the 
license which is allowed in the direction of synthesis. 
We can tolerate a certain amount of generalizing ; this 
is necessary and is scientifically proper; but it is un- 
necessary, and therefore unscientific and improper, to 
go beyond certain fixed limits. In a word the mo- 
ment the investigator exceeds the regions of necessity 
with his syntheses (and the scientist himself will ad- 
mit that all laws are but necessary applications of the 
synthetic principle in order to assist the furtherance 
of analysis), in that moment does he commit the great 
scientific sin, and this is exactly what Naturalism does. 

Put it in another way : So long as students continue 
to narrow their horizons and to focus their lenses upon 
smaller objects, so long can they go ahead safely and 
obtain, not only average but approximately correct 
results. Whatever error results from their calcula- 



% PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

tions will always be evident and therefore innocuouS; 
and the approximation of their formulae will never 
be overlooked. But the moment they begin to widen 
their field of study, and to extend their operations into 
the unknown and unfathomable depths of experience, 
they then enter upon a course of certain destruction. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that as one progresses in 
this direction, the enlarging of his subject makes him 
forget and overlook the approximateness of his prem- 
ises. It is impossible for one in extensive work to keep, 
as can be done in intensive work, account of variations. 
For example, an error of one one-thousandth in the 
weight of an atom can do no harm as long as we con- 
tinue to deal with single atoms or small groups, but 
once we undertake cosmic thought, and deal with that 
which comprises worlds upon worlds, our initial error 
of one one-thousandth assumes such proportions as to 
be no longer negligible, and our formula for the mac- 
rocosm no longer possesses the value which belongs 
to our microcosmic formulae. 

This argument can be applied in two degrees: one, 
we can insist upon the unscientific character of all un- 
necessary generalizations; by which we mean all gen- 
eralizations beyond those laws which are induced from 
and for the purpose of understanding nature; and, 
secondly, we can assert specifically that the domains of 
character and human personality are without the 
region of necessity, and that all applications of scien- 
tific Naturalism therein are as unpardonable as they 
are uncertain. The chemical formula, for example, 
with which the naturalist would build his cosmos is 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 97 

made up of the same principles as those employed in 
creating the economic man ; but just as economists are 
coming to understand that Ruskin ^ knew more than 
those who ridiculed him — that there is no such thing 
as an economic man, and hence that there is no appli- 
cation of the politico-economic laws to be made upon 
that principle; so also must they realize that there is 
no perfect atom, and no perfect atmosphere, and no 
perfect measure, and hence no final or universal appli- 
cation for scientific laws. 

To put this in another way: the endeavor of the 
Naturalist to make a universe can in a way be likened 
to the effort of the translator to produce "Faust." The 
ideas can be conveyed into another language, and the 
plot set down, and the poetry carried over, but it is at 
best an approximate result that is reached. 'Taust" in 
English is not "Faust," and never can be. The fine 
shadings of the poetry are lost; the infinitesimal sug- 
gestions and plays upon words ; the element of onoma- 
topoeia, and the psychological significance of certain 
monosyllables; all of these are lost, and though for 
practical purposes we have the same drama, in reality 
it is another drama in a totally different atmosphere. 
Even so when men try to translate this world of sin 
and sorrow, and seed-time and harvest, and earth- 
quakes and calms into a mathematical formula; when 



^ Compare Ruskin's "Crown of Wild Olive," "Unto This 
Last," and his economic writings generally, wherein is taught 
what we might call personal as opposed to utilitarian eco- 
nomics. 

8 



PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 



they try to reduce to matter and motion everything 
from the tides of the ocean to the thoughts of the poor 
man; when they try to make this translation, though 
they may get for practical purposes and for text-book 
usages what appears to be the same world, in reality 
they have obtained another world, with another kind 
of creature, and an atmosphere such as never was or 
will be breathed by man. In a word, the result is not 
exact, and therefore not scientific. 

Practical Objections to Naturalism. 

A third objection to this endeavor to reduce the 
universe to a chemico-dynamic formula, is that if it 
were successful it would be intellectually suicidal. As 
an alternative solution of the world-problem it can- 
not content the human mind. This is so because it 
leaves the human mind out of its reckoning. It is an 
attempt to escape one's shadow, or to stand upon one's 
own shoulders. 

To be explicit: the Naturalist thinks, and then dis- 
counts the value of his thinking by his definition of 
thought. He affirms that he believes in his conclusion 
because, as a man, he is bound to accept all conclu- 
sions, however disagreeable they may be to him, if 
they are logical and reasonable. He affirms that his 
conclusion is the only one to which an unbiased man 
can come. So far so good ! The conclusion is accepted, 
mark you, because of its reasonableness and freedom 
from bias. But this is exactly what is not the case 
according to the hypothesis with which the student set 
out ; since according to his basic prmciple he has never 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 99 

had any choice between bias, and freedom from bias; 
and there has never been a question of reasonableness 
or unreasonableness; since choice between reason 
and unreason is a matter of free will, and he, according- 
to his hypothesis, possesses no free will. He there- 
fore had no choice to begin with. What then? Sim- 
ply that he has come to his conclusion because he had 
to ; because the laws of heredity and environment gave 
it him. In a word, bias and unreasonableness have 
had nothing to do with the matter, and our Naturalist 
is no more logical than any one else. 

The forces of the cosmos, the influence of the ages, 
the circling of the stars, and all the whole world of 
force brought him to his definition by a relentless 
process. So reason and perspicacity, as a picking and 
choosing between right and wrong and light and dark- 
ness, have had nothing to do with his investigations,, 
and his superior claim to level-headedness and good 
judgment is worthless — upon his own hypothesis. His 
theory is, on the contrary, but the same kind of a 
product as the falling of a star or the ripening of an 
apple, or any of the other predestined events in the 
cosmic process. 

As Professor James puts it in his essay on the "Di- 
lemma of Determinism" : the determinist if he carried 
out his theory must end in hopeless pessimism. He 
may struggle with all his might and main to reach a 
reasonable solution to his problem, and then in the 
end he awakens to the fact that he has not been strug- 
gling — since struggling implies freedom — but rather 
that he has been driven by blind, reasonless force. 



100 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

How, then, is he to value his solution? Why should 
it have any particular merit, humanly speaking ? Why 
should it be held up as the best and the truest ? What 
right has it to any more attention — upon the natural- 
istic basis — than the idealistic solution, since reason 
as a thing of human value has had no more to do with 
its discovery than with the idealist's discovery of God? 
This is a far-reaching question and one which we 
can press relentlessly. We can ask whether Idealism 
and its belief in God is not equally as much a product 
of heredity and environment, and as such worthy, 
humanly and scientifically speaking, of the same at- 
tention as the naturalistic solution? It must be if the 
naturalistic hypothesis be right. Given two leaves 
driven before the storm, one of which lands upon a 
flower bed and the other upon the desk of a learned 
man — what right has the leaf upon the learned man's 
desk to say to the one upon the flower bed, ''My judg- 
ment is better than yours and my conclusions more 
reliable, for behold you lie upon a useless flower bed 
and I upon the desk of a world benefactor !" Judg- 
ment had nothing to do with these two cases ; the wind 
has done it all; the leaves have been passive objects 
of its course. Even so with the naturalistic thinker; 
his judgment has had nothing to do with his result; 
the cosmic force has driven him, and his superior claim 
to a better power of discrimination is absurd — unless 
he give up the whole background of his theory and 
assert that he possesses the power to choose between 
good and evil — unless, in a word, he asserts that he 
lias the power of free choice. 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 101 

The naturalistic position then drives one into intel- 
lectual pessimism, since none of its results possess 
anything but necessity behind them^ and since with 
them goes inevitably the feeling of futility and help- 
lessness ; the feeling that they have no right to be con- 
sidered on the ground of their intrinsic reasonable- 
ness, since they are but one of the many results of the 
storm and stress of life. 

Such a theory as opposed to Idealism it is to be sub- 
mitted is not practical, and hence not worthy of at- 
tention. The human mind would not develop were it 
compelled to assume the pessimistic position. In order 
to act at all mind needs optimism. The fundamental 
requirement — the basic necessity for the production of 
a theory, and for the creation of an hypothesis, and 
for the construction of a system — even of Naturalism 
— is hopefulness ! In order to build a structure of 
any kind, theoretical or practical, the intellect must 
possess in the first place faith in its power of discrim- 
ination. This is a psychological necessity. Something 
must always start from somewhere, and the environ- 
ment from which the investigator must start is the 
environment of optimism. As well try to jump when 
suspended in the air as to start theorizing when sus- 
pended in pessimism. In Naturalism we have such a 
blow dealt to the value of judgment that if accepted 
in the first place it would be impossible for the theorist 
to proceed one step. 

It is for this reason that we asseverate that not only 
is Naturalism confronted by a practical objection of 
insuperable proportions, but that it would never have 



102 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

come into existence at all had its ''interpretation" of 
life been accepted as true. As an hypothesis it is a prac- 
tical impossibility; it may be interesting to men as a 
theory, but in reality it can never be received. 

The Freedom of the Will. 

One of the subsidiary subjects in a discussion of 
this kind is that of the freedom of the will. We have 
alluded to it in the first part and suggested it in the 
present discussion. It is best in this connection to 
state the idealistic position. In the first place one must 
admit that the whole problem is beyond the pale of dis- 
cussion; since being elemental and ultimate its real is- 
sues are inexpressible. We can never discuss a thing 
unless we can separate ourselves from it, as it were, and 
then viewing it from the distance bring it within the 
compass of our thought. This question cannot be thus 
segregated and consequently is not open to normal 
discussion. We cannot, as Mr. Jack puts it in his 
** Alchemy of Thought," "beg, borrow or steal a point 
of view clear outside the universe," and hence we can- 
not see freedom as a thing-other- than-ourselves. In 
all matters of this kind it is purely a question of the 
personal equation. 

It is impossible for one to argue with a man 
who declares that his will is not free. We cannot 
disprove his statement, any more than we can read 
his thoughts, or influence his judgment. Nor on 
the other hand can he debate with us when we as- 
sert that our will is free. We would remove, there- 
fore, this question about the freedom of the will out 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 103 

of the domain of discursive reasoning and place it in 
the region of human needs. Such is the tendency of 
the best modern thought. As a practical solution to 
the world-problem we believe that it is the wisest, and 
that upon titilitarian grounds it is necessary to believe 
in it. We admit that the case against it is conclusive, 
scientifically speaking, but we deny that scientific val- 
ues are germane in this instance. 

But what is to be understood by the term, "freedom 
of the will"? This is a question which still demands 
an answer. The old theory — the explanation given 
in pre-scientific days by theologians generally — was 
that it consisted simply in the ability to do at any 
time exactly as one pleased. It was intended and un- 
derstood to mean the power of uninfluenced choice. 
We can no longer, however, hold to such an inexact 
definition. It entirely sets at naught and overlooks 
the influences of heredity and environment. It disre- 
gards too many things which actually do influence 
choice. 

In opposition to this "uninfluenced choice" theory is 
that of the Naturalist, who would have it that man 
has no more freedom than have the leaves which are 
driven before the storm. According to this theory — 
which is that to which we have already referred above 
in speaking indefinitely of the man who denies that he 
is free — there is no such thing as an act which is not 
the result of certain objective and definite influences 
or causes; if there were, it is pointed out, then the 
reign of law is not universal. If I can do something 
which is not caused by external and previous happen- 



104 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

ings, then am I a lawbreaker — a miracle worker! 
According to this school of thought then every act of 
such a nature would be miraculous. 

Now in distinct mediation between these opposing 
theories is that which we may call that of ''self-iden- 
tification," and it is the one which is here adopted. 
According to it, freedom is "man's power of becoming 
a veritable cause to himself, in making personally his 
own, and being wholly self-identified with, such acts 
of will as themselves are in perfect accordance with, 
and are therefore the true experience and develop- 
ment of, the nature which is essentially and properly 
his own." 

It is not a question of uninfluenced choice. There 
cannot be a perfectly equal choice between two acts 
or words or thoughts. Heredity and environment 
affect each choice. But, and this is the vital point, 
they affect each choice distributively. The career of a 
man as a whole choice, collectively speaking, they 
do not determine. It is a question of the whole-career- 
possibiHty. 

Now when applied directly this whole-career-pos- 
sibility is seen to be the possibility which every man 
possesses of doing that which is right. The man who 
is the servant of sin is no longer free. On the other 
hand, the man who could do no evil would not be free. 
But he who can work out his own salvation, and re- 
spond to the responsibilities which are placed upon 
him, and can realize his sonship — he who can do this 
is free. "Self-identification" means the eternal ability 
to come to one's own and not to be compelled by an 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 105 

outside force to do that which is not in accordance 
with one's deepest desires or needs. 

In a short volume of this kind this subject can be 
dealt with only vaguely, and the student is urged to 
complete what has so shortly been said here by read- 
ing "Atonement and Personality," by R. C. Moberly, 
pages 220-22^, First Edition. 

Agnosticism. 

Before leaving this division of our subject, which 
might be called the destructive division, we must at- 
tend to the matter of Agnosticism. In concluding our 
examination of the philosophic basis of Naturalism 
we came to this point: having exposed the fallacy of 
any endeavor to think about "Universals" or "Wholes" 
from the point of view of empiricism, it was then 
suggested that the Naturalist might reply that this 
was so, but that he for his part denied to every one 
the right to speculate beyond the pale of experi- 
ence. In a word the Naturalist would in this 
case allow generalization to be carried to a certain 
point, but no further. He would allow the creation 
of a natural cosmos, but declare that the elements 
which are necessary to make it a perfect cosmos — as 
would be necessary to make a perfect translation of 
"Faust," for example — that into these atmospheric and 
undefinable elements we have no right to pry. Such a 
position as this we affirmed to be a departure from 
his original hypothesis — which in fact he would be 
willing to grant. Such a reply from the Naturalist is 



106 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the commencement of Agnosticism, and to Agnosti- 
cism we must now turn our attention. 

We are glad to do this for two reasons : the first, 
to complete the argument in the midst of which we 
paused, by reason of the entrance of a new element; 
and the second, to free ourselves from a possible ac- 
cusation of ourselves being agnostic. This second 
point is most important, since in our attack upon the 
value of scientific laws we laid ourselves open to a 
serious charge. If, for example, the testimony of the 
senses is as unreliable as we stated, then have we not 
committed ourselves to a position quite at variance 
with any claims to final knowledge? 

In what follows we shall deal with these two points. 
We shall endeavor to show how that the argument of 
the Agnostic against prying into the secrets of life is 
humanly untenable; and secondly, how that our po- 
sition is what might be called that of Christian Ag- 
nosticism. 

Agnosticism is the theory which attacks the value 
of a conclusion upon the grounds that the premises are 
insufficient. Now, as has been indicated, this is exactly 
what has been done in assailing all attempts to gen- 
eralize upon particular premises. If we make uncer- 
tain and precarious all products of the mind's acqui- 
sition ; if we discount the value of all sense perception 
— as we do when we refer to the habitual unre- 
liability of the senses — when we do this we nec- 
essarily discount the worth of every product of 
human thought. If one says, for example, that the 
eyes and the ears are so fallible that experiments made 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 107 

under their observations are never to be trusted, he 
naturally undermines thereby the whole validity of 
the thought process — he becomes either a skeptic or an 
Agnostic. We have then, therefore, laid ourselves 
open to the charge of Agnosticism. Let us be per- 
fectly frank and confess that we are agnostic to this 
extent, and that the religious interpretation of the 
world implies as much; but let us proceed further to 
examine the Agnostic's theory, for it will be seen that 
there is another and more important manner in which 
we allowed the limitations of human thought.* 

It would be well for us to state at large the elements 
of this very live and most popular of all modern theo- 
ries. The vast accumulations of knowledge, which 
have come to men in the past hundred years, have 
come so rapidly as to result in intellectual dyspepsia. 
Overcrowd the mind and you get the same result that 
comes when you overcrowd the stomach. Agnosti- 
cism is a form of intellectual bewilderment. The 
name itself, given by Huxley, signifies the opposite of 
Gnosticism. Now Gnosticism is that form of thought 
which ventures without fear or shame to write down 
and to formulate the whole geography and economy 
of an imagined heavenly kingdom. Gnosticism is 
unhesitating belief in the ability of the human mind 
to comprehend, through various processes, the prob- 
lem of life, and completely to understand the universe. 



* Between Skepticism and Agnosticism the difference is a 
question of degree rather than of kind. Skepticism allows 
no generalizations, Agnosticism only a few. 



108 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

The Gnostic imagines that for him there is no secret, 
since he can unravel all ; that no longer need men "see 
through a glass darkly." 

As opposed to this pretence to see "face to face," 
to know all, the Agnostic says that we cannot see 
through the glass at all. He affirms that we cannot, 
as the Christian would have it, see through the glass 
even darkly. It is opaque. Beyond the things which 
appear and which are cognizable by the senses we can 
know nothing. The Agnostic is, in a word, natural- 
istic in his theory. He is not content, however, to 
repudiate the possibility of seeing through the glass, 
but he commences, and here he gets himself into 
trouble, to philosophize about the things which are on 
his side of that opaque substance. He carries us 
through a consideration of the ultimates. We are 
shown, with a logic which is irresistible, that such con- 
cepts as matter and motion, and time and space, are 
severally of themselves unthinkable. We are shown 
how "time" as such cannot be conceived, and likewise 
'space," and likewise all of the ultimate concepts of 
thought. 

This being so, and the limits of speculative thought 
thus involving us in contradictions or inconceivabili- 
ties, the Agnostic proceeds to conclude that any belief 
in anything which is final, such as either the universe 
of Naturalism or the God of Idealism, is foolish. If, 
he argues, we cannot think without confusion about 
such a simple thing as "time," what right have we to 
speculate about such larger things as are posited by 
the Materialist or the theologian ? Theology and sys- 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 109 

tematized infidelity are equally abominations ! For 
example, in criticising the theologian's procedure, the 
Agnostic reminds us of the unthinkableness of a Time- 
less Being coming into time relations — ^the Incarnation 
or the Creation ; or again we are reminded that an In- 
finite Will cannot ^er se yield to the conditions which 
are involved in the conception of a free humanity; or 
again we are told of the absurdity of One who knows 
no beginning ever beginning anything — creating a 
world, for example. These and similar logical culs de 
sac are we reminded of, and in the face of them we 
are bidden to surrender, to yield to the limits of hu- 
man understanding, and to admit the complete rela- 
tivity of thought; we are advised to surrender to the 
necessity of the case, and to rest content in thinking 
only about such things as we can surround with our 
minds and comprehend. 

With equal vigor the Agnostic attacks the position 
of the Naturalist, as, according to his theory, all defi- 
nitions of universals are unthinkable. The great Jew, 
Spinoza, with his aphorism deiinitio negatio est (to 
define is to negate), summed up the argument ad- 
mirably. We must admit that logically we do limit 
when we define, and that therefore the unlimited is 
not patent to definition, and therefore that universals, 
as unlimited concepts, cannot be defined. Hence all 
reachings out beyond individual concepts are doomed 
to failure. As the logician would put it, we can deal 
with distributives, but collectives are as such beyond 
the range of human comprehension. Such is the Ag- 
nostic position. Am utter surrender it is to the rela- 



no PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

tivity of thought; a complete capitulation to the con- 
ditions in which we are set; a supine admission that 
the human mind is not competent to deal with any- 
final or ultimate concept; that is to say, if there are 
any secrets in the universe, we at least have no right 
to pry into them.^ 

What is to be said to this theory ? It should be ap- 
proached from two different points of view. First as 
philosophers we must admit the cogency of its prem- 
ises; we must admit that to define is to negate, and 
that by the ingenuity of logic it is possible to show 
that the simplest of such basic ideas as time and space 
involve us in hopeless contradictions. Just as we are 
not afraid to range ourselves with the Pragmatists, 
and to travel part of the journey with them, so we need 
not fear to keep company part of the way with the 
Agnostics. We are glad to allow that, so far as men- 
tal processes are concerned, it is impossible to get 
a clear understanding of final things. We admit with- 
out hesitation the contradiction which can be con- 
jured up in the idea of a Timeless One revealing Him- 
self in time ; we admit that the very idea of an Incar- 
nation, or of a purposeful God — who has everything 
and hence should need to make nothing — we admit 
that so far as thought processes are concerned, these 
things are self-contradictory. We grant that the es- 
sence of Theism involves us in innumerable impossi- 
bilities of thought. As philosophers we must admit, 



^Cf. Herbert Spencer's "First Principles," and Huxley in 
loco. 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 1 1 1 

then, the trenchancy of the Agnostic position, but we 
do not stop there. 

As philosophers, not of the old school, but of the 
new, we assert that thought processes are in them- 
selves insufficient; that the very demonstration of the 
incompetency of thought processes does in itself dem- 
onstrate that they are insufficient for the formation 
of a theory or for the diagnosis of the world-problem. 
Agnosticism is in itself the supremest of contradic- 
tions, since if we cannot know that we know, how can 
we know that we do not know? This is by all the 
more recent students of the problem admitted to be 
the fundamental fallacy in the Agnostic position. It 
is an illustration of the danger of trusting in thought 
processes. Whoever confides in logic must, as Spen- 
cer himself has shown, end in contradiction. 

We must go behind these activities of the mind, and 
free ourselves from the inertia into which the relativity 
of thought throws us; we must do this and realize 
that if thought processes are insufficient, then into our 
philosophy must be brought life processes. Either 
bring life into philosophy, or give up everything and 
cease to think ! That is what we must do if mind is 
not in the last resort an ignis fatuus. So then in deal- 
ing with this popular, but little understood theory ; this 
theory to which the man of the street glibly proclaims 
his adherence without knowing what it means or 
what it implies, we begin and end by demanding the 
right to emerge from the regions of inductive and 
deductive logic, and to strike out into the daylight of 
life. We assert that to remain in the mazes of thought 



112 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

is futile and suicidal, and that a theory of life which 
does not bring into its conclusions the big, broad facts 
of ordinary existence is an unworthy theory. We de- 
mand that before the conclusion of the world-problem 
can be valid, there must be incorporated in the prem- 
ises some elements of human experience. 

In other words, we flatly refuse to debate with the 
Agnostic upon his own grounds. He desires us to 
accept his plausible premises, and we are tempted to, 
since so long as they remain within the skull they are 
true. But the trouble is that there is something out- 
side of our heads, and that our "right hands have ter- 
rible things to teach us." The Agnostic's premises are 
true so far as they go, but they are not the whole truth, 
and we cannot enter into a debate until the whole 
truth be brought into the evidence. But this the Ag- 
nostic will not do, since his conclusions depend upon 
limiting the premises to the confines of speculative 
thought. Therefore we must be frank and confess 
that we will not argue with those who deny all valid- 
ity to universals, and who repudiate the worth of 
thoughts upon the finalities of life. The breach be- 
tween the Agnostic and the Idealist, then, is not one 
so much of conclusions as of premise, and until agree- 
ment in regard to the premise is reached debate must 
be futile. 

It is not a question, as some would have us believe, 
of a choice between delirious Gnosticism and atro- 
phied Agnosticism. Imagining that the matter is nar- 
rowed to these limits causes most of the difficulty. If 
men suppose that they are forced to accept either a 



THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NA TURALISM 1 13 

know-a// or a know-nothing attitude towards life, then 
it were perhaps best to be agnostic. But no such dilem- 
ma confronts us. The middle ground is open for oc- 
cupation, the know-something ground, and thus re- 
lying upon our ability to see darkly through the glass 
we escape the horns of an ugly dilemma. 

This, then, is how we deal with the Agnostic. We 
say to the man who endeavors to confine us to the 
limit of thought processes, and therefore to deny us all 
right to pry into that part of the universe which is not 
subject to the tests of the laboratory or the clinic, to 
such we say: to do this is to destroy the best part of 
the evidence; to exclude from the premises things 
which are germane. Therefore we cannot allow your 
objection. 

But it has now become evident that we must give 
some good reason for this claim that the excluded bits 
of evidence are valuable. We must substantiate this 
position. But it is to be done naturally under the con- 
structive part of our essay, and must therefore be put 
off until we undertake such a substantiation in our 
examination of the value of Idealism. 



CHAPTER III. 
PHASES OF NATURALISM. 

WE have considered in the two preceding chap- 
ters the elements of NaturaHsm, commencing 
for the purpose of clarification with the statement that 
in the regions of discursive or philosophic thought 
there are two possible attitudes which may be adopted, 
the idealistic or the naturalistic. We endeavored to 
make plain the fact that in considering the world- 
problem one has either to show that there is a mean- 
ing which underlies phenomena, or that there is not. 
The only effort which is made to escape from this 
dilemma is that of the Pantheist, but as will be indi- 
cated later on, the Pantheist is at bottom either mate- 
rialistic or idealistic. The great schools of thought 
led by Spinoza on the one hand and Hegel on the other 
when reduced to their lowest terms reveal their affinity 
to one of these two basic attitudes. 

When, then, one discusses the religious problem it 
is necessary to begin at the beginning and find out 
whether he stands on land or water; to find out which 
of these positions he takes for his own. Until the 
rock- bottom of the foundation is found it is useless 
to discuss any of the details of the superstructure — 
aye, even any of the details of the foundation itself. 
Foundations rest upon a foundation, and it is this ul- 
timate of which we are in search. In contemporary 
religious discussions the prime factor in creating con- 



PHASES OF NA TURALISM 1 15 

fusion is failure to start from the beginning. Theo- 
rists and theologians, skeptics and neologians, unbe- 
lievers and half -believers, do more often than they 
dream build theories and take positions without ever 
having considered on which foundation stone their 
position rests. Estimable individuals start new 
schools of thought, and come to astonishing results, 
simply because they have never found out whether 
as a first premise they allow the possibility of there 
being a meaning behind phenomena or not. In a word, 
the first thing a man must do in discussing the relig- 
ious question is to find out whether his position is ideal- 
istic or naturalistic. 

Now the importance of this assertion can only be 
realized after one has examined into the types of 
new theology (so called) which are in vogue to-day,. 
If it be found, for example, that a new theory is fun- 
damentally naturalistic — that its first premise is anti- 
idealistic — then we can at once know that the thing 
to be discussed is not the conclusion but the first prem- 
ise. And we can further know — if we have followed 
the discussion closely and understand how Natu- 
ralism and Idealism are mutually exclusive, and that 
anything which starts from the naturalistic basis 
thereby excludes itself from any participation in re- 
ligion — we can further know that if a new religion be 
naturalistic then as a matter of fact it can be no re- 
ligion at all. 

What we wish to make plain here is that cer- 
tain popular theories, which receive wide acceptance 
as theologies, and which delight a large number of 



116 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

men and women who dream that in them they have 
found a creed which they can accept without stul- 
tifying themselves — what we wish to make plain from 
our exposition of the mutual exclusiveness of the poles 
of thought, is that most of these new and popular re- 
ligions are not religions at all, or at least that they only 
possess the right to indulge in religious terminology 
and thought when they forget or violate the first 
premise upon which their systems are built. 

There are so many examples of this modern form of 
speculation, that one need not designate any particu- 
lar instance. They are all built upon the same hy- 
pothesis, and all issue from the same psychological at- 
mosphere.^ Their principal tenet is that the decrees 
of Naturalism must be listened to — that anything 



^If one desires for clearness a thoroughgoing statement 
of the fundamental principles which are characteristic of new- 
religions, he cannot do better, perhaps, than consult an article 
by the Rev. Chas. Voysey, published in "The Religious Sys- 
tems of the World," by Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1902. There 
we find it stated "that all knowledge of God whatever must be 
based on natural facts — on certain indisputable facts in the 
outer and physical phenomena of Nature, and on certain indis- 
putable facts in the nature and faculties of man; on these lat- 
ter as the interpreters of the former. Under this Canon, the 
•corollary is drawn, that no belief of Theism can be at variance 
with the exact and demonstrated conclusions of science." 
Now this so-called Canon represents the premise which 
dominates this mode of thought. Since Francis Newman in 
1858 gave impetus to it, down until the present day, no matter 
how much details may have varied, this rule, that everything 
must be measured by its approximation to the demonstrations 
of science, has been the great point with new theologians. 



PHASES OF NA TURALISM 117 

which comes between a man and the pronouncements 
of the empirical scientist must be cast aside at what- 
ever cost ! 

To this theory many excellent people give allegiance. 
Their ecclesiastical regularity is to be discovered, not 
in their objections to the form of the Church's organ- 
ization but in the matter of its creed. They are loyal 
in their support of Christian work, but openly an- 
nounce that they can no longer hold those elements 
of the Apostles' Creed which collide with the dogmas 
and decrees of the laboratory. In a word they seek 
to remain Christians in name and Naturalists in theory. 

Now it is most desirable in these days to expose the 
impossibility of this position, and to point out that 
they who pursue such a course, and who yield to the 
persuasiveness of this or that innovator, have in the last 
resort to be faulted for inconsistency. 

It is a simple matter to say that the modern man 
can accept no miracles, and to reject the "supernatural" 
element in the Gospel story is to place one's self in a 
thoroughly comfortable position, worldly speaking. 
To discourse upon the difference between the histor- 
ical and the supernatural or apocalyptic Jesus is a 
delightful pastime, but — and here is what it is neces- 
sary to dwell upon — whenever one thus creates a 
choice between miraculous and non-miraculous, be- 
tween historical (as meaning revealed to the eye) and 
apocalyptic (as meaning revealed to the spirit) — when- 
ever one creates with the modern innovator such a 
dilemma as this, and then proceeds to affirm that it is 



118 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

perfectly reasonable to be abundantly religious and 
choose the natural, non-miraculous and so-called his- 
torical horn; whenever one does this he is guilty of 
the error of contradiction. This is so because, if there 
be nothing which is not natural — i. e., which is dif- 
ferent from that which we experience with our senses 
— and if there cannot be allowed the possibility of 
the miraculous — i. e., of that which has never yet been 
sensually experienced — and finally, if there be noth- 
ing below history in its modern sense — i. e., as a rec- 
ord of facts and figures — if we make such as these 
our premises, then it is idle for anyone to discuss the 
kind of religion which he prefers. 

If one reasons after this manner then no religion 
can be his, since religion arises out of the idealistic in- 
terpretation of life, and it implies without qualification, 
first, that the natural is not all, since it as such has no 
meaning or mystery. The natural is the self-evident, 
according to the Naturalist; and if it possessed any 
inherent meaning, if it were more than on the surface 
it appeared to be, then it would be mysterious — and 
there is no distinction between the mysterious and the 
supernatural. "Supernatural" simply means the pres- 
ence in the natural of an element of meaning; of some- 
thing which cannot be apprehended with the organs 
of sense. This is the first implication of Idealism: 
that there is that in the universe which has meaning; 
that beyond the facts of sense experience there are 
facts of larger value. 

And then in the second place Idealism implies that 



PHASES OF NA TURALISM 1 19 

the miraculous is not to be condemned a priori as im- 
possible. Idealism means that we do not know with 
our five senses all that is to be known. Now if there 
may be more than our senses apprehend, then it fol- 
lows that for all we know the miraculous may be possi- 
ble. Idealism commits us to allowing the possibility 
of there being something beyond the range of sense 
experience, and therefore it commits itself to allowing 
the a priori possibility of the miraculous. 

Finally, Idealism implies the apocalyptic rather 
than the scientific side of history. It commits us 
to the position that beyond facts and figures there 
are world movements, personalities and purposes. It 
commits us to the belief that in the making of man- 
kind there is more to be considered than mechanism. 
It clearly implies that the real value in history 
lies in the intangible, atmospheric and indescribable, 
rather than in the tangible and describable. Ideal- 
ism sees movements and developments, it sees pur- 
poses in process of fulfillment; it sees ideals in proc- 
ess of realization. There is no point to Idealism if 
its first emphasis be not upon this mysterious element 
in history. Now Naturalism rejects this side of the 
question and talks abovit an imperative choice, for ex- 
ample, between the historical and apocalyptic Jesus. 
And yet it goes on to treat, or at least religious Natur- 
ahsm so-called, goes on to treat Jesus as if the apoc- 
alyptic were an element to be attended to. For ex- 
ample, people of the type under discussion would be- 
gin by upholding what is called ''scientific history." 



120 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

When they do this they exclude all the elements of 
purpose and personality, and then they abruptly turn 
about and discourse upon the purpose and personality 
of Jesus. 

We have thus at some length endeavored to expose 
what we believe to be the error of those who endeavor 
to mix the water of Naturalism with the oil of the 
spirit — the error being in not perceiving before they 
set out that the conclusions which they desire to reach 
cannot be reached so long as one begins by prohibit- 
ing the possibility of any elements which are not de- 
monstrable in sense experience. 

Less careful and less scientific than the foregoing 
type of false religion is that of the modern individual 
who tries to invent a new religion which shall contain 
such elements of Christianity as shall not collide 
with the law of the laboratory. Such is the new re- 
ligionist proper; the person who makes his creed 
measure up to his text-book on chemistry. Once 
again it is to be insisted that whoever asserts: "If 
this or that is not materially demonstrable, then I will 
cast it out of my creed" ; whoever asserts this, takes 
his stand upon the naturalistic basis; and whoever 
does this, does completely in his first premise exclude 
the whole of the religious hypothesis. 

There is no halting ground between these extremes. 
One may be very religious or only semi-religious; one 
may be disturbed by innumerable doubts, but in the end, 
if he is to be religious at all, his position must be ideal- 
istic. It is a logical impossibility to be naturalistic and 



PHASES OF NA TURALISM 121 

have any sympathetic deaHngs with religion. It is log- 
ically impossible to assert, on the one hand, that empir- 
ical demonstration is the court of last resort, and on 
the other, that one is interested in Christianity. And 
yet this is exactly what is done by many in these days, 
and it is all because they fail to realize that entire re- 
liance upon the demonstrations of science is identi- 
cal with the assertion that behind the phenomena 
with which science deals there is no meaning. Who- 
ever, therefore, would dilute orthodoxy, must be very 
careful, in the first place, if he would remain Chris- 
tian, to see to it that the reasons given for this dilu- 
tion be not the reasons of the Naturalist. 

Whenever, then, one is approached by any of these 
modern reformers, before entering into details, it is 
always necessary to go to rock -bottom. It is useless 
to discuss with a new religionist any of the elements 
of his belief until one finds out whether in the last re- 
sort he is a Naturalist or not. And then if he is a 
Naturalist all discussion is in vain, since his use of 
the word religion is of courtesy only. He is an aes- 
thete, which is the modern way of saying that he is a 
pagan,^ and that his position is in the last resort ut- 
terly opposed to the very possibiHty of religion, aye, 
of human freedom. To the apostle, then, or to the dis- 
ciple of the new religion we say, "Either give up your 
phraseology or else give up your Naturalism." 



^ See the discussion of relation between Paganism and 
yEstheticism in the chapter on Pantheism. 



122 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

Such we would affirm to be the way in which we 
must deal with the numerous qualifiers of the faith, 
and with all who reject for reasons sufficient to them- 
selves the creed of their fathers. If, on the other hand, 
they honestly admit the validity of the idealistic po- 
sition, then the method of dealing with them is quite 
different; it is a question of interpretation. 



CHAPTER IV. 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM. 

IT has been pointed out that when one begins to 
philosophize, that is to say when one begins to 
weigh seriously the problems of Hfe, he must become 
either a NaturaHst or an Idealist. Now, inasmuch as 
Naturalism by its hypothesis denies the reasonable- 
ness of any religion; and inasmuch as our object is to 
test the value of religion ; therefore, lest we lose time 
in seeking that which from the outset may be unreas- 
onable and valueless, we have had to commence by in- 
vestigating this theory which would invalidate, if true, 
that which we are about to discuss. In a word, be- 
fore we could proceed further we have had to decide 
whether Naturalism is a satisfactory solution to the 
world-problem, for if it is, then all further discussion 
is useless. 

As a result of our study it appears that there are 
certain philosophical and scientific and practical facts 
which compel us to question the validity of this anti- 
religious theory. We have found, if we may put it 
even more forcibly, that Naturalism does not fulfill 
its promise; that despite its plausible simplicity it 
does none the less involve those who hold to it in a 
number of obscure incongruities and philosophical im- 
possibilities. We have therefore dismissed it in the 
hope that that theory which is its antithesis may be 
found more acceptable — or at least that it may be 



124 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

found less impossible and less baffling. For, and the 
plainer we make this truth the better, "man cannot 
by searching" find the complete answer to the riddle 
of the Universe; and the further we speculate the 
more clearly do we realize the hopelessness of any at- 
tempt to write down in black and white the whole of 
the cosmic meaning. This being so, it follows that 
we are to search, not for a perfect solution to our prob- 
lem, but for the best which can be found — for that 
which will most nearly approximate to the needs of 
thinking humanity. Therefore let us turn to Ideal- 
ism in order to see whether it provides us with a theory 
which is more acceptable and less impossible than is 
Naturalism. 

It will not be possible for us to pursue our investi- 
gation of Idealism in the same manner as that in 
which we investigated its antithesis, for the obvious 
reason that philosophy cannot be allowed to bear tes- 
timony on its own behalf. 

Philosophy being the search for the meaning of life 
is no more than the intellectual expression of Idealism. 
Idealism may be said to find three forms of expres- 
sion: Esthetics, or the speech of the emotions and 
senses, under which is studied all that pertains to the 
"beautiful;" Ethics, or the speech of the will, under 
which is studied all that pertains to the "good;" Phi- 
losophy proper, or the speech of the intellect, under 
which is studied all that pertains to the "true." Phi- 
losophy, therefore, presupposes the possibility of the 
reasonableness of Idealism — of the reasonableness of 
the theory that life possesses meaning — and as such it 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 1 25 

is not competent to argue on behalf of that which it 
presupposes, lest it be convicted of arguing in a circle. 
When, then, one seeks for points of view from which 
to approach this subject he finds but two, the practi- 
cal and the scientific, and these two are so nearly akin 
that it is only for paragraphic purposes that we dis- 
tinguish between them. Let us begin by examining 
into the practical value of Idealism. 

As a matter of fact there is no larger argument for 
the reasonableness of the contention that there is more 
in man's life than matter and motion bound together 
in a contentless sequence, than the fact that it is prac- 
tically imperative for us to act as if it were so. It 
may be well enough to show inconsistencies in this 
or that theory; it may be well enough to expound, as 
has been done by keen logicians, that this or that 
theory involves one in inconceivabilities; but no mat- 
ter how inconceivable and inconsistent it may be shown 
to be, if we are to live and move and have any kind 
of being, we must peremptorily proceed from mo- 
ment to moment, and from day to day, upon the hy- 
pothesis that the chief importance of those things 
which come to us through the senses is to be found 
in their meaning. 

It is simply beyond belief that the world of men 
would be what it now is ; that humanity would be lusty 
and happy and hopeful and ambitious and deep of pur- 
pose; it is unbelievable that men could have risen to 
the heights whereon they now stand, had they not 
assumed that there was more in Hfe than a meaning- 
less succession of insignificant sensations. If a Mill 



126 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

had persuaded the world centuries ago that matter 
was no more than a ''permanent possibiHty of sensa- 
tion," it is unquestionable as a fact of psychological 
sociology that society would not have become what it 
now is. And further, it is to be asserted, upon the 
same basis, that the victorious career of humanity 
cannot continue, unless men in the future act as they 
have in the past upon the basis of Idealism. 

Let us illustrate this question as clearly as we may 
from certain aspects of life. The world is for man a 
place of poetry and tragedy and comedy and duty. It 
is not permitted for any to dispense with the parapher- 
nalia of the stage. We cannot so much as live un- 
less we accept the conditions imposed upon us. In 
proportion as we renounce our desires to be independ- 
ent of the scenic devices, will be our prosperity. By 
which we mean to say, that men cannot prosper un- 
less they accept the presence of, and the importance 
of, the poetical and the tragic and the comic and the 
ethical elements of life. For example: from day to 
day we find ourselves confronted by situations: at 
this moment all is comedy, at that all is tragedy; at 
one turn of the road we are aroused, unexpectedly, to 
poetical considerations; at another the voice of duty 
suddenly breaks in upon our ears. Now what do these 
situations imply? That is one of the vital questions 
in life. Why is it that comedy bursts in upon our 
lives, and why do men laugh? Or why again do we 
find tragedy darkening the door? What is tragedy? 
Or, again, why do we yield to emotions which we call 
poetical, and what is poetry? Or why does duty drive 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 127 

US, like reluctant children, from the paths of caprice 
and self-will? What are these elements which make 
up so large a part of our lives? ^ 

After all, poetry and duty, comedy and tragedy, are 
terms adopted by men for the purpose of describing 
some of the meanings which life and experience are 
constantly creating. A thing to be comic must have 
extraordinary relations to its environment, and the 
very unusualness of these relations it is, which bear 
testimony to the significance of those usual or ordi- 
nary relations, which might have been overlooked be- 
cause of their usualness. Again, tragedy is but an- 
other way of describing a significant warp in the beam 
of life; the word tragedy is an endeavor to express 
the peculiarity of a situation the painfulness of which 
is in proportion to its profound significance. Poetry 
again is an expression of what one conceives to be 
the meaning of this or that object; while duty, what 
is it, but the summoning of men to make their actions 
accord with the meaning of life ; to live so as to imply 
what fife impHes? 

Let us put it in another way. Suppose we did not 
recognize these elements of the day's work; suppose 
there were not given to us any perception or appre- 
ciation of comedy or tragedy, and that we were blind 
to the poetical, and could not hear the voice of duty. 
Is it not evident that if we disregarded these environ- 



^A most interesting discussion of these questions is to be 
found in C. C. Everett's book entitled "Poetry, Comedy and 
Duty." 



128 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

ing facts of life we should fail to rise to our full po- 
tentialities? Is it not evident that it is only in pro- 
portion as we appreciate and associate with these 
waves of feeling and volition that we rise to the 
heights of manhood? For what is life to man but the 
"having" of an experience, while for beasts it is but 
the mere ''being" of an experience? ''To be" an ex- 
perience means to pass through the eventualities of 
life without even becoming conscious of their differ- 
ences, or of their several peculiarities; to walk down 
the road of life without so much as noticing the flow- 
ers which border the way ; to look with Wordsworth's 
Peter Bell on the primrose and see nothing but the 
primrose. 

To he an experience is to be blind and deaf to all of 
the colors and sounds and light and shadows and har- 
monies and perspectives of the world. To he an ex- 
perience means to fail to see in life tragedy or com- 
edy or poetry or duty. On the other hand, to have 
an experience means to perceive all of these things, 
and upon perceiving, to study them; and studying, to 
understand them; and understanding them to get a 
grasp on life; a grasp such as will open up to us its 
glorious possibilities; a grasp such as will enable us, 
as all experience does testify, to rise to the height oi 
manhood, and to dominate the world. 

Such is the practical argument for the idealistic 
position, and such is philosophy's apology for its own 
existence. It all amounts to an assertion that one can- 
not be a real man unless he takes the world as if it 
were drenched with meaning. It is to assert that in 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 129 

proportion to our acceptance of the fact that phenom- 
ena have meaning, is our chance of becoming their 
master. The world of matter will master us, if we 
treat it as if it had no significance; but if we see in 
each atom a suggestion, if with the melancholy Jaques 
we find tongues in trees and books in running brooks 
and sermons in stones, then will the trees and the 
brooks and the stones become our slaves and the whole 
world will yield to us the mastery. If you would then 
be a man and a conqueror, be an IdeaHst! 

More than this, it will be found that all who have 
ever succeeded in life have consciously or uncon- 
sciously been idealists, of one type or another. No 
man has ever prospered unless he has treated his 
career as a ''whole/' and thus to treat anything 
is to act upon idealistic principles. All who have 
ever scaled the heights have treated their careers 
as a whole, and have gained their measures of suc- 
cess in proportion as they have given attention to 
the various moments of their lives, not as isolated 
items, but as related parts. It is because they have 
never forgotten to relate one experience to the rest of 
their lives; because no one moment was ever treated 
as if it were of itself an end; because they have in 
moments of triumph or disaster ever remembered that 
the triumph or the disaster was but one part of a larger 
whole, that they have won the battle of Hfe. The suc- 
cessful statesman, or soldier, or thinker, or inventor, 
all such have occupied themselves in relating one expe- 
rience to another, and in attending to each only as to a 
part which belonged in reality to a larger whole. 

10 



130 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

Now this process, which we call in common par- 
lance, planning or organizing, and which is so essen- 
tially typical of the man of mark; this studying of the 
elements which make up one's life, is all done because 
of the belief that life has a meaning. If life were no 
more than a sequence of events with no hidden thread 
of significance, and no unifying p'rinciple running 
through it all; if one considered life as an indetermi- 
nate sequence of unrelated events, then to be sure one 
could be a Naturalist. But the moment we conceive 
of our lives as wholes, and relate one part or incident 
in them to another, and seek to bind them all together 
in a larger unity ; the moment we treat our experience 
at all — instead of being experiences — in that moment 
do we become philosophers and idealists. It is there- 
fore making no assumption, but merely the stating of 
a psychological fact, when we affirm that the con- 
quest of the temporal presupposes Idealism. It always 
has been so, and accumulating experience compels us 
to believe that it always will be so. Though we need 
not walk with our heads in the clouds, though we need 
not lose our way through gazing at the mountain top, 
yet we must, if we are to advance, lift up our eyes unto 
the hills in order to value the presence of the lights 
and shadows. 

When we turn to our next subject, the examination 
of Idealism from the point of view of science, we find 
a corroboration of all that has been said. In fact we 
shall have illustrated most clearly the practical neces- 
sity of Idealism when we have studied the methods of 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 131 

science, since it will be seen that it is preeminently 
idealistic; or rather that it depends for all of its vic- 
tories upon that very activity which accounts for the 
existence of Idealism — the imagination. 

In order to investigate this question let us begin 
with the question : What is the organ of Idealism ? 
What creates ideals? How do they arise? To what 
do we owe the existence of the innumerable ideas 
with which the world abounds? And it is evident that 
it is to the imagination that we owe the existence of 
ideas and ideals. It is the faculty which brings into our 
lives conceptions and thoughts and theories; it is the 
originator and creator of everything which does not 
owe its origin to the senses. For example, I think 
of a city which I have visited; that is an object of 
thought which my senses have brought into existence. 
Then I think of a perfect city, a city free from graft 
and filth and crime; a city where all is joy and peace; 
this is an object of thought which my imagination 
has brought into existence. 

There are then these two ways of creating thoughts : 
through the activity of the senses and through the 
activity of the imagination. It is not our business 
here to discuss the psychology of the imagination, 
but it is necessary that we make clear these two truths : 
First, that Idealism is the product of the imaginative 
faculty; secondly, that to this same faculty is science 
indebted for a large part of its success.^ When we 

^ We shall discuss later on the obvious retort that there is 
a valid and an invalid way in which to make use of the imagi- 
nation, and that science alone uses the valid way. 



132 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

have said this much it should be evident what is im- 
pHed when we affirm that science is the product of 
IdeaHsm. We mean that it is the product of that fac- 
ulty which lies at the basis thereof, and we mean that 
everything which is produced with the help of the im- 
agination is to some extent idealistic. Let us make 
this clear. 

Whenever one pauses to take a reckoning he dis- 
covers that v/hat we are now able to term scientific 
hypotheses were in the beginning but imaginative theo- 
ries, but the fancies of olden times which have in ex- 
perience proven themselves to be true — to be more than 
the fancies which they were in the beginning. For ex- 
ainple: What was the theory of the rotundity of the 
earth in the youth of the great Columbus? Was it 
not a dream, a creation of man's ever fertile imagina- 
tion? Columbus dreamed a dream, and he had the 
courage to believe that what his imaginative faculty 
presented to his mind was as true as were the things 
which were presented to it by his sense of sight or 
feeling. He trusted to his imagination in that instance 
just as he trusted in other instances his eyesight. And 
so that fact of modern science which we called the ro- 
tundity of the earth was in the commencement no more 
than a fancy. 

Or again, Darwin imagined some years ago that by 
a process of selection the animal kingdom gradually 
improved certain of its species until it evolved that 
triumph which we call mankind. This theory of the 
origin of species which is called "Evolution" is like- 
wise entirely a creation of the imaginative faculty — it is 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 133 

a fancy ! It is an idea ! So far as its origin, its psy- 
chological origin, is concerned it is as much an idea 
as was Plato's Republic, or Dante's Hell. For the 
long, long development of species is something which 
a priori is beyond the range of sense experience. No 
one can or could see or hear the advance which has 
been made by the animal kingdom. The theory of 
evolution is called to this day by its adherents an "hy- 
pothesis," and that means an idea. It is therefore the 
product of that same faculty which makes Idealism. 
It is in a measure a form of Idealism. Darwin and 
Dante were brother idealists. 

But at once this coupling together of the names of 
the great biologist and the great poet provokes an 
objection, and we are emphatically reminded that there 
is a great gulf between the imaginative creations of 
these two masters ; that one gave us fact and the other 
fancy; that one told us of what was real, while the 
other sang to us of what was unreal.^ We are, in a 



^ Rather than allow ourselves to be plunged into that 
most abysmic of all philosophical discussions as to the mean- 
ings and natures of "Reality," and "Experience," we shall 
say briefly in the first place that, as what is to follow will 
show, by "Real" we mean that which proves its reality in expe- 
rience ; and in the second place, that by "Experience" we mean 
the summing up of the past. Now it is to be noted that such 
a definition as this of experience is objected to most strenuous- 
ly by the followers of William James — the Pragmatists. Ac- 
cording to James it is not possible for experience to be such 
a summing up of the past as is implied in our definition. 
For him experience is a state of flux. It is, as he puts it, 
"experience ing'''\ that is to say, its face is to the future. 



134 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

word, reminded that it is necessary to distinguish be- 
tween the activities in which we acquire information, 
and in our gatherings of data to exclude from the 
testimony all such activities as result in the cre- 
ation of hippogriffs and hells. This is an objection 
which we are glad to welcome, since it not only 
coincides with the opinion of the thoughtful Idealist, 
but also because it will enable us later on to illus- 
trate a point of no small importance. But for the 



He would have it that the moment one endeavors to re- 
capitulate the past without regard to the future he ceases 
to experience. Recapitulation is to James something quite 
different from experiencing. The one deals with the past as 
past, the other with the past only as it juts out into the 
future, and the experiencer stands at the point of jutting out 
with his face to the future. To this it is to be replied that 
while one admits that experience is a state of flux and not of 
momentary recapitulations, yet as a matter of fact unless 
one did pause and draw lines and recapitulate he could not 
know experience at all. The possibility of concrete thought 
— of experiencing — depends upon reckoning up the past at 
a given moment. A noun, for example, is a product of ex- 
perience and it is the product of an act of recapitulation 
without reference to the future. In the same way we add up 
a sum and say that two and two equal four, and while we are 
willing to admit that the four may be added to, still if we are 
to be conscious beings we must say that at the moment when 
we added, each of the twos equaled two and at that time made 
four. Practical necessity rules here and not theoretical 
philosophy (as the practical Pragmatist would have it), and 
we can and must define experience for thinking purposes as 
a summing up of the past. The element of futurity without 
doubt is ever present, but the necessities of life compel us 
to disregard it, when we speak or think. 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 135 

moment we are concerned merely with a question of 
method; we wish to make perfectly evident that so 
far as psychological processes are concerned, there is 
no difference between the method of the poet and that 
of the scientist; that science advances by making use 
of the organ of Idealism — if we may thus speak of 
the imagination. 

We are now in a position to understand the force and 
the point of what is called the "Ontological argument." 
For many centuries there have been a number of "stock" 
arguments which have been used by the exponents of 
natural theology. In almost every old book upon "Evi- 
dences" or Natural ReHgion will be found the so-called Cos- 
mological and Teleological and Ontological and Moral argu- 
ments; often indeed they have been rashly called "proofs." 
Now in this present volume we have adopted a meth- 
od which will not allow us to make such use of them 
as has been customary in the past. It is not that we 
have outgrown them, or that we are one bit wiser than were 
our philosophical forefathers ; it is merely a question of point 
of view ; we think and we look at things differently from what 
they did. We shall, however, be careful to point out in the 
proper connection the essence of each of these arguments, 
and in the present connection, while we are discussing the 
imagination, we can with propriety take up the Ontological 
argument in order to make plain its essence and significance. 

The value of the "arguments" is not generally appreciated. 
It is fashionable to smile indulgently upon them in these days, 
just as we smile indulgently on the old rabbinical, or the less 
old and much more acute scholastic method of argumentation. 
But to do this is a great mistake, for it cannot be too con- 
fidently asserted that we have not outgrown, and never shall 
outgrow these forms of thought. The fact of the matter is, 
that they should be called forms of thought, rather than ar- 
guments. 



136 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

It is exactly as if one lived in a house with but four win- 
dows through which he could look out upon the world. All 
that could ever be known or learned about the world and the 
universe in the midst of which the house was set, must needs 
come through information which is to be acquired as one 
gazes out of one of these windows. Even so, each one of us 
lives in the house from which he can look out upon the world 
in no way, except through one of four forms of thought, 
and these are they of which we have been speaking; 
They are the categories, as it were, of synthetic reasoning; 
the methods in which one must think, if he cares to think 
at all, upon the world-problem. No man can escape this. 
Every philosopher that has ever written, though he may have 
been most careful to avoid these terms, has made use of one 
of these methods. Hegel, for example, used the ontological 
method ; and Schleiermacher the cosmological ; and a whole 
host of thinkers, from Aristotle down, have been teleologists. 

As has been said, it will be indicated in this book exactly 
what the essence of these arguments are at such points as are 
best fitted to bring out their significance; at this moment we 
are in a position from which we can best explain the Onto- 
logical argument. 

St. Anselm, though not the originator, since as we have 
pointed out these arguments are all old as synthetic thought, 
developed to its perfection this process of thought which is 
called ontological (i. e., the speech of being). He was a be- 
liever in the unlimited validity under certain conditions of 
the feats of the imagination. He taught that anything which 
the imagination created must, if in its essence it contained the 
idea of existence, actually exist. For example, he said that 
his mind conceived of something "than which nothing could 
be greater" — this he afiirmed to be God, and a sufficient 
proof of God's existence. That which persuaded him of the 
finality of the argument was this. He said : "I conceive of 
something than which nothing can be greater. Now unless 
this something exists, there would be something greater than 
it. Therefore it must exist." 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 137 

Such bold logic has of course its charms, but we can realize 
now that for practical purposes it is valueless. What the 
great old thinker actually reached by this method of procedure 
was the idea of "something than which nothing can be 
greater." He acquired an infinite idea, but no more. He 
could prove by logic that his idea existed, but beyond that 
nothing. 

Now in the argument in which we have just indulged it 
will be seen that we began exactly as did Anselm. We began 
with the imagination. Where the modern thinker, however, de- 
serts the old-time Saint is in the method by which he proves 
his conclusions. St. Anselm left it to be done by questionable 
logic. The modern thinker, on the other hand, obtains his idea 
of something than which nothing can be greater — of God — and 
then leaves that idea to human experience for authentication. 
A product of the imagination can never by any feat of logic 
or rhetoric become more than an idea. The regularity of 
the sun or the certainty of gravity were only ideas in the be- 
ginning but they put on reality — became incarnate, we might 
say — when human experience discovered that they corre- 
sponded to actualities of existence. So much for the so- 
called Ontological argument. 

It is now necessary to return to that objection with 
which we broke in upon the discussion of the part 
played by the imagination in science. As was then 
stated, an objection to the unHmited use of and confi- 
dence in the imaginative faculty — an objection to the 
carrying of it to such extremes as result in the creation 
of hippogrififs and hells — is of help rather than hin- 
drance to the thoughtful Idealist, since it enables him 
more clearly and pertinently to define and illustrate 
just what is to be considered as a valid and scientific 
use of this idea-creating faculty. 

We are reminded, then, that when Columbus 



138 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

dreamed his dream the world scoffed at him; and that 
his vision was scientifically valueless until he had 
crossed the ocean — or rather until other seamen had 
rounded the Horn and came back to Europe from the 
Orient. When we are thus reminded of the time 
and experience which have been required before the 
dream of the rotundity of the world became an ac- 
cepted fact, we have at once to listen to the assertion 
that no product of the imagination possesses value 
until it has been empirically proven to be true to fact. 

Now what is to be said to this condition put upon 
us by the scientists? How is the Idealist to take this 
limitation to the validity of the imagination? And 
without hesitation it is to be answered that we accept 
this condition most gladly; that it is to be welcomed; 
it is to be agreed to by the Idealist; he is more than 
ready to abide by it explicitly. At all times the sober 
Idealist is willing to allow that feats of the imagina- 
tive faculty must be checked up and authenticated by 
experience. If we did not do so, then there would be 
no difference between a horse and a hippogriff, and 
Puck would be as real a creature as Palestrina. If 
we did not submit to experience the things created by 
our fancies then indeed would our world be peopled 
with perplexing prodigies! Sea-serpents would be 
among the least disconcerting of its inhabitants ! 

For certain, then, we allow that all products of the 
imagination be regarded with suspicion until expe- 
rience has demonstrated their reality. But — and here 
is the vital point over which disagreement arises — what 
is the criterion of experience? What is a valid ex- 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 139 

perience, and what and who are acceptable witnesses? 
It is no longer a question of Idealism or Naturalism, 
but of what is to be regarded as the standard form of 
experience. For explanation, we will be told that it 
is unobjectionable to conjure up an hypothesis as to 
the descent of man; to have a vision of the primeval 
and pre-historic and primitive people; to do this we 
are told is unobjectionable. So also we are informed 
that it is proper to conjure up a theory as to the origin 
of the universe, even though in one's imaginings sense 
data are never incorporated. This is unobjectionable. 
But it is most objectionable, we are told, to conjure 
up ideas of God, or of a future life. 

Now the reason for this acceptance of one imagina- 
tive feat and rejection of another is, that while it is 
conceivable that we may in the course of time check 
up and discover the truth or falsity of the nebular 
hypothesis or of the Darwinian theory, it is not con- 
ceivable that we can ever by an empirical process find 
any evidence as to the existence or non-existence of 
God. We see now where the trouble is going to arise. 
It is all a question of whether the only kind of expe- 
rience which is to be admitted as testimony is eye or 
ear or nose — sense — testimony. Our scientists will al- 
low any amount of imagining, so long as it be sub- 
jected to sense experience for verification. What is 
the defender of religious faith to say to this? 

It is to be contended in answer to this that no one 
has the right — the scientific right — to dogmatize as to 
what is a valid form of experience. It is to be con- 
tended that the validity of experience is on its part 



140 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

quite as much a question of experience as is the vaHd- 
ity of testimony ; it is to be held that there is nothing 
in my eyesight, as such, which makes it a final court 
of appeal as to the existence of a jinricksha. There 
is nothing as siich in any man's senses which makes 
them infallible for the purpose of auditing the books 
of the imagination. What gives to the senses their 
right to decide is merely the fact that in the centuries 
their reliability is vouched for by an infinite amount 
of corroboration and collateral testimony. In a word, 
we yield to the judgments of sense experience, because 
in themselves they are vouched for by racial expe- 
rience. 

We repeat then that there is nothing in momentary 
empiricism as such which makes it infallible, and that 
sense experience must be subjected, quite as much as 
must ideas, to the tests of racial experience. We as- 
sert then that no one has the right to dogmatize as to 
what is at this moment or that a valid form of expe- 
rience, since validity is not a question of the moment, 
but of the ages. Having said so much, we may dismiss 
the objector who protests that the idea of God is one 
which can never be subjected to the provings of expe- 
rience on the ground that his experience is the only 
kind that is to be admitted to court. We dismiss this 
objection and pass on to a statement of what the Ide- 
alist considers to be a criterion, according to which 
the creatures of his imaginings may be judged. 

The Idealist takes the position: imagination is the 
organ by which is discovered the unknown meanings 
that life possesses. With the imagination we specu- 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 141 

late upon things beyond the range of sense. These spec- 
ulations we subject to racial experience for justifica- 
tion, and any idea which the racial experience pro- 
claims to be real, we assert to have won its title to the 
term Reality. In a word, we submit to experience; 
but we do not submit to partial or momentary or labo- 
ratory experience, but rather to the experience of hu- 
man beings; — of the whole world of human personal- 
ities. It is thus that we justify, upon grounds which 
scientifically speaking are unimpeachable, our faith 
in Idealism.* 

To sum up what has been said in defense of Ideal- 
ism as the better method in which to interpret this 
world, it would not be beside the point to quote the 
old Hebrew prophet : " Where no vision is the peo- 
ple perish ; " and also to repeat the words of a modern 
prophet : ''A man's power is his idea multiplied by his 
personality." These two statements reduce the whole 
argument to a practical problem. When all is said 
and done, as has been pointed out at length, it is in 
the end a question of practicality. Happiness and wel- 
fare, peace and prosperity, have always been, and must 
in the future be, the exclusive product of Idealism. 
It alone can create them! It alone is responsible for 
the fact that men have arisen above the brutes ; it alone 
is the method whereby men can attain to the dominion 
over all the earth; it alone can usher in those better 



* Compare at large 'The Credentials of Science," by Prof. 
J. P. Cooke. 



142 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

days for which all men — be they socialists or anarch- 
ists or monarchists — are in search. In whatever di- 
rection we turn we find the practical value of this at- 
titude, rather than of the naturalistic attitude, toward 
life. If then Naturalism is impractical, and if it 
plunges one into innumerable difficulties of thought 
and act; and if on the other hand IdeaUsm, even 
though it brings with it intellectual difficulties, does 
yet present a practical scheme of life; if we are faced 
by such a dilemma as this, we frankly choose that 
horn which, though not faultless from the point of 
view of logic, does nevertheless hold out to us a hope 
and an inspiration. 

Having said so much it becomes us to proceed to 
the next subject: — the question as to how we are to 
take or interpret this preferable scheme. For we are 
far from having exhausted the question of Idealism, 
and there is much more to be said before we have so 
much as approached that vast problem in search of 
which we set out, — the problem of the existence of 
what Christians call God. 

Although we have found that to be an acceptable 
hypothesis which approaches the universe upon the 
supposition that it is full of meaning; and although 
we have shown reason for the belief that the chief 
value in an object lies in its significance; and although 
this leads us on to the further conclusion that behind 
the appearance and transitoriness of everything that 
we see there exists something which is real and per- 
manent; it yet remains for us to ask what that reality 
is. Again, and to be more explicit : if there is a mean- 



THE SUFFICIENCY OF IDEALISM 143 

ing beneath and within phenomena — a permanent value 
which makes it possible for the transitory on its part 
to possess value, — what, it must be asked, is the nature 
of that which creates the meaning? If meaning is 
found, there must be that which makes it. If there 
are sermons to be found in stones, and tongues in 
trees, and books in the running brooks, and good in 
everything, then it is to be concluded that there is a 
somewhat which preaches the sermon and speaks 
through the trees and writes the books, and is respon- 
sible for the goodness of the world. 

What, then, it is for us to ask, is responsible for the 
significance which is to be found in all creation ? This 
is the question which must be answered in the next 
chapter upon the interpretation of Idealism. 



CHAPTER V. 
THE INTERPRETATION OF IDEALISM. 

IT has been the object of the preceding chapters to 
point out that men find objective nature signifi- 
cant; that they demand something more in hfe than 
is allowed them by the Naturalist ; that when it comes 
to a choice between a mechanical world and a mean- 
ingful world they clamorously prefer the latter. It has 
been admitted that in all ways the problem is one of 
presumption; that acute definition is impossible be- 
cause of the limitedness and relativity of our knowl- 
edge; but the point which the apologist tries to make 
plain is that Idealism is humanly superior to Natural- 
ism, for the very human reason that it is less objec- 
tionable, and offers fewer philosophical and practical, 
and perhaps scientific, difficulties. Having then cast 
in our lot with the Idealist, and having determined to 
approach nature with the conviction that there is more 
in it than appears to the eye or ear or to any sense, it 
is now necessary that we ask what the nature of this 
"more" shall be taken to be? 

There is more in nature than the senses can tell us 
of. If this be so it follows as Idealism postulates, 
that nature is more than a mechanism, since a mechan- 
ism is a thing which is empirically comprehensible — 
which can be grasped by the senses. If, once again, 
nature is more than a mechanism it follows that it is 
comprehensible only by means of philosophy, since 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 145 

philosophy is the only method by which we can deal 
with things which exceed the limitations of experi- 
ence. Nature, in a word, is that which we have termed 
a "whole" or an "idea," and it must be dealt with as 
such. The process by which one deals with "wholes" 
is, as has been pointed out, interpretation. Let us 
therefore endeavor to interpret nature. 

The first thing to be noted is that the belief that 
nature possesses a meaning suggests inevitably that 
there must be some thing, or power, or person, that 
creates and is responsible for this fact. A meaning 
implies the presence of something which is not ephem- 
eral. Whenever a perishable or transitory object pos- 
sesses a significance, the conclusion to be drawn is 
that behind the transitory there abides an eternal which 
shines through it and gives to it its meaning. A thing 
does not possess significance until it is seen to be the 
representative of, or manifestation of, a power which 
lies behind it. Significance implies that a thing is a 
sign, and a sign is an object whose importance lies 
not in itself, but in that to which it points, or in that 
which placed it as a pointer. In this instance we are 
concerned with that which put the sign in position ; 
we desire to know who set up and owns the sign. 
To say the same thing in another way, a thing must 
be " possessed " before it can possess meaning. What, 
then, it is to be asked, possesses nature? Or to ex- 
press it in yet another way, if nature shows signs of 
being possessed where shall we look for the possessor? 

That is the problem which confronts us when we 
seek to interpret the universe — to be idealistic. What 
II 



146 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

possesses nature ? Obviously whatever it is, it is some- 
thing over which time and space have no dominion. 
It is something which is eternal and infinite! How, 
then, shall we define the infinite and eternal which 
gives to nature its meaning; which puts the tongue in 
the tree, and the book in the running brook, and the 
sermon in the stone, and the good in everything? 

At once on the presentation of this problem there 
arise two solutions between which we have to choose. 
The pathway which lies before the beginner in Ideal- 
ism leads immediately to a bifurcation ; in one direction 
the path leads to Pantheism, in the other to Theism, 
In other words, the thoroughgoing Idealist ends, when 
he pursues his theory persistently, in one of these two 
forms of thought. Every kind of IdeaHsm is reduc- 
ible in the last resort either to Pantheism or Theism. 
To these two phases of the subject it is necessary now 
to turn, and because it is the most easily approached, 
let us deal first with Pantheism. It presents the phase 
of IdeaHsm which, because of its apparent simplicity, 
makes the loudest appeal to the seeker for truth. 

Pantheism. 

The study of Pantheism like that of Idealism begins 
with a bifurcation in the roadway. One straight road 
does not stretch out before us, but two, and they run 
in opposite directions. As has before been stated, Pan- 
theism is not a distinct form of thought, as is Natur- 
alism or Idealism, since its various forms are always 
reducible in the end to one of these larger and ultimate 
categories. Pantheism is either an emotional Natur- 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 147 

alism or an emotional Idealism. In a word, as a theory 
it is only a matter of form and not of substance, in- 
asmuch as substantially it is ever either naturalistic or 
idealistic. Now, though we are in this chapter dealing 
with Idealism; and though one form of Pantheism is 
purely naturalistic, it is necessary nevertheless in this 
place to attend to this kind of Naturalism, if for no 
other reason than to point out that it is not, as it is 
often supposed to be, idealistic. Let us begin then our 
study of Pantheism with this problem. 

AVhat we have to make plain is that a certain kind 
of Pantheism, the best known, perhaps, is utterly nat~ 
uralistic. The type to which we refer is that which 
was so splendidly set forth by the philosopher of 
Amsterdam, Spinoza.^ Spinoza's form of reasoning 
finds, to be sure, but little favor in these days, and yet 
the substance of what he taught is far more prevalent 
— as will be shown in time — than is generally recog- 
nized. 

Now what is the nature of this form of Pantheism? 
To make use of language quite different from that 
used by its great exponent, we may begin by saying: 
that this kind of Pantheism identifies God — or that 
which abides and presides and gives to nature its sig- 
nificance — with the universe. " You seek for an ob- 
ject for reverence," the teacher would say; "you seek 
for that which explains the presence of the tongue in 



^The student can find a short and simple explanation of 
Spinoza's Philosophy in the volume devoted to his work in 
Blackwood's Philosophical Classics. 



148 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the tree or of the sermon in the stone; you desire to 
know what God is? Then be it known to you that 
He who sustains and upholds the world, and He who 
does so abundantly manifest Himself in the sunset 
or in the flower bell or in the chorus ending of Eurip- 
ides; — ^that the Eternal and Infinite who reigns and 
governs and accomplishes these wonders is none other 
than the Universe itself! Surely the Universe is in- 
finite and eternal! And surely it is competent to en- 
dow with significance each and every atom! And 
surely it is an object for reverence than which none can 
be higher!" Such in our own language would be the 
answer of ''the god-intoxicated man" to one who asked 
him about his Maker. 

Now the first thing to be noted about this theory is 
its likeness to a kind of Idealism ; and the second, how 
that in reality it is blankest Naturalism. In the first 
place, this identification of the Infinite and Eternal — 
of God — with the objective universe savors of Ideal- 
ism, and in fact is so accepted by many because it 
seems to present the most alluring form thereof. See 
how this is so by examining the mood in which the 
devotee of this kind of "religion" places himself. He 
lifts up his eyes to the mountain tops and ponders on 
their splendor; he watches the innumerable stars as 
tranquilly they climb the sky; he listens to the strains 
of some majestic symphony, or to the winds singing 
in the trees; he smells the rose when first it blooms, 
or the earth when the thaws of early spring make it 
,:give forth an odor of indescribable richness ; he touch- 
es with his hand some mighty rock and pauses in won- 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 149 

der at its strength ; — thus with his senses he approaches 
nature, and at each approach he meets with wonderful 
experiences. The further he goes and the more thor- 
oughly he investigates, so much the more marvelous 
does he find the world to be. Everything that he 
meets bewilders him by its strength or its beauty or 
its majesty. The powers of nature and the charms 
thereof speak to him in diverse tongues, and in un- 
premeditated awe he falls down upon his knees and 
cries out to the world, " Thou art God !" Nor is 
this an unusual action, for who can fail to be impressed 
when he discovers the wonders of nature? 

Perhaps the best illustration of this mood is that 
voiced by Wordsworth in our own language,^ and by 
Goethe in the German. Take these lines of Faust, 
wherein he endeavors to explain his creed to Gretchen, 
as a consummate expression of this mood of the wor- 



Compare "Tintern Abbey" and the Sonnet: 

"The world is too much with us ; late and soon, 
"Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers; 
"Little we see in Nature that is ours; 
"We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! 
"This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon; 
"And the winds that will be howling at all hours, 
"Are upgathered now like sleeping flowers; 
"For this, for everything, we are out of tune; 
"It moves us not — Great God ! I'd rather be 
"A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn ; 
"So might I, standing on this pleasant lea, 
"Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn; 
"Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; 
"Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn." 



150 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

shipper of nature as a whole — of the naturalistic 
Pantheist : 

"Who can name Him? 
Who thus proclaim Him: 
/ believe Him? 
Who that hath feeling 
His bosom steeling, 
Can say: / believe Him not? 
The All-embracing, 
The All-sustaining, 
Clasps and sustains He not 
Thee, me, Himself? 

Springs not the vault of Heaven above us? 
Lieth not Earth firm-stablished 'neath our feet? 
And with a cheerful twinkling 
Climb not eternal stars the sky? 
Eye into eye gaze I not upon thee? 
Surgeth not all 
' To head and heart within thee? 

And floats in endless mystery 
Invisible visible around thee; 

Great though it be, fill thou therefrom thine heart 
And when in the feeling wholly blest thou art, 
Call it then what thou wilt! 
Call it Bliss! Heart! Love! God! 
I have no name for it! 
Feeling is all in all! 
Name is but sound and reek, 
A mist round the glow of Heaven!'" 

In this we see how Faust, in awe-struck won- 
der, finds the universe so full of splendor and beauty 
that for him it presents an object worthy of worship. 



^ Compare " Faust," Part I, Garden scene. 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 151 

Not only is it worthy of worship, but it is worthy of 
those thoughts with which men approach their Divin- 
ity. But if we analyze this mood, which is typical of 
all pantheistic moods of this type, we see that it is no 
more than what is sometimes called " cosmic emotion- 
alism." * For what is it which is at the bottom of 
Faust's awe ? Is it not feeling ? It is because he feels 
so deeply in the presence of nature that he is thus so 
wrought up. 

Now ask another question : What is the basis of this 
feeling ? Is it not unadulterated sense experience ? It 
is all a matter of aroused sense activities. His eyes 
and ears bring him such tidings of the world around 
him that he becomes ecstatic. His entire mood is sen- 
sual. He presents a problem not in ethics or in the- 
ology, but in sesthetics. It requires no acuteness to 
perceive that his God and his theology are the exclusive 
result of sense data^ and that whatever meaning the 
universe may possess for him is no more than a sensual 
meaning. 

If our distinction between Naturalism and Idealism 
has been clearly made, it should be evident that this 
mood is clearly one of emotional Naturalism. Faust 
by limiting, as he presumably would, his sources of 
information to the senses, does thereby proclaim him- 
self a Naturalist. In the second place, whatever mean- 
ing he acquires through these sources is a matter, as 



* See a most alluring essay on this subject in "The Creed 
of a Layman," by Frederic Harrison, Chapter V. 



152 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the last lines reveal, for emotionalism and not for 
ratiocination.^ 

To such teachings it is to be answered: that the 
Christian religion calls only for such a faith as shall 
be the product of the whole personality ; ^ that in the 
life of the Founder of Christianity is exemphfied its 
rejection of a shallow emotionalism by the manner in 
which He dealt with many who wished to be persuaded 
to His teaching by works of wonder — ^works which 
would arouse emotional enthusiasm; that wherever re- 



^ It would require a separate chapter upon the psychology 
of religion to discuss the question here raised as to whether 
after all religion is any more than a matter of the emotions. 
That this is so is agreed to at considerable length by many; 
Schleiermacher with his definition of religion as the sense of 
dependence would perhaps be the most powerful exponent of 
this point of view. A recent exposition, and a most read- 
able one, may be found in the "Psychology of Religious Be^ 
lief," by J. B. Pratt, wherein following out the lines so splen- 
didly worked out from a similar point of view by James in 
his "Varieties of Religious Experience," he argues that ex- 
perience reveals the fact that the "undertone" of feeling is 
the real rock on which religion rests. It is an immovable 
foundation. Reason is shown to be not fundamental so far 
as our appreciation of values is concerned; while feeling, 
whether crude or refined, methodistical or mystical, is the 
originator of all real belief. 

'The use which has been made of the word "emotional" in 
this chapter, it should clearly be understood, is that one which 
is customary in common parlance. In some of the more re- 
cent books on religious psychology "emotions" is used with 
what would seem to be the same significance as that intended 
by the author in the phrase "whole personality." 



THE INTERPRETATION OF IDEALISM 153 

ligion has been emotionalistic it has within a short 
time degenerated into a complete MateriaHsm. In an- 
other place we deal with this same problem by impli- 
cation, pointing out that Christianity as the per- 
fected religion is above the emotionalism of primitive 
forms. 

Exactly the same verdict has to be pronounced upon 
all kinds of Pantheism in which the only avenue 
through which information and inspiration come is 
that of sense experience. Sense data can never origi- 
nate an idealistic position ; for though one be stirred to 
his depths by the glory of some saffron-colored sunset, 
and though one dream of Meadows of Asphodel and 
Islands of the Blest; though under the spell of the cos- 
mic emotion one build a paradise; yet, because of the 
origin of the inspiration, all is doomed to evaporation. 
And this is so because the things which originated the 
ideals are perishable, and because whoever looks for 
inspiration to that which is ephemeral commits him- 
self into the care of that which cannot eternally sat- 
isfy. Once the sense stimulant is gone, what remains 
to reproduce the experience? Unless one's intuition 
and inspiration come from that which is by hypothesis 
eternal, his faith is by his own premises perishable. 

The theistic Idealist's faith is based upon the belief 
that his inspiration comes from an eternal and invisi- 
ble power, which is quite different from an inspiration 
which comes from the marvels of the perishable world. 
Emotional Naturalism is not idealistic for the all-suffi- 
cient reason that it originates in sense experience, and 
further, because that which depends upon the senses 



154 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

only for information is that which violates the first 
principle of Idealism, which is : that the significance of 
the world and its ability to inspire men with awe owes 
its origin to something beyond and beneath that which 
appears — to something which cannot be apprehended 
by the senses. To conclude, then, it may be said that 
a mood which is caused by appearances — be they the 
sun or the stars or the flowers or the poetry of the 
world — is a mood which is based upon that kind of 
data which can never create a true Idealism. 

It is most interesting to note how that this form 
of emotionalism illustrated by Goethe and by all who 
look to pregnant nature for the origin of their high 
thoughts is but a refined and conscious recrudescence 
of the Paganism of the ancient world. 

Religions may be said generally to have prospered 
in history in the same order as that in which thoughts 
rule in the growing child. At first all was objective 
and materialistic and emotional. This corresponds to 
early childhood in individuals, and to that form of re- 
ligion wherein it is all a matter of the senses. As, for 
example, the worship of idols, in which the worshipper 
concentrated his emotions upon an act of reverence, 
and neither paused to reason out its value, nor pro- 
ceeded to will himself to deal righteously. The reason 
and the will were not brought into Paganism, any 
more than they are made use of by the infant. 

Then the second stage in religious development 
might be said to be that of reason, when, like the ma- 
turing man who supposes that he can solve the prob- 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 155 

lems of life with his newly discovered ability to think 
and make syllogisms, the maturing world imagined 
that it could with its new-found wisdom write down 
the meaning of the spheres. Hence we had Scholas- 
ticism and volumes without number upon philosophy. 
All of these were symptoms of an age when men be- 
lieved that they could with their minds solve the prob- 
lem of the universe. 

Then came the third stage, which we might call the 
modern stage, in which thinkers, like men who have 
passed the smartness of their teens and realized that 
work and will alone can find the "way," turn to the 
will, in the belief that by it and through it they alone 
can reach the desirable conclusion. Accordingly we 
have "ethical culture" societies, and are told that right 
doing is the method by which humanity is to find the 
enfranchising truth. 

Now the position of the Christian should be a sum- 
ming up and a composition of these three forms. It 
is to be believed that the sense of dependence is a le- 
gitimate element in the true and perfected religion. 
But it is only one-third. Again to ratiocination and 
volition must be allowed their respective shares. We 
might, speaking historically, hold up Christ as the il- 
lustration of the perfect fusion of these elements, and 
then admit that His followers have but begun to ap- 
proximate to His ideal. The early days were perhaps 
emotional, owing to the influence of contemporary 
Paganism ; the Middle Ages were over rationalistic, a 
result of the blessed Renaissance ; and in the present 
days we see too much, and may see more, emphasis 



156 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

placed on the will to do righteously. The Christian 
believes that when the Kingdom comes men will have 
passed these partial moods, and will stand out, as did 
the Master, equally influenced by the three elements 
which go towards the making of the perfect person- 
ality. 

Having now dealt with the first and most apparent 
form of Pantheism, let us turn to the second type, that 
which is recognizably idealistic. It will be remem- 
bered that it was pointed out that when one began the 
study of Idealism he found himself confronted by two 
kinds, the pantheistic and the theistic. Having charac- 
terized that type of Pantheism which is not idealistic, 
it is time that we take up the type that is, in order 
that we may decide whether it appeals to us as the 
best of the two pathways into which the highway of 
Idealism bifurcates. 

In the pursuit of truth one is ever meeting with 
these dilemmas. We began with that between Natu- 
ralism and Idealism, and now we are facing the one 
between the two kinds of Idealism. Further than this, 
the sympathetic student, when confronted by such 
dilemmas, must always be prepared to find aspects of 
the truth on both sides, and, as in the problem which 
now lies before us, he must expect to learn that it is 
not a question between one theory which is all wrong 
and one which is all right, but between one which is 
wholesome and human, and one which is unwholesome 
and abnormal. 

To begin with, then, let us describe the two types 



THE INTERPRETATION OF IDEALISM 157 

of Idealism to which we have reference: ideaHstic 
Pantheism and Theism. Pantheism is the belief, as 
we already know, that God is all, and that all is God. 
It conceives of God as immanent or in the world. It 
declines to allow that God can be in any measure apart 
from His creation. On the other hand, Theism con- 
ceives of God as both in the world and out of it; as 
being both immanent and transcendent.'^ 

These, then, are the two forms which lie before the 
Idealist awaiting his choice. Which shall we choose? 



'There was a time when Christian thinkers thought of 
God as transcendent only ; as utterly removed from the world ; 
but such a conception flourished only under primitive con- 
ditions, and at a time when theological thought was by rea- 
son of its fanaticism reduced almost to the level of the 
bizarre. An interesting example of this way of thinking is 
that given by John Fiske in his "Idea of God," where he 
tells of how as a child he pictured the Almighty. 

Another form of transcendent thought must be remarked 
upon, and that is that form popular in the eighteenth century 
under the name of Deism. It was the creed of a group of 
able thinkers — who did not push their conclusions far enough 
however — who taught that God having once made the world 
left it to itself and remained from it forever separate. The 
occasion for this theory was a desire to retain belief in the 
Divinity and yet deny the possibility of miracles. This was 
effected by conceiving of the Creator as existent and yet 
unable by reason of the law of His Being to interfere with 
that which He had once created. At this place we cannot dis- 
cuss this problem farther than to say that it fails in its object, 
because it was so evidently the creature of a desire to avoid 
certain conclusions — the possibility of miracles for example — 
at any cost. The student is referred for discussions on this 
subject to J. R. Illingworth's "Immanence and Transcendence." 



158 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

In order to decide we must examine into them that it 
may be seen whereto they lead us. 

Of the many forms in which ideahstic Pantheism 
appears, that which is perhaps the best known — be- 
cause of its notoriety — is so-called Christian Science. 
But there is a more noble and ancient expression of 
this form of beHef, and that is that which is to be 
found in the religion of primitive India.^ Or, again, 
and to come down to more recent times, we find an 
expression, perhaps the most brilliant expression of 
it, in the philosophy of Hegel. But with the actual 
outcroppings of this creed we are not concerned. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that those who pro- 
fess it in its various forms are generally eager and 
hasty to deny that they are Pantheists. What con- 
cerns us just now is the theory itself rather than the 
theorizers. 

In brief then it may be premised, as it should al- 
ready be understood, that the fundamental tenet of 
ideahstic Pantheism is that all is mind: that each and 



^ It is exceedingly difficult to deal with Brahmanism, be- 
cause in its present polytheistic form it reveals but few traces 
of its original Pantheism. However, the present fantastic 
worship of gods-many is but a crude development of the 
theory that everything is a manifestation of the eternal 
mind, and so far as we are able to assert an3rthing positively 
about this fine old form of religion, we can say that its es- 
sential doctrine is that all is mind and that everything which 
appears to the senses is illusion. The student should for 
convenience consult some shorter volume upon the history of 
religion, such for example as that by Allen Menzies. 



THE INTERPRETATION OF IDEALISM 159 

every atom or object, personal or impersonal, is but 
a manifestation of the all-engulfing, all-designing 
mind. Whether these multitudinous manifestations of 
the Eternal Mind are illusory and non-existent, as 
some would have it, or whether they are temporary 
and relative realities, as perhaps the great philosopher 
would express it — these details are not essential to 
the discussion here; what we must grasp is the fact 
that we are asked to believe that in the beginning and 
in the end all was and will be cosmic mind. How are 
we to greet this proposition? 

It is to be realized primarily that this position pos- 
sesses real attractions. If we could accept it, it would 
relieve us of many of the inconveniences which sur- 
round the simple Theist. It does away with the 
perplexities resultant from the conceiving of God 
as Eternal and Timeless, and yet as coming into time 
relations with the world. It is an easy solution to the 
problem created by the juxtaposition of our free wills 
and the foreknowledge of the Father; — it solves the 
problem of predestination and free will. It does away 
with most of the difficulties which meet us when we 
speak of the divine government, and is the simplest 
hypothesis by which to account for "providence." It 
solves the problem of matter and evil by relegating 
them to the convenient cupboard of imaginary delu- 
sions. But with all of its advantages it yet possesses 
one disadvantage of such proportions as to make it for 
toiling humanity worthless, and that is, that it deprives 
men of their individuality. If all is mind, and if our 
minds are but manifestations of the Eternal Mind, 



160 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

then are all ideas of separate and individually re- 
sponsible personalities but hallucinations.^ As has 
been pointed out, it is not a choice that the Idealist has 
to make between one thing that is all wrong and one 
that is all right, but between one which is humanly 
valuable and one which is humanly worthless. All 
idealistic positions — as well as all naturalistic ones — 
are hypothetical, and what we have to do is to decide 
which hypothesis is preferable. 

Consider, for example, the result of accepting as a 
final truth this denial of the separateness of our per- 
sonalities; this theory that in reality each one of us 
is no more than a manifestation of the eternal and 
all-absorbing One. Were this so, then is it not evident 
to begin with that all moral issues would be blurred? 
For what creates a moral or ethical issue, if it is not 
belief in individual responsibility — the individual's 
power to purpose? That such a belief as the ability 
to purpose involves us in fathomless difficulties about 
free will it has been admitted. But when one is deal- 
ing with life he has to accept difficulties of all kinds, 
and it is to be contended that to throw over individ- 
uality for the sake of avoiding the problem raised 
thereby, and to accept in lieu thereof a Pantheism 
wherein there is but one mind and one will, is to fly 
from lesser to greater evils. 

Further, it is to be argued that the progress of the 
race is in proportion to man's recognition of individ- 



®For a discussion of this see Andrew Seth's "Hegelianism 
and Personality." 



THE INTERPRETA TION OF IDEALISM 161 

ual responsibility — of individual purposes and minds. 
Experience shows us how wherever a people have 
rejected this difficult belief, they have degenerated. 
As Paganism destroyed men by making them Mate- 
rialists, so has idealistic Pantheism destroyed men by 
making them indifferent to the demands of social and 
economic and ethical welfare. And why should they 
not become indolent and indifferent, if the One Mind 
utterly dominates their minds, and if all of their acts, 
whether good or bad, are to be taken as manifesta- 
tions of the Eternal Mind? It is a very practical 
problem which confronts the Idealist when he has to 
choose between Pantheism and Theism. In aiding 
him to decide one cannot do better than to recommend 
him to a study of the development of the different 
races, with particular reference to the results reached 
by those races which have believed in the inviolability 
of individuality, and the races which have rejected that 
belief. On the one hand we see energy and activity 
and progress, on the other inertia and inactivity and 
decay.^^ 



" It is sometimes suggested by superficial thinkers that the 
inactive people are the happiest, and that with the individual- 
istic energy of Christendom has come nothing but sorrow. 
To such it is to be replied that if one defines happiness as 
sensual enjoyment this is without doubt true, but that upon 
such an hypothesis the hog in his wallow is the happiest of 
creatures, and that even the hog has pains, and hence the 
summuyn bonuni of happiness must be conceded to the stone 
or stick. True happiness is a question of achievement, and 
where that is found, is found also the conviction that the 
individual is an unit of mind and purpose. 



162 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

One other objection is to be entered against panthe- 
istic IdeaHsm, and that is that it is apt to be exclusive- 
ly emotional. That this is so will be seen from the 
fact already indicated that surrender of individ- 
ual responsibility brings with it loss of will and reason. 
All pantheistic positions are in the end matters of tem- 
perament. This is a dangerous word to handle, tem- 
perament, since it may be answered that all Idealism 
is equally temperamental. But there is a wide differ- 
ence between an emotional temperament and one 
which proceeds from a well balanced and well devel- 
oped personality. In the one case the result is delete- 
rious, and in the other wholesome. The Pantheistic 
temperament results in a destruction of initiative, the 
Theistic in its encouragement. If Pantheism, begin 
though it may, upon an idealistic basis — in the belief 
that all is mind; if Pantheism become a question of 
the emotions, as it would seem inevitably to, then it 
must end in being naturalistic; and the objection to 
this is^ as has already been shown, that it is a rejec- 
tion of Idealism and a complete capitulation to its an- 
tithesis. 

In the end, it has to be repeated, this whole prob- 
lem is reducible to a matter of preference. It is a 
question of the relative worth of human needs, and 
men's comparative evaluation of the same. It is not 
possible for me to prove that my form of Idealism is 
truer to reason than my neighbor's. The persistence 
of various kinds of philosophy proves this. If any 
one form of Idealism could have been demonstrated 
to be the truest, then would the philosophical war long 



THE INTERPRETATION OF IDEALISM 163 

since have ceased to be waged. Between an Idealism 
which postulates that the explanation of the meaning- 
fulness of the world is to be found in the fact that it 
is but a manifestation of mind, and the Idealism which 
explains this fact upon the hypothesis that the world 
is the creation of the mind which is at once immanent 
and transcendent; between these two positions it is a 
question as to which is best calculated to meet the 
demand of the needs of humanity. The cautious and 
yet fearless philosopher will admit the possibility of 
there being a large element of truth in idealistic Pan- 
theism. He will avoid attempting to argue it out of 
existence.^^ He will rather take his stand upon the 
fact of human needs, and assert that they are not to 
be met by an annihilation of human personality, but 
by an assertion of its reality and definiteness; and 
then beyond that, by belief in the personality of the 
Governor of this Universe — by the belief that that 
which makes this world so significant is that it was 
made and is now governed by a personal God. 



"The student is to be warned against endeavoring to 
convert by argumentative logic — by philosophy — the disciples 
of Mrs. Eddy. This is likewise to be avoided in all cases 
where the position objected to is based upon a pantheistic 
form of Idealism. It has been emphasized already that "by 
searching" man cannot find God, and it is to be repeated here. 
The position of pantheistic Idealists cannot be shaken by 
Theistic logic for the reason that they rest their belief upon 
the same kind of "searching" as that adopted by the Theist. 
The difference in their conclusions has resulted not so much 
from what their logic has taught them as from what they 
have learned from the experience of humanity. 



164 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

But when we make use of this word " personaUty," 
and apply it thus to the human and divine Being alike, 
it is necessary that one hasten to define just what he 
means thereby. To this question of the meaning of 
the word personality as applied to men and God, the 
next chapter must be devoted. 



CHAPTER VI. 
HUMAN PERSONALITY. 

IN the preceding chapter we rejected as valueless 
for practical purposes that interpretation of Ideal- 
ism which destroys or in any way discounts the im- 
portance of a human personality. It now remains for 
us to examine the other method of interpreting Ideal- 
ism, that, namely, which by anticipation we have al- 
ready named the theistic. 

Theism is the theory which holds that the signifi- 
cance of the world is to be ascribed to the fact that it 
is the creation of an infinite Person; a Person who, 
apart from and distinct from these little personalities 
of ours, governs and directs the universe. It will at 
once be evident that if we are to look into this theory 
properly it can only be done by investigating this 
word ''personality." Until we know what we mean by 
this term we cannot pretend to deal with Theism itself. 

But when we commence to study personality we 
discover that our efforts are not merely introductory 
to the problem of Theism, but that they form the basis 
of, and penetrate into the heart of the entire subject; 
that so far from the study of personality being a sep- 
arate study from that of Theism it is identical there- 
with; that all theistic problems stand or fall with the 
problems of personality. And this is so because the 
problem of personality is a final problem. It cuts to 
the very core of life and thought. It reaches down 



166 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

to the utmost depths of philosophy. It is, in a word, 
the problem as to the being of God and as to man's re- 
lation to Him. All theology presupposes an under- 
standing of personality ; and a complete understanding 
of personality would be a complete theology. They 
are to all intents and purposes interchangeable and mu- 
tually inclusive questions. 

Having said so much, it need hardly be added that 
when in the following pages we devote ourselves to 
the meaning of personality we are definitely discussing 
Theism. Though the subject be treated from an ap- 
parently non-theological point of view, a considera- 
tion of this interchangeability of problems should con- 
vince the student that we are in fact going to the heart 
of the matter.^ 



^The foregoing statement might seem to be precipitate, 
but its truth will be perceived when it is pointed out that all 
denials of the freedom of the will (and by the freedom of the 
will is merely meant the positive side of v/hat is meant by 
personality; personality and will-freedom are interchangeable 
terms, or rather we might say that a person is a free object, 
and an object which is free is a person), all denials of the 
freedom of the will are preceded by rejections of the belief 
in a personal God; and vice versa all rejections of the con- 
clusions of the Theist are antedated by denials that men are 
free. The intimate connections between these two things 
should be very apparent. If I am a cause unto myself, then 
am I beyond the compulsion of Nature's law, and hence must 
I look behind that law if I would find the final cause of the 
Universe. Hence it is that whoever would accept or reject 
belief in God must in the first place accept or reject belief in 
his own freedom. The possibility or impossibility of a free 
will underlies the possibility or impossibility of the existence 
of God. 



HUMAN PERSONALITY 167 

As yet, however, our terms are but loose, and if we 
are to come to any definite understanding, and if we 
are to profit by this discussion, and if we are to dis- 
cover the pecuHar value and significance of the theistic 
form of Idealism, it can only be as we know exactly 
what is meant when we use this word personal. 

Now this is the more necessary because according 
to the common interpretation of the word person, it is 
not necessarily associated with things religious, and 
does not inevitably suggest God. The ordinary idea 
of personality is in reality one which would be utterly 
inappropriate if applied to the Divinity. If, for ex- 
ample, one were to ask the average man what he meant 
by personality, he would probably reply that he meant 
that by which he was differentiated from the beasts. 
Now as a matter of fact this is an element, a large 
element in its significance, but when one is dealing 
with cosmic thoughts rather than with biological, the 
proper significance of the term is to be found in its 
relation, not to the beasts which are below us, but 
to the Being which is above us. In a word, the cru- 
cial importance of this term in matters philosophical 
lies in the fact that it indicates not our superiority to 
the cattle but our inferiority to God. We mean when 
we speak of ourselves as persons, not that we possess 
a prize, but that we lack it. Let us look thoroughly 
into this matter. 

In the first place let us emphasize what has been 
said, by admitting that the Greek Xenophanes was 
quite justified in ridiculing the ancient religious teach- 
ers upon the ground that they brought God down to 



168 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

their level (what he said was that the lions if they 
could think would picture their God as a majestic 
Lion), just because these same theologians — if we 
may call them such — conceived of personality as a 
unique possession of men — a perfect possession. Now 
it is perfectly true that if we think of personality as 
something possessed by us in its perfection, that then 
to apply the term to the Infinite Being who rules the 
Earth would indeed be bringing God down to the level 
of humanity. 

But when we thus reason we are overlooking the 
larger half of the truth. Whenever we think of per- 
sonality as something of which we are to be proud, 
then are we thinking of ourselves from the bestial 
point of view. The fact of the matter is that when 
we have considered it from all points of view we 
shall find that we have no reason to be proud of our 
personality, but rather to be ashamed. It is only after 
we have advanced thus far in our philosophical thought 
that we shall begin to understand the true signifi- 
cance of this matter; it is only when we shall have 
understood and appreciated this other aspect that we 
shall be able to advance in theological thought. 

Let us then proceed to ask what is meant when we 
affirm that our personality is something of which we 
should in reality be ashamed. What is human per- 
sonality from the philosophical point of view? And 
we may reply by saying that it is imperfection and in- 
completion! From the ideal standpoint human per- 
sonality is a term with which we mean to denote that 
which though striven after is not attained — imperfec- 



HUMAN PERSONALITY 169 

tion. A person is an animate object dissatisfied with 
its condition — a Tantalus with the prize in view but 
beyond reach. When we call ourselves persons we 
mean thereby, that though we are not really personal, 
yet we would be, and at least have a glimmering of 
what that attribute implies. I am a person, not be- 
cause I am somewhat, but because I can see beyond 
these limitations and hindrances to what I may become. 

This definition, though unusual, is absolutely true. 
When we look upon the Universe from the Idealist's 
standpoint we learn that we call ourselves persons not 
to magnify but to humiliate ourselves ! We have not 
named God after us, but ourselves after Him. When 
we use this word we refer not to what we already 
have, but to that of which we possess a faint and 
feeble reminder and suggestion. 

What, for example, is the most characteristic trait 
of the normal man ? Is it not to bewail his limitations ? 
To proclaim his dissatisfaction? To expound his im- 
perfection? No normal man is free from this feeling 
of limitedness. None are satisfied. Whoever so much 
as dreamed of a man who was content with his ac- 
complishments, or satisfied with his knowledge, or re- 
signed to the limitations which are put upon his will? 
All men by instinct would see beyond the horizon! 
All men by nature resent the shortness of their sight, 
and the dullness of their ears, and the pathetic dim- 
ness of their other senses ! Now, when thus we consider 
impatient and impotent man, we realize that this sense 
of his incompleteness is in reality his glory. It is be- 
cause men have cried throughout the ages, " I shall be 



170 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

satisfied when I awake in Thy likeness ;" it is because 
they have thus felt their emptiness, that they have been 
spurred on and inspired. Give a man much and you 
damn him to a life of lazy safety, give him little and 
you bless him with a life of zealous striving. It is the 
"infinite wealth of weakness" which is our great pos- 
session, since it spurs us on and endows us with the 
joy and the glory of fighting for strength.^ 

Even so it is man's realization of his weakness — not 
his strength — which enables him to labor and to plan. 
Why is it that we rise up early to scheme and work? 
Why do we desire more and more learning? Why do 
we struggle for more and more power? Is it not in 
order that we may quiet the demands of our nature; 
— the demands which we make to approximate more 
nearly to the potentialities with which we feel our- 
selves endowed? Our deepest instinct is one of dis- 
satisfaction, and this it is which drives us and makes 
us what we are. We live only to demand and to de- 
sire and to hope and to strive for more than we have. 
In other words, our lives are at best but purposes, and 
a person is a purpose. The two words might almost 
be used interchangeably. The person is what he is — 
is more than the brute — because he is a being of pur- 
pose, and the purpose is to overcome limitations; — to 
see and know and accomplish ever more and more. 
The dissatisfaction which drives us is the result of the 
knowledge which comes to us with the years, of what 



^ Read William Watson's poem, "The Dream of Man," for 
a most suggestive illustration of this point. 



HUMAN PERSONALITY 171 

personality ought to be — a purpose which forever ac- 
complishes. 

But this thought must be further illustrated if it is 
to be clearly grasped. Of what type of humanity do 
we use the phrase, " There is a real man?" Is it not 
always of those who despite their abilities are none the 
less humble? The heroes who win our regard are 
those who have achieved renown because of an in- 
tense dissatisfaction with their conditions; who have 
taken hold grimly of the wheel of life and worked with 
might and main to better their own or their neigh- 
bor's condition. Such as never strove — the unambi- 
tious, the self-satisfied, such have never won the 
world's esteem. It is of the humblest, and hence those 
who labor hardest for self-improvement or race im- 
provement, that we say Behold a Man ! Our criterion 
of manhood is realization of insufficiency and a con- 
sequential intensity of striving. 

As we grow older and wiser, our dissatisfaction with 
little deeds deepens; as we learn ever more and more, 
we long with Socrates even yet more for wisdom; as 
we begin with the increasing years to come to the full 
height of manhood, we discover that in reality our 
height is as nothing in comparison to what we would 
have it be, and the taller we become, and the loftier 
the mountain top on which we stand, the more em- 
barrassing becomes the horizon, and the more do we 
feel our inability to see afar. 

It is when we thus reason, for example, that we 
perceive that we should never use the present tense 
of the verb ''to be" in applying it to ourselves. If 



172 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

my discontent increases with the accumulating years, 
and if with each addition to my knowledge I re- 
alize ever more and more how ignorant I am; if it 
is thus that we ever seem to be less and less, and 
seem with each accomplishment to be less and less of 
an accomplisher ; if, once again, with the expansion 
of my powers I come nearer and nearer to an inevitable 
realization that I am not what I would be; — if this is 
the path along which persons travel, then they can 
never properly announce that they are, but rather that 
they hope they may become I Who can stand upon 
his feet and fearlessly proclaim, " I am ? " Who will 
not rather announce, '* I am striving and struggling in 
the hope that I may become." As it has been put in 
another connection, only the Lord of Heaven and 
Earth and the beasts of the field may say, '' I am." The 
Almighty is, and therefore can use such words, while 
the thoughtless brutes being devoid of all idea of im- 
perfection (which is the explanation of why they on 
their part do not labor like men) can likewise without 
shame, affirm that they are. This is what is meant 
by that curious old phrase in Exodus, when God spoke 
unto Moses and said : " Thus shalt thou say unto the 
children of Israel, I AM hath sent me." 

To sum up this examination into the essence of hu- 
man personality we might say that its dominating 
characteristic is the sense of developableness. The 
brutes, not giving evidence of the idea that they might 
develop their powers, are not called by us persons. 
We do not predicate personality until we experience 
some evidence of a conscious ability to develop. When 



HUMAN PERSONALITY 173 

we see a being, however low, however degraded, in 
whom there remains a single sign of developable- 
ness, we treat it as, and call it, a person. Such, for 
example, is the difference — the infinite difference, be- 
tween the anthropoid ape and the Andaman islander. 
Further than this, we predicate personality in increas- 
ing degrees and with increasing confidence as we see 
more and more a realized potentiality and possibility 
of power. Finally, and it is perhaps metaphorically, 
but it is nevertheless true, we only say Ecce Homo I of 
those who have developed in the past and show evi- 
dence of a desire for even greater development in the 
future. Such is the criterion of the passive side of 
personality. 

It would be interesting, if space permitted, to go 
more deeply into this subject and to discuss the rela- 
tive importance which exists between the three ele- 
ments which go towards the making of a complete 
man, i. e., the Emotions, the Intellect and the Will. 
For us in this connection all that can be allowed, how- 
ever, is the statement that though the foregoing 
would seem to place as the fundamental element the 
Will — that whereby we develop — yet such an inter- 
pretation would be permissible only were we to fail 
to note that there is a difference between the will as 
a part of a personality and the will as the whole per- 
son. In other words, one must notice that the will as 
distinct from the emotions and intellect is one thing, 
and the will as the summing up of a whole character 
is another. It is this will which sums up and sub- 
sumes the three elements of Will, Emotion and Intel- 



174 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

lect that must be identified with the essence of per- 
sonaHty; the essence which we designate as the sense 
of developableness. Such then we affirm to be the 
passive aspect of what personaUty is. Let us now 
turn to the positive or active aspect. 

To do this we need only sum up what has been said 
in another way. If sense of developableness is the 
passive side, then endeavor to develop must be the 
other. If I cannot say '' I am/' I can at least say " I 
strive to be." Struggling, striving, working, plan- 
ning, endeavoring, to become what we feel we might 
be; this is the active expression of a person. In pro- 
portion as this expression is lacking do we fail to 
predicate real manhood. In proportion as we se£ men 
acknowledging their imperfection do we admit their 
progress towards perfection. 

Thus then do we define and describe human person- 
ality, and it is only when we do so that we are able to 
take the same word and apply it reverently and rea- 
sonably to the Infinite Being who directs the cosmos 
on its way. Let us, now that we have this true mean- 
ing clearly in our minds, turn to an examination of 
that problem which precipitated upon us this question 
of the meaning of the word personal: the problem 
of theistic Idealism ; of how it is and why it is that we 
dare apply this same word to God. 



CHAPTER VII. 
DIVINE PERSONALITY 

WE must recapitulate. In our study of Idealism 
we concluded that that which gives the mean- 
ing which we find in the Universe must be the power 
which drives it. Having gone thus far, we had to 
pause and ask whether or not the hypothesis of the 
Pantheist might not be a sufficient explanation of 
everything; whether the vastness of the power of the 
rushing Universe might not by reason of its very vast- 
ness be enough to account for the tongues in the trees 
and the sermons in the stones. To this suggestion we 
had to demur on the ground that mere vastness, if 
blind and purposeless, could carry us to no satisfying 
end; could put no tongues in the trees, for the simple 
reason that from the beginning upon such a theory it 
was premised and presumed that there could be no 
language for tongues to speak, and that the meaning 
which appeared to exist was no more than the crea- 
tion of an emotional phantasy, a sensual excitement, 
a form of hysteria, or whatever else one chooses to 
call it. 

Now, when we had progressed thus far we 
had come to one of those places or neutral zones 
in philosophy where regress or progress became 
a matter not of logic but of preference. Honesty 
is the best policy, and it is to be admitted, as it 
has been so often, that when it comes to a choice be- 



176 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

tween Naturalism and Idealism, or between a Panthe- 
ism which would explain the book in the running 
brook by the sheer awfulness of the power which 
makes it run, and a Theism which explains it upon 
the principle of a Personal Director; — it is to be ad- 
mitted that when this choice is presented to us we are 
in the same predicament as that in which we were 
when we had to choose between a meaningless and a 
meaningful creation. What is to be decided is not, 
which is the most logical, but which is preferable; 
which is the least objectionable and the least service- 
able and the least humanly reasonable of the theories. 

Even so when we approach the question of a per- 
sonal God. We must understand distinctly that the 
matter is to be decided in the light of utility and (that 
most hackneyed of all expressions) common sense. 
So let us now turn to our study of the personality of 
the Absolute from this human point of view. 

Now that we know what is to be understood by the 
term human personality we need fear no such criti- 
cism as that made by Xenophanes of old. We no 
longer fear to be told that we are bringing God down 
to our level. If in calling God a person we are pre- 
sumptuous, the presumption then lies in our daring to 
lift ourselves up towards Him. That is the crime of 
which we are guilty, and what we have to deal with 
here is the motive or reason which leads us into this 
crime, and it is to be found in what have been called 
for many years the Cosmological and the Teleological 
arguments. 

As has been before stated, these arguments are apt to 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 177 

be considered out of date, and their force is generally 
thought to have been lost. Without doubt so far as 
their ancient conception and composition is concerned 
they are antiquated and more or less ineffective. But 
being fundamental forms of thought, forms in which 
men must think, if they are to think at all upon final 
problems, it will readily be realized that there must 
be a modern way of composing them, such as will 
make them applicable to modern conditions. 

For example, when Paley, in the days when evolu- 
tion had but dimly been dreamed of,^ argued as a tel- 
eologist, he said: "Were a savage to find a watch 
upon the seashore he would at once conclude that a 
mind like to his mind must have made the machine 
which so agreed with his own crude ideas of mechan- 
ism. It is just what he would have made had he had 
the ingenuity." The argument is then carried a step 
further, and we are bidden to believe that upon the 
same principle, men perceiving the mechanism of the 
eye, or the arrangements by which the crops grow, 
naturally believe that a person like unto them must in 
the beginning have designed them. Now in arguing 
thus in these days of evolutionary knowledge, we lose 
ourselves and our cause, since it can be at once replied 
that the eye or the crop was no special creation but a 
development from some previous condition — a develop- 
ment which the needs of the world forced. So far then 
as special creations and special instances of ingenuity 
are concerned we cannot argue with regard to them 



* Paley's "Evidences of Christianity." 

13 



178 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

teleologically. And yet the teleological significance of 
the universe as a whole is by no means lost. In fact 
modern knowledge has but intensified its value. Let 
us take up then this argument from design from a 
modern point of view, and show how it gives a worthy 
excuse for believing that the power which drives the 
world may be called personal. 

By personal it is to be remembered we mean, not 
that He who rules the cosmos is like us, as Paley would 
in olden days have put it, but that we are like Him. 
We are like Him in that we perceive Him to be the 
realization of what we would be. We cry, "I shall be 
satisfied when I awake in Thy likeness," because we 
are now dissatisfied and long to be like Him — we are 
dissatisfied with the limitations which are put upon 
our wills — we are discontented with our condition, and 
cannot be contented till we can will as He wills. 

But what do we mean by saying that He wills ? Are 
we not at once in using such words bringing Him 
down to us ? No ! for by using such a word we mean 
to express the idea that the Infinite Energy which 
drives the world does so without fault or failure or 
feebleness — does it in no imperfect way, but in the 
perfect way. We see, for example, how that the his- 
tory of the world has been one of unerring develop- 
ment and progress. As men — and to try and look 
from any other point of view is bad psychology — we 
see how that through the ages the Power which has 
directed the cosmos has done so without hindrance; 
how that for It to plan has been to accomplish; how 
that for It to will has been to perfect. We see that 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 179 

nothing resists the will of the Infinite, and how that it 
completes all that it undertakes. In a word, the Ab- 
solute is a prevailing purpose — while we, who can 
never make the will and the accomplishment coincide, 
are failing purposes. 

But again we have it objected that the whole ques- 
tion has been begged in applying the word " purpose " 
as an epithet to the Infinite. To this it is to be an- 
swered, that the word is used in no illicit way; that 
by purpose we mean to express that which cannot be 
expressed in any other way. When one sees a force 
accomplishing results (that behind evolution, for ex- 
ample), he does not necessarily predicate to it all of the 
attributes of human personality when he says that it 
purposes; he does not thus attribute to the Absolute 
such human traits as memory, or forgetfulness, or 
wishing or planning. These are but traits which are 
consistent with imperfect purposing. To plan implies 
limitations which are not to be found in the Power 
which drives the world. But there is a great gulf be- 
tween the planning of finite beings and the planning of 
the Infinite which is coincident with accomplishing. 

In speaking then of the purposing of God we do- 
not make Him like us — limited and finite; far from 
it! If one will but think the matter out it will be- 
come evident that to assert that purposefulness is, a 
priori, an attribute, applicable only to human beings, 
such as ourselves, is exactly the same kind of an error 
as that which is involved in asserting that in speaking- 
of God as personal one is bringing Him down to men. 
When we apply purpose to the Infinite we mean there- 



180 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

by prevailing purpose, and not failing purpose — and 
there is the width of infinity between prevaihng pur- 
pose and the purposings of feeble men. The one is 
equivalent to eternal accomplishment, the other to 
eternal striving.^ 

Now it is just this fact of eternal accomplishment 
which makes men in the midst of their failures 
and struggles look up to the Highest. It is the fact 
that they see in the Power which directs the Universe 
exactly that prevailing purposefulness which they 
themselves long after, that makes them call themselves 
by Its name. It is because men see the Infinite do 
what they yearn to do — bring all of its plans to com- 



^ The problem of the relation between the accomplishments 
of the Infinite power and purposing, has been worked out 
perhaps more fully than any other theistic question. In a 
recent volume of V. F. Storr on "Development and Divine 
Purpose" we have it thus expressed: "As we cannot think 
of our own volitional activity except in terms of ends which 
ultimately take a moral coloring, so we cannot think of 
God except as purposing moral ends. It might be retorted 
that God may will an immoral end, just as a man, in virtue 
of his freedom, can and does, will to do evil. From the point 
of view of our present argument that is a fair retort; but, 
even so, the objector has granted what we are primarily con- 
tending for, namely, the existence of a will with a content 
and characteristics, seeking positive ends which it conceives 
as worth pursuing. What we must banish from our minds 
is the thought of bare, indeterminate will." (Page 280.) 

This whole problem is discussed with power by James 
Martineau in his "Study of Religion." To such larger works 
as these the student is urged to apply himself. Here we are 
able only to hint at the significance of the problem. 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 181 

pletion — that makes them recognize in it their arche- 
type. It is because they see in Him a perfect, unim- 
peded Doer that they understand how imperfect and 
impeded they are. 

The enlargement of our knowledge, the discoveries 
of the scientists, have but deepened our appreciation 
of the Will-fulness of the Infinite. The theory of evo- 
lution, for example, is no more and no less than a state- 
ment of cosmic purposefulness. The larger the deed 
the greater the doer, and with each addition to our 
knowledge we perceive more and more clearly the ma- 
jestic proportions of the divine accomplishment. What 
the "far off divine event" may be towards which the 
whole creation is moving is not in this connection a 
question at point. All that is needed for the present 
is to indicate that the whole creation does move in a 
definite and harmonious manner, and to point out that 
all movement in a definite direction can be thought of 
by human beings like ourselves under no other terms 
than those of purpose.^ 

When we speak of the personality of the Absolute, 
then, what we mean is that it reveals to us the perfect 
illustration of that which we feel ourselves to be fee- 
ble imitations. Our little lives are made up of unend- 
ing attempts to accomplish. We struggle from the 
morning until the evening, and yet are never able to 
bring to fruition. Change and chance, weakness and 
folly, inability and ignorance, these all combine to frus- 



' Compare V. F. Storr's "Development and Divine Purpose, 
Chapter XII. 



182 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

trate our efforts. We feel that we are free, but for all 
our freedom to will we do not yet possess the ability 
to perform. Then at length we lift up our eyes to the 
hills, we survey the universe, we see how that it is 
driven by an all-compelling, all-completing Force, and 
as we study that force and see its omnipotence, its 
ability to do whatever it attempts, to enforce all of its 
commands, we say to ourselves : " That is our arche- 
type ! That is the perfect will and the perfect per- 
sonality of which we are but suggestions!" And so 
we call it Personal, not in order to make it like us, hut 
in order to indicate what we would he if only our wills 
could prevail. 

That, then, is our motive for calling the Infinite a 
person. Oppressed by our limitations, and depressed 
by the obstacles which bar our way, we look up to the 
Absolute and see in its prevailing purposefulness the 
real meaning of the word, and the real illustration of 
what it is; — we see that divine personality means Ac- 
complisher. It is in this form then that we would put 
the Teleological argument. To the question. What is 
the meaning of the world's apparent movement to- 
wards an end? — we reply: It means that it is forced 
towards an end by a prevailing will; a will which 
never falters, a will which is infinite. 

The Cosmological Argument. 

But then there is another matter to be considered 
in this discussion of the personality of the Infinite, and 
it is that which comes under what is called the cosmo- 
logical form of thought. If teleology deals with the 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 183 

whither, cosmology is the study of the whence of the 
world. If teleology finds in the purposefulness of the 
Infinite Power reason for calling it "personal," cosmol- 
ogy finds in its reliability evidence which points in the 
same direction.* Let us now study for a moment the 



* It would be best to state briefly the form in which it 
has been customary to state the Cosmological argument. It 
is the argument, as has been indicated, of the "whence" of the 
Universe. Whence this vast mechanism, so amazing and so 
all-absorbing? Obviously, since a result postulates a cause, 
what we perceive must have been caused. Let us say that 
the Energy which is everywhere evident caused the result 
which we call the present universe. But now we cannot think 
of that energy as itself uncaused; everything suggests some 
prior cause. So we ask what caused the Energy? Thus by 
a series of regressions the cosmologist would take us back to 
a First Cause which is to be identified with God. 

But there is an unanswerable objection to this form of the 
argument. It is that keenly made use of by cultured 
Buddhists, who, on the Christian's positing the All Creator 
reply, "Who made Him?" The trouble lies in the fact that 
the postulate with which one begins this kind of reasoning 
cannot be abandoned when one comes to the idea of God. If, 
that is, every product must be the result of some producer, if 
every effect must have a cause, what right have we to say of 
God that to Him this line of reasoning does not apply? How 
can we escape asking "Who made God?" if we have worked 
back to Him upon the assumption that the human mind can- 
not think of a thing which has not been caused? 

In the text here will be found a totally different application 
of the principle of dependence. Perhaps it should not be 
called the "Cosmological" argument, but the reader will dis- 
cover after reflection that the basic idea, that of dependence, 
rules supreme in the way in which the argument is here 
conducted, quite as much as in the more usual method. 



184 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

question of the reliability of the Cosmic Energy, and 
see what that fact of reliability suggests. 

In the first place, consider how we depend upon the 
regularity and trustworthiness of the Absolute. This 
dependence is so vital a part of our make-up that, like 
all other things which are vital, it is not, and cannot 
be, fully realized. We never appreciate facts which 
are not to be dissociated from ourselves. Neverthe- 
less the fact is there. From sunrise to sunset we de- 
pend upon the regularity of the Cosmic Energy. This 
seems a trivial statement because it is trivial, prac- 
tically; but actually and psychologically it is porten- 
tous and overwhelming. Underneath the child are 
the arms of the mother, and expecting nothing else 
the child makes no comment. Underneath us are the 
Everlasting Arms, and we, expecting nothing else, 
make no comment. But just now the point to be made 
is that when comment is perforce made, it is of one in- 
evitable type; when we do remark upon the Everlast- 
ing Arms — the arms which hold the earth in its place 
and move it around the sun ; the arms which bring in 
seed time and harvest, and the blessings of the Earth's 
abundance; the arms which make the coal to burn, 
the electricity to labor and the oil to flow, and the 
steam to propel, and the wedge and the pulley and the 
lever to do their work ; — when we think of the Infinite 
Energy which thus drives the world, whether we be 
agnostic scientists, or gnostic theosophists, or theists, 
we are compelled to realize that we depend upon it, 
and further, that we trust it and rely upon it. 

Treat such a statement as we may, we cannot escape 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 185 

the conclusion that we rely upon the cosmic energy. 
Did we not thus attribute reliableness to it — conscious- 
ly or unconsciously — we would never dream on our 
part of making plans for the day's work. The pre- 
supposition of plan-making; the presupposition of sci- 
entific investigation, and of every other act of man, is 
trust in the reliableness of the Infinite. 

This is the first point that is to be made clear, and 
the second is to be seen when it is asked : What does 
the attribute " reliableness " suggest ? And we begin 
the answer to this question by saying that in using the 
word reliableness we are making use of a phrase which 
is applicable only to that which might likewise be con- 
ceived of as unreliable. When we say a thing is trust- 
worthy, we by suggestion attribute to it the possibil- 
ity of its being untrustworthy; and once we do this, 
we by suggestion bring it within the sphere of free 
will activity. 

It is no answer to this to suggest that we speak in 
exactly the same way of the reliableness of a piece of 
steel or the dependableness of a watch, since when 
we do thus speak of a piece of mechanism we are not 
using the term in quite the same way— we are speak- 
ing in undiluted metaphor and are consciously for pur- 
poses of poetry or convenience personifying the inani- 
mate object. Nor is it a valid answer to reply that in 
both cases we are making equal use of metaphor, since 
though not in kind, yet in degree there is an infinite 
difference between the reliance which we place in a 
watch which we ourselves could make, and our conse- 
quent feelings towards it, and that which we place in 



186 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the Infinite Force which is so vastly beyond our com- 
prehension, and the consequent sense of relationship 
thereto. That we are making use of metaphor when we 
speak thus of the Infinite is to be allowed, though in a 
different way from that in which it is used of the 
watch. This is to be willingly granted for the simple 
and harmless reason that all speech is metaphor, and 
without metaphor man cannot so much as utter his 
most commonplace thoughts. But, and here is the 
point, it makes all the difference in the world how the 
metaphor is used. 

But return to our question as to what this attribu- 
tion of reliableness to the Infinite suggests. This 
brings out a fact of vital importance and one which 
has not often enough been attended to in this connec- 
tion. Beyond the incidental fact that the attributing 
of reliableness postulates likewise the attributing of 
t^/ireliableness — a point which is of value only by way 
of enlargement — ^beyond this fact which reveals the 
connection between reliability and freedom, is the 
further fact that "reliableness" does in reality mean 
— under the form of an abstract noun — exactly what 
we try to express with the word "person." Just as 
it might be said that the word "bravery" is but the 
abstract equivalent for what is indicated by the word 
"hero." So it is that by reliableness we indicate what 
the word person is intended to suggest. To appreciate, 
however, the force of this it is needful that we recall 
what has been said upon the true meaning of the word 
personality. 

If it were true that personality were a term devoid of 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 187 

implications of perfection, then what is here affirmed 
would be untenable. But since we do not dream of 
asserting that all persons are what they should be; 
since persons are not, but are rather becoming; since 
a human person is a bundle of faults ; even so we dare 
state that the word reliability is the idea which it is 
intended should be expressed by this word person. 
This is so because person means in reality some- 
thing very different from that which a human person 
actually is; even so does reliability stand for an attri- 
bute which is far beyond the deserts of ordinary mor- 
tals. We mortals are certainly not illustrations of re- 
liability, but we are equally unworthy of being looked 
upon as illustrations of real personality. 

Now the vital point comes in when we perceive that 
what we do conceive to be a perfect person, a person 
such as we would like to be, a person devoid of our 
faults and failings; — what we do conceive as being 
implied in, and potential in, personality, is exactly what 
we mean by the word reliability. When the idea con- 
tained in the word personality originated it was meant 
to express the realization of what a man might be were 
he faultless. And so it is that we affirm that that 
which reliableness suggests is that which is expressible 
only in the word Person. 

To sum up. We think of the Infinite Power which 
rules the world in terms of trustworthiness, and trust- 
worthiness is expressible only in the language of per- 
sonality. The conclusion which follows from this is 
not that the Infinite is comprehensible to us, but that 
so long as we think of it, and depend upon it, just so 



188 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

long must we bow to the limitations of language and 
speak of it and think of it as personal. This conclu- 
sion would not be helpful had we not already seen that 
we are not interested in proving that God is like us, 
but rather in showing how everything points to 
the fact that we are like Him; that we are only fee- 
ble imitations of Him. Therefore we need not regret 
that our conclusion is not more drastic. All that this 
method of dealing with the argument from dependence 
is intended to do, is to show that we have, cosmolog- 
ically speaking, as much, if not more, right to speak 
of the personality of the Infinite, as we have to speak 
of the personality of John Smith. In both cases it 
is merely a question of moral relationship — of the re- 
lation which results from dependence upon good will. 

We have now illustrated the modern value of 
these arguments. If one pursue the matter further 
he will but find more and more reasons for our think- 
ing of the Power which is above us in the terms 
which we apply to ourselves. He is a prevailing pur- 
pose, and He is reliable. These are two attributes 
which are inseparable from the language of person- 
ality. They represent the qualities which above all 
others we aspire to obtain. They are the attributes in 
accordance with which we adjudge the worth of our 
neighbors. They are the criteria by which we meas- 
ure manhood. Little wonder then that mankind, find- 
ing these qualities after which it aspires, and by which 
it measures its individuals, and up to which it looks 
in the Force which drives the world, should speak of 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 189 

it as personal. It is to be questioned seriously how 
else that Force could be spoken of. In what way 
could we express the capacity and the power of the 
Absolute which would in any way make its processes 
plain to language-using men, unless we spoke of it as 
Personal ? 

To conclude and sum up what has been said : ( i ) 
The Infinite can be spoken of as a Person without ir- 
reverence or violence of reason. (2) The Infinite 
must be spoken of in such terms if one desires to re- 
fer to one's dependence upon it, or if one desires to con- 
sider its ability to accomplish and prevail. These are 
the results to which we come, when with an adequate 
understanding of what personality means, we study the 
relation which humanity bears to the Power which 
drives the world. It is not only that it is reasonable 
to use this much abused word in speaking of that 
Power, but that it is necessary if one would actually 
state in the inevitable metaphor of language just what 
the relations of man to the Infinite Energy are. 

When one weighs these conclusions seriously he 
finds that they are most helpful. He finds himself pro- 
vided with an hypothesis which is of incalculable aid 
in dealing with the demands and suppHes of life. It 
has been insisted all along that the question is one 
which has to be referred, in the last resort, to prac- 
tical needs, and it must now be insisted that this con- 
clusion — that the Power which rules is personal — is 
one which supplies us with a working solution to the 
world-problem which is of final value — of value so 
great as to overawe all objections. 



190 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

That with which we commenced our philosophical 
examination was the problem of the why, of the 
world's peculiar suggestiveness. We quoted, indi- 
rectly, Browning and his saying that we can never 
shake ourselves free from the intimations which na- 
ture forces upon us of another world, or of another 
and higher Power. He asked why do we find " fan- 
cies " in the flower bell, or why does **some one's 
death " or a '' chorus ending from Euripides " arouse 
within us thoughts of things higher than any that 
we can here perceive. If we accept the interpretation 
of Idealism, which has been given here, namely, that 
the world is governed by a personal God, then there 
should be no need to ask any more of these " whys." 
The matter is from now on self-evident, and the apol- 
ogist who has led his readers to this threshold, and 
who has shown them that it is reasonable to believe 
that the power which drives the world is a Person; — 
the apologist who has gone thus far need pursue his 
philosophical task no further. 

Given this explanation of the significance of Na- 
ture one can at once grasp the reason for the tongue 
in the tree and the book in the brook. And more than 
this, it is to be asserted that under no other theory can 
these things be satisfactorily accounted for. Even with 
ideahstic Pantheism their propriety seems less. But 
when we yield to the reasonings of the Theist, and 
believe that God has made all things to be His ambas- 
sadors and representatives, — that a personal Deity 
created the earth and the sky and the sea, and guided 
the hand that wrote great poetry, and was responsible 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 191 

for the death of our friend; — when we accept this 
truth and bow down our heads in reverence, then the 
mists are driven away and we stand in a world bathed 
in the sunshine of understanding. And that is the 
great object of philosophy, to make the world com- 
prehensible, and we insist that the philosophy of the 
Theist is the only kind that truly attains to this end. 

To put it all in another way, we found ourselves 
when we began this discussion in a world of Mystery 
and Purpose and Dependence. We found that every 
object suggested one of these qualities, that every deed 
brought one of them into prominence. We found that 
all was subject, whether we wished it or no, to the 
rulings of a power which is omnipotent. And finding 
such wonderful phenomena we paused in awe-struck 
wonder — asking and seeking to find what it all im- 
plied. First we went to the Naturalist and asked him 
to explain it to us, but his explanation did but con- 
fuse things, and instead of clearing up the mystery 
made it but so much the more inexplicable. What he 
had to say to us made the mystery of the tongue in the 
tree far more profound. He tried to explain it away, 
and yet the more he explained and the more he sought 
to minimize it, the louder did the tongue cry out and 
the deeper became our conviction that the voice which 
we heard was real. Accordingly since the explana- 
tion of the Naturalist had, instead of helping us, made 
us much more curious, and much more convinced that 
despite his protestations there was something to be 
found out, we turned to the Idealist. 

First we asked the idealistic Pantheist to tell us 



192 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

what it all meant. His reply, however, was cruel and 
demanded of us admissions which we as human be- 
ings were unwilling to make. "If you would under- 
stand the book in the running brook," said he, "you 
must begin by giving up all ideas about separate 
and inviolable personalities; you must learn that 
all is mind, whether it be the brook or the stone or 
your own self — that every object is but a manifesta- 
tion of the all-engulfing mind. The whole universe is 
mind and its manifestations, and you are but one of 
the many epiphanies." 

But we were utterly unwilling for many reasons — 
most of them purely humanitarian — to give up the 
very thing which we deemed to be most worth while ; 
— the only thing whereby we saw the world to be re- 
deemable: individual effort; — and so at last we turned 
to the theistic Idealist, and from him at last re- 
ceived the explanation of which we were in need. 
He told us that the world was the creation of a Per- 
sonal God, and that each of us was His child. Once 
we heard this all the mystery vanished, and the pur- 
posefulness of the world became plain, and our feeling 
of dependence was justified. 

And so having come to the point at which these 
things — the fancy in the flower bell or the sermon in 
the stone — are explicable, we need not for our pur- 
poses further labor over philosophy. All that the 
apologist has to do is to present a reasonable expla- 
nation of the origin of these phenomena with which 
life is filled, and having done that much he can leave 



DIVINE PERSONALITY 193 

enlargements upon the subject to those who care to 
undertake them. 

The end of the part devoted to philosophical Apolo- 
getics has now been reached, and it is well that before 
turning to the next section we state exactly what the 
purport of our argument has been. In the first place, 
the ideal that has been before us has been that of sug- 
gestiveness. At the cost of leaving many things un- 
said, and of saying some things in an unusual way, 
we have limited the discussion to a narrow field. In 
the second place, we have purposely refrained from 
carrying the argument beyond a certain point — a point 
perhaps unsatisfying to many. But all of this has 
been necessary in order to force the reader to do his 
own thinking — since unless that results, then this and 
all other books upon such a subject will have been 
written to no purpose. If in any subject auto-educa- 
tion is essential, it is in Apologetics, and the apologist 
can render no greater service than to force people to 
thinking along certain lines. 

In conclusion, then, let us point our where self- 
education and examination has to begin. 

Inasmuch as we cannot by searching find God, and 
inasmuch on the other hand as we cannot by logic 
postulate that there is no God, the task which lies be- 
fore the thinker is to discover which of these alterna- 
tives is humanly the more acceptable. He must turn 
to the weather vanes of human needs and mark which 
way they point. Now this process of noting the 
weather vanes is what we call learning through ex- 
perience. Experience! that is the court into which 



194 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

we must take our problems. Experience! that is the 
school in which each man must educate himself. It 
may be that the kind of experience undergone by some 
will be of a purely practical kind; on the other hand, 
those who are metaphysically inclined will weigh these 
matters in the scales of intellectual and ratiocinative 
experience ; they will see in their long reasonings, and 
they will learn as they tread the path of scholarship, 
just what the real values of Hfe are, and in what re- 
lation to them stands the faith in an Infinite Father. 
And surely if any men should be glad and ready thus 
to trust to the provings of experience it should be the 
Christians. 

This is then the school in which the student is urged 
to educate himself. He is urged to be patient, and 
not to mistake momentary triumphs or failures for 
permanent results. He is urged to remember, that as 
all good things are hard to find and possess, so above 
all blessings it is difficult to grasp the philosophic con- 
viction that " God's in His Heaven." We must work 
out our own philosophical salvation, and all that has 
been put down in the preceding pages is intended to 
point out the lines of thought along which that desir- 
able end is to be attained. 



APPENDIX. 
ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. 

THERE is one problem which cannot be left out 
of a book of this kind, much as one might wish 
to, and that is the problem of evil. It is not a major 
problem, but it is a very large one — the largest of all of 
the minor problems which present themselves for so- 
lution to the Christian thinker. We say, " much as 
one might wish to," because it is always well in deal- 
ing with the existence of evil to begin by admitting 
that it cannot be solved with ease — if it can be solved 
at all. 

To begin with, what is the problem? It is that 
which arises the moment we find in juxtaposition: the 
belief in a loving Creator — Father and the presence 
in the world, of suffering and sorrow and sin. If, it 
is asked, God is infinite and able to do anything, and 
if also He is a loving Father, then " why stand we in 
jeopardy every hour?" Why the Messina and San 
Francisco earthquakes? Why these slums in all large 
cities? Why so many men and women who prowl 
about like the ravening wolves, seeking whom they 
may for their own gain destroy? Why all this evil 
in the world which God has created and declared to 
be good? This is an unavoidable question, and has 
been thrust at believers time and time again. Now by 
deep thinkers like Schopenhauer; now by shallow 
sophists like Robert Ingersoll; now by earnest Chris- 



196 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

tians to whom the contradiction which it seems to cre- 
ate is more than they are able to let pass. Why then 
is there evil in the world? 

The first thing to be said is that the worst thing a 
man can do when presented with the problem of evil 
is to suppose that it can be easily solved. One is almost 
tempted to say that most of the intellectual pitfalls 
which have come to the Christian Church have been 
prepared by enthusiasts who have imagined that they 
had found a simple solution to this terrible question. 
In the early centuries much of the heresy sprung 
from attempts to escape from this dilemma by short 
cuts. What we call Gnosticism, for example, was the 
chiefest philosophical enemy that arose within the 
midst of the faithful in the early days, and much of it 
originated out of a desire to relieve the creed of the in- 
explicable presence of evil in the world. The leaders 
in this movement proceeded in this way: If God is 
good, they argued, then He cannot have created that 
which is bad. This being so, whence did it come? 
Evidently from a creator of evil things who works 
against the good God. From this process of reason- 
ing, common to almost all eastern thought, there came 
the theory which is called Dualism, or the existence of 
two creators, one of them beneficient and the other 
maleficient. Another typical instance is that of Or- 
mudz and Ahriman, the opposing deities of Zoroas- 
trianism. Now it is to be noted that in the early days 
of the Church many thinkers broke loose from her 
moorings and went over to Oriental dualism, all be- 



ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 197 

cause they supposed that by so doing they could dis- 
pose without difficulty of the problem of evil. 

But not only in those early days did men thus go 
astray in order to escape from the embarrassments of 
sin and suffering, since equally in these times we find 
theories springing up which owe their origin to the de- 
sire to explain away what seems to be a blunder. Of 
all the theories which have sprung from this desire, 
Christian Science is the most prosperous. It en- 
deavors to attain its end by denying the existence of 
evil — by saying that it is a creature of the imagination. 

Then, lastly, this problem has been dealt with by 
many orthodox believers by stating that private evil 
proves itself in the end to be for the public good. That 
is to say, we are asked to believe that the ultimate end 
of God's purposes is the welfare of the whole world, 
and that in order thus to bring in universal good He has 
at times to subject individuals to misery. We are told 
that the sufferings, for example, at Messina will in the 
end be seen to have been for the welfare of the world 
at large. Now this theory is no explanation of the 
presence of evil; it is at best but a pious subterfuge, 
and it in no way touches or relieves the thinker's sit- 
uation. 

Having thus stated the problem^ and exhibited typ- 
ical ways in which it is dealt with, we are in a position 
reverently to approach it. From what has been said 
it should be evident to begin with that we must pro- 
ceed cautiously with the problem and not imagine that 
there is a solution easily to be found. The very plaus- 
ibility of the dualists' solution, and the simplicity of 



198 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the others that are offered should make us suspicious. 
Whenever one is confronted with a difficulty which 
has baffled centuries of thinkers he should look with 
suspicion on any solution which is short and simple. 
For if it were the true one then why these centuries 
of debate? Men do not labor for ages over matters 
which can be solved with an aphorism. And we can- 
not hope to find in a day an answer to the question 
over which thinkers like Augustine toiled for a life- 
time.^ What is to be said here upon this problem, 
and how are we to find a solution which shall be in 
harmony with our philosophy of experience? 

Perhaps the best way in which we can introduce 
what is to be said is by repeating that it is not to be 
expected that men can solve with an aphorism a ques- 
tion which has puzzled thinkers throughout the cen- 
turies. In other words, it is to be put down that no 
solution can be immediately reached; that whatever 
we learn and however we unravel the vast enigma will 
depend upon our experience. 

Our problem is to be regarded as an integral part 
of the whole problem of personality. The difficulties 
which meet us in dealing with the problem of human 
life are in themselves so large that this new and sub- 
sidiary difficulty cannot be treated apart by itself. From 
one point of view, and that perhaps the most important, 



^ The entire dispute about predestination, which began 
with St. Paul, reached its zenith with Augustine, and blazed 
out again in the writings of Calvin, is attributable to the 
enigma of evil. 



ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 199 

this question is but another aspect of the original ques- 
tion as to the meaning of the universe. Now when 
we dealt with the main problem we concluded that it 
all depended in the first place upon our conception of 
human personality and its needs. Then in the second 
place we decided that just what the needs of free in- 
dividuals were could only be found out by an appeal 
to experience in its various forms. Now this is exactly 
what we must do when we approach the question of 
the existence of evil; we must appeal to experience 
with the assurance that in it we shall learn — not to- 
day or to-morrow, but in God's own time — the mean- 
ing of this forbidding and fearful element in life. 

We begin with an unfaltering belief that somehow 
all things are working under the Father's direction for 
a final good. As it has been put by A. K. Rogers in 
"The Religious Conception of the World," the justi- 
fication of evil lies in this : that "the spirit of practical 
optimism, arising itself out of the process of expe- 
rience, is the prophet of its own success, and of the 
actual attainment of good objectively in the world." 
(Pages 254-5.) In other words, the plain fact that we 
are optimists under the circumstances prophesies that 
there is good ground for our faith. We have as it 
were " overcome evil " or at least the fear thereof. 
We no longer yield with the ancient Greeks or the 
Moslems to passive fatalism. We know that in the end 
all will be well. 

But, it will be averred, this in no way excuses God 
for letting evil into the world, and that is the whole 
of the problem ! To this it is to be answered that in 



200 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

the first place the world we have is the world we have, 
and to think of the world which we might have had 
is pessimism; and pessimism is the negative of Chris- 
tian Theism, and is thereby excluded by our first prin- 
ciple. And then in the second place it is to be said 
that to speak thus is to make God a different kind of 
being from what experience has taught us to believe 
that He is. To quote Rogers again: "If we are con- 
ditioned by God's life, so too we condition it in turn. 
It is to the fact that our natures are what they are 
that the necessity of evil is due — natures that are un- 
developed at the start, and that can only attain to wis- 
dom and stability of character by a gradual process 
of growth." (Page 258.) What we are we are — 
persons who are put into this world for the purpose 
of working out our own salvation. Evil is the rough 
material on which we hammer out our characters. It 
is our opportunity to accomplish that which is eter- 
nally worth while. This being so we do condition God, 
and place a limit upon His creative power, since He 
could not have made us what we are and kept us free 
from possibilities of sin and suffering. 

Hence we do not seek to excuse God ; rather we set 
aside as immaterial and uncalled for all demands that 
we should. We accept the world in which we live, 
and the conditions which necessarily accompany hu- 
man personality. We accept these things and look to 
a larger experience than that which is now ours to 
make plain to us why creation was carried out along 
such and such lines. 

Thus it is that we deal with this great problem of 



ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 201 

the real presence of evil. We do not deny its exist- 
ence; nor do we seek to minimize it; nor do we seek 
to explain it away; nor do we seek by pious maxims 
to quiet questioners. With all its ugliest facts we ac- 
cept it, and because we are Christian optimists we know 
that in time we shall be able to understand those things 
which now through the darkness of the glass appear 
to us so black. In a word, if we are so bold as to begin 
at all with belief in God ; if we are so daring as to com- 
mence with the conviction that we are free agents in 
a world of law and order; then we have within us the 
courage which can silence all the questionings which 
arise in the presence of life's ugliest scars. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR PHILOSOPHICAL 
APOLOGETICS. 

The following books are recommended for collateral read- 
ing in Philosophical Apologetics: 

Caird, E. — "Evolution of Religion." 

Caird, J. — "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion." 

Martineau, J. "The Study of Religion." 

Caldecott, A.— "Philosophy of Religion." 
Hoffding, H.— "Philosophy of Religion." 
Lotze, H. — "Microcosmos." 

Lotze, H. — "Outline of Philosophy of Religion." 
Eraser, C. — "Philosophy of Theism." 
Knight, W.— "Aspects of Theism." 

Ward, J. — "The Realm of Ends ; or. Pluralism and Theism." 
Royce, J. — "Religious Aspect of Philosophy." 
Oman, J. — "Problem of Eaith and Freedom in the Last Two 
Centuries." 
Caldecott, A. — "Selections from the Literature of Theism." 



202 PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS 

Gwatkin, H. N. — "Knowledge of God." 
Rashdall, H. — "The Theory of Good and Evil." 
Rashdall, H.— "Philosophy and Religion." 
Swete, H. B. — "Cambridge Theological Essays on Some 
Questions of the Day." 

Knox, G. W. — "Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the 
Christian Religion." 

Fairbairn, A. N. — "The Philosophy of the Christian Re- 
ligion." 

Ward, W. G. — "Essays in the Philosophy of Theism," 
Eucken, R. — "The Problem of Human Life." 
Eucken, R. — "The Truth of Religion." 
Kaftan, J. — "The Truth of the Christian Religion." 
Temple, W. — "The Nature of Personality." 
Caird, J. — "The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity." 
Caird, E. — "The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Phi- 
losophers." 
Adam, J. — "The Religious Teachers of Greece." 
Bigg, C W. — "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria." 
Mackenzie, W. D.— "The Final Faith." 
Coe, G. A.— "The Religion of a Mature Mind." 
Fiske, J. — "The Idea of God." 
Hyde, W. de W.— "From Epicurus to Christ." 
King, H. C — "Reconstruction in Theology." 
King, H. C. — "Theology and the Social Consciousness." 

On the Psychology and History of Religion. 

Ames, E. S. — "The Psychology of Religious Experience." 
Pratt, J. B.— "The Psychology of Religious Belief." 
Everett, C. C. — "Psychological Elements of Religious 

Faith." 

Boussett, W. — "What is Religion?" 

Lang, A. — "The Making of Religion." 

Marett, R. R.— "The Threshold of Religion." 

Jevons, F. B. — "Introduction to the History of Religion." 

" Enclycopaedia of Religion and Ethics." — Edited by James 

Hastings. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 203 

On Naturalism. 

Ward, J. — "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 

Balfour, A. J. — "Foundation of Belief." 

Balfour, A. J.— "Philosophic Doubt" 

Cooke, J. P.— "The Credentials of Science." 

Cooke, J. P. — "Chemistry and Religion." 

Otto, R.— "Naturalism and Religion." 

Romanes, G. — "Thoughts on Religion." 

Bergson, H. — "Creative Evolution." 

James, W. — "The Will to Believe." 

Boutroux, E. — "Science and Religion." 

Fiske, J. — "Through Nature to God." 

Temple, W. — "Faith and Modern Thought." 

Palmer, W. S. — "An Agnostic's Progress." 

Lodge, O. — "Life and Matter." 

Lodge, O. — "The Substance of Faith." 

Lodge, O. — "Science and Immortality." 

Waggett, P. N. — "The Scientific Temper in Religion." 

Waggett, P. N. — "Religion and Science." 

Shurman, S. G. — "Agnosticism and Religion." 

Schmidt, R. — "The Scientific Creed of a Theologian." 

Storr, V. F. — "Development and Divine Purpose." 

Spalding, J. L. — "Religion, Agnosticism and Education." 

D'Arcy, C. F. — "Christianity and the Supernatural." 

Griffith-Jones, E. — "Ascent Through Christ." 

Wallace, W.— "Man's Place in the Universe." 

Flint, R. — "Agnosticism." 

Rashdall, H.— "Contentio Veritatis." 

Hinton, J.— "The Mystery of Pain." 

Stock, St. G.— "The Problem of Evil." 

Tennant, F. R. — "Origin and Propagation of Sin." 

Howison, T. T. — "Limits of Evolution." 

Thompson, W. H. — "Brain and Personality." 

On the History of Rationalism. 

Benn, A. W.— "History of English Rationalism in the 
Nineteenth Century." 



204 PHILOSOPHISAL APOLOFETICS 

White, A. D. — "The Warfare Between Science and Re- 
ligion." 

Lecky, W. — "History of Rationalism." 

Farrar, A. S.— "Critical History of Free Thought." 

Lange, F. A.— "History of Materialism." 



PART III. 

HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS. 

Chapter I. The Scope of the Subject. 

Chapter IL The Historicity of the Gospel Narrative. 



^^ For we have not followed cunningly devised fables 
when we made known unto you the power and coming 
of our Lord Jesus Christy but were eye witnesses of his 
majesty'' —II Peter, i: i6. 



CHAPTER I. 
THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT. 

IN our study of Philosophical Apologetics we learned 
that from the point of view of human reasonable- 
ness it is better to believe in a Personal God than to 
believe, either that there is no God and that the world 
is driven by blind force, or that the Universe itself is 
God. We said that in the last resort it was a matter 
of preference. Now, even though one accepts the con- 
clusion there reached as the preferable one, it has not 
brought him to the point of view of the Christian. The 
Christian conceives of God as a loving Father, who not 
only made the world, but who likewise has from the 
beginning cared for it, and particularly for mankind. 
To such a conclusion it is not possible for philosophy 
to bring us. There are many and interesting argu- 
ments by which it has been shown that God would 
have cared for the creature, and that He would have 
sent His Son to redeem mankind; these things have 
for centuries been the subjects of long and skillful 
argumentations, but it is to be doubted whether such 
argumentation has been useful and effective. 

Even allowing that the Almighty is Personal, it is 
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to show that He 
would " for us men and our salvation " enter into this 
world in order to save. As was pointed out in the 
first section, were the way of God scrutable it is hard 
to see how an historical revelation can be accounted for. 



208 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

It is just because God's ways and thoughts are not 
ours, that in order to make Himself fully known to us 
He had to become Incarnate, — to humble Himself to 
our estate, and through the medium of the flesh teach 
us the things which we needed to know. The histor- 
ical appearance of the Infinite! That is it on which 
we must fall back when we wish to learn the full truth 
about the Father. The appearance in time is the 
final court to which the Christian has to appeal! No 
matter how cogent our arguments may become, and 
no matter how persuasive our philosophy, in the last 
resort as Christians we have but one satisfying source 
for argument, and that is the historical revelation. 

So it is, then, that Historical Apologetics are the 
only kind that really avail in dealing with the details 
of our subject. Vital Apologetics of course under- 
lie even the historical; but we are dealing now 
not with life but with argument, and of arguments the 
only one which actually counts is the historical. This 
should make plain then exactly what is meant by the 
title of this third section. In it is to be found a set- 
ting forth of the historical facts upon which the Chris- 
tian depends for the actual fortification of his faith. 
And further there will have to be discussed the grounds 
on which we dignify the Christian revelation with the 
word historical. 

To begin with, then, we must set forth the historical 
facts upon which is based our faith. These it is read- 
ily grasped are to be found in the book which we call 
the New Testament, and in the record of the Christian 
Church. Historical Apologetics are concerned, then, 



THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT 209 

in the first place with telling what occurred in Pales- 
tine between the days of Herod the King and Pontius 
Pilate the Governor; and in the second place in re- 
cording the results of that wonderful occurrence. In 
this place it is not necessary to repeat the Gospel story. 
It is the best known story in the Western world at 
least. Every child knows how that Jesus was born in 
Bethlehem ; how that after thirty years of silent prep- 
aration He came forth and publicly convinced cer- 
tain of His followers of the fact that He was the long 
looked- for Messiah; how that He astonished the world 
with works of wonder and with words of power; how 
that by the envious Jews He was apprehended, tried 
and crucified ; how that He rose from the dead, and in 
the presence of many was taken to another world; 
how that as a result of His short ministry He taught 
the world the only truth which can save and set men 
free. All of these historical facts need no repetition 
here. To them we need merely to point, and state that 
they form the first part of the historical basis upon 
which the Christian relies for the justification of his 
belief. 

Then comes the second part, the result of this brief 
ministry of the Master — the story of the work and 
development of the Christian Church. As a piece of 
empirical argument this record of the life of the 
Church is the most powerful of all arguments. The 
results, the magnificent results of that insignificant 
event, do more than anything else testify to the eternal 
value of that which was from the worldly point of 
view so petty. That life and that character which to 

15 



210 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

the eyes of men were so steeped in sorrow and failure 
have in the centuries shown themselves to have pro- 
duced such joy and such victories that one is forced 
to recognize that there were in Jesus more than or- 
dinary powers and knowledge. The story of the 
Church's triumph over the forces of this world/ and 



^ It is to be remembered that the Church conquered the 
world before she allied herself with it, and that it was only 
because she conquered first that she was able to make the re- 
grettable alliance later. The triumph of the lesser and the 
weaker over the greater and the mightier, is a testimony to 
the divinity of its Founder far greater than His recorded 
work and words. 

Men often ask us to surrender our belief in miracles, so- 
called, and it is in this connection that we can most prop- 
erly refer to that problem. Of course one has to define 
"miracle" as an illustration or exhibition of a law not yet 
understood. A miracle could not be something which broke 
through the conditions imposed by law. That is unthink- 
able. It must be a manifestation of some hitherto un- 
known law. And yet when one comes to apply this rigidly 
to the Gospel story he does not find himself aided especially 
in his interpretation. To be perfectly frank in dealing with 
this matter, it seems best not to use carelessly this explanation 
of miracles. It is logical, but when pressed is not altogether 
satisfactory. It postulates the existence of too many un- 
known laws. The best thing to do would seem to be to 
reason thus : 

(i) Idealism postulates that we do not know all there is 
to be known about law and order. 

(2) The acceptance of the possibility of an Incarnation, 
is accepting that which is clearly from the logician's point of 
view unthinkable, i. e., the Timeless One coming into time re- 
lations. 



THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT 211 

of what it now is, form the great argument for its di- 
vine origin. The apologist would sooner surrender, 
so far as forensic usage is concerned, the "miracles" 
of the Gospels than the miracle of the Church's 
career. It is honestly questionable whether, human- 
ly speaking, we could not give up the signs and won- 
ders which Jesus wrought, and, as a matter of fact, 
give up that which is one of the least significant of the 
things which can be said about Christianity's Founder. 



(3) The acceptance of the freedom of the will is the accept- 
ance of something which for the Naturalist is an out and 
out violation of Nature's law and order — each free act is 

utterly miraculous. 

All of this being so it would seem to be straining at a gnat 
to accept tliese "miraculous" major premises and find dif- 
ficulty in accepting under any conditions those incidental and 
minor ones which are recorded in the Gospels. 

If this prove unsatisfactory, as it probably will to many^ 
then perhaps the best thing to do is to suspend judgment, and 
adopt the attitude that one must allow the possibility of the 
Gospel miracles until their historical invahdity can be 
shown. In dealing with an objector to the recorded miracles 
in the New Testament the first thing to do is, as has been 
insisted upon in the section upon Naturalism, to get rid of 
all incidental matters, to set in order the actual facts under 
debate, and getting down to first premises find out whether 
the objector is dealing with life from the naturalistic or ideal^ 
istic position. If it be that he denies the possibility of any- 
thing which is not subject to known and observable laws, thert. 
all discussion as to occurrences recorded in the Gospels or- 
elsewhere is but wasted time. If, on the other hand, he admit 
the possibility of occurrences which are not subject to known 
and observable (i.e., empirically verifiable) laws; if he ap- 
proach life as an Idealist, then the proper thing to do is to ad- 



212 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

His feeding of the multitudes with a few loaves and 
fishes is no breach of the law and is nothing extraordi- 
nary in comparison to His feeding of the multitudes 
during the past centuries with no other instrument than 
an unworthy priesthood and an unwelcome (worldly 
speaking) doctrine ! His turning of water into wine is 
far less baffling than His turning thousands of rep- 



vise a suspension of judgment. Further, during this period of 
suspended judgment he must be and continue completely un- 
biased. It is not an unprejudiced position which is assumed 
by the Naturalists. 

One has only to refer to the outspoken refusal of many 
€ven to listen to evidence upon cases of mind reading, to 
point out the prejudice of the average NaturaHst in all mat- 
ters where a violation of observable laws seems imminent. 
The Idealist must avoid this, and throughout must be willing 
to accept testimony from both sides ; and more, must give as 
much credence to him who swears to one side as to him who 
swears to the other side of the question. Errors and mistakes 
from hysteria are inevitable, but one must none the less re- 
main unprejudiced, since errors and mistakes are equally 
made by those whose hysteria shows itself under the guise 
of an obsession against the unusual. There is so much humbug 
in the world of "spiritualism" that one ought to be cautious 
and reserved. What we would merely suggest is that despite 
the humbuggery and fraud so prevalent one should maintain 
an attitude of impartiality. 

In the last resort, we repeat, the Idealist must admit the 
possibility of the results of unknown laws — of laws which are 
not observable by the senses, and admitting that, maintain a 
suspended judgment. Nothing is more dogmatic and more 
hysterical than to assert the a priori impossibility of anything 
-which is not accountable for under the now known laws of 
IvFature. 



THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT 213 

rebates into pious servants of God! His raising of 
Lazarus dismays us less than His raising of those who 
Hke Augustine were spiritually dead. 

It is the marvellous growth, and the far more mar- 
vellous accomplishment of the Church which bears the 
loudest testimony to the Divinity of Christ.^ In the 
presence of the facts which are written upon the pages 
of European history one cannot but pause and wonder. 
That so much good and so much power, and so many 
blessings should come into the world as a result of the 
life of Him who was crucified, is perhaps the most 
potent of all the historical arguments which can be 
brought to bear upon the problem. 

Such then in outline are the historical arguments 
which more than all philosophical dissertations bear 
witness to the faith of the Christian. They are prac- 
tical arguments, they deal with life, and as such they 
come close to us whensoever we handle them. But it 
is to be recognized that between these two forms of 
the historical witness there is a wide difference. No 
one attempts to deny the facts of the victory of the 
Church and its prodigious success. Many on the other 



^ There is a familiar story which is an excellent illustra- 
tion of this point. It relates how that a Jewish money- 
lender at the Court of Louis IX resisted all the arguments 
with which the pious King tried to convert him to Christianity. 
Finally, however, after a trip to Rome, a trip which the King 
supposed would completely turn him against the faith, he 
succumbed, telling the King that a Religion which had pros- 
pered in the face of so foul a leadership as that which he had 
seen at Rome must indeed be guided by Him who was Divine. 



214 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

hand deny us the right to use the word historical as 
apphed to the story of the hfe, death and resurrection 
of Jesus. The one we are told is patent to all men 
because to it the testimony is unquestionable and con- 
vincing; the other is problematical and its truthful- 
ness questionable on the grounds that they who tes- 
tified to it (the Gospel writers) were prejudiced and 
unable, by reason of the tensity of the times, to bear 
what can be called reliable evidence. In a word the 
historicity of the Gospel story and of the whole New 
Testament is called in question, and before one can 
fully use that part of the historical argument he must 
establish the authenticity and reliability of those writ- 
ings. 

Let us get this matter distinctly understood, because 
only as one understands it can he fully appreciate the 
value of historical Apologetics. It amounts to this : on 
behalf of my faith in the Lord Christ, and in order to 
tell the world that it is justifiable, I adduce certain 
concrete living facts. In the first place, I tell of the 
work which the Church of Christ has done and refer 
to it as evidence of my Lord's Divinity. To this the 
world has no objections to offer except that unless I 
can show that this movement began with a real fact, 
and has not merely developed and accumulated 
strength as it proceeded — that unless I can show that 
that from which it began was all that it is claimed to 
have been, then will the work of the Church be put 
down and explained as one of the many curious phe- 
nomena with which the history of the world abounds — 
perhaps the most curious and astonishing. 



THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT 215 

So then if I am to persuade anybody of the final 
value of my faith I must show that the work of the 
Church is not to be explained as a curious and won- 
derful example of racial hysteria — of a belief which 
grew out of nothing but imagined facts — I must show 
the world that the marvelous story of the Church's 
career is to be explained and accounted for by the fact 
that those things which are recorded in the Gospels 
and Epistles and from which the Church drew its in- 
spiration actually and really occurred. I need not 
necessarily demonstrate that this or that miracle was 
performed, but that the record as an whole is a truth- 
ful account of the Hfe of Jesus. 

We are in the last resort therefore driven to the task 
of showing the value of the Gospels and Epistles as 
testimony, and to this task, which is the principal task 
of this kind of Apologetics we must devote a separate 
chapter. 



CHAPTER 11. 

THE HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL 
NARRATIVE. 

UNLIKE other religions, Christianity is closely 
connected with historical fact. The appeal to 
history is found in the earliest form of the Christian 
creed. While for most of the Oriental religions, 
the time or the circumstances under which they origi- 
nated, are comparatively unimportant, the historical 
nexus of Christianity is a vital matter. The docu- 
ments to which we have to refer when we ask what 
Christianity is, contain historical details, and among 
the essentials of the Christian faith are such questions 
as whether Paul the Apostle died in the reign of Nero, 
or whether the organization of the Catholic Church 
can be traced back to the time of the Flavian emperors. 
The importance of the historical side of Apologetics 
may be seen in the fact that recently the question has 
been asked whether the founder of the Christian faith 
was an historical character or not. This query has to 
be faced, and faced without impatience or passion. 
That the question should originate at all can only be 
explained because in the progress of scientific knowl- 



NoTE. — The writer of this chapter desires to express his ob- 
ligations to Mgr. P, Batiffol's " Orphdus et Pfivangile," recently 
translated into English by G. C. H. Pollen, under the title 
" Credibility of the Gospel." 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 217 

edge the laws of natural phenomena have come to be 
more thoroughly understood than the problems of 
man's personality. One accepts without scruple ab- 
stract formulae, while one hesitates to acknowledge the 
indefinite possibilities of human genius. The result is 
that it would seem easier in these days to persuade the 
majority of the public that Dante's Divine Comedy 
could be written by a guild of Florentine artisans, than 
by the creative inspiration of one man. 

In order to answer questions arising in regard to 
the historicity of the Life of Jesus, no methods of 
investigation or research should be pressed into serv- 
ice that are, or that would be, out of place in any 
other type of historical narrative. The application of 
criticism to the sources of the life of Jesus is no more 
out of place than the application of criticism to the 
life of St. Francis of Assisi. In both cases one is 
carried back to the reflected views of contemporaries, 
and in both cases, because of the absence of inten- 
tional literary authorship, one must depend on sec- 
ondary accounts. The great characters in secular his- 
tory, both political and literary, in many cases left 
direct personal records of their opinions. Jesus did 
not do this. We have, therefore, to depend on reports 
of his teaching rather than upon words consciously 
written down by him over his own signature to record 
what His life and His work was understood by Him to 
mean. This certainly adds a difficulty to the life of the 
founder of Christianity, which differentiates the study 
of Christian origins from the investigations of the lives 



218 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

of military leaders and statesmen, such as Julius Caesar, 
and literary geniuses, such as Plato. 

The principles of historical research will be found 
to lead to the formulation of a few positive posi- 
tions in regard to the historicity of the Gospel narra- 
tive. It is no longer possible to reject the Gospels as a 
whole, simply because they contain the records of mir- 
acles and supernatural events. It is no longer allow- 
able to treat the story of a miracle as if it were the 
product of imposture. Too much is known to-day of 
the psychology of religion, individual and social, to en- 
courage any such absolute parti pris where the relig- 
ious convictions of mankind at other stages of culture 
are brought into play. There has been much revision 
of judgment also on the question as to the amount of 
time that must necessarily elapse between the period 
at which the supposed miraculous event happened and 
the period when it was first made a matter of record. 
The idea that a miracle is the result of a process of 
long growth in religious consciousness has been def- 
initely abandoned. This point has been admirably put 
by Professor Harnack in the following words : "To 
reject narratives as useless or to shift them onto a later 
period because they relate miracles, is nothing but a 
prejudice." 

Some of the most thoroughly impartial historical 
studies of the mediaeval period are based on the use 
of sources that are filled with records of miraculous 
happenings. When St. Augustine in his famous book 
on ''The City of God" says that he had personal 
knowledge of seventy miracles of healing that took 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 219 

place in his diocese within the two years before he 
began the composition of the book, no one doubts the 
good faith of the author, nor is there any reason for 
suspecting the authenticity of the chapter of the book 
in which these events, regarded by him as proof of 
the miraculous, are recorded. In the same way, there 
is no reason to question the good faith of the author 
of "The Acts," or to suspect that he never visited the 
Island of Malta simply because he reports in his nar- 
rative of his sojourn there the fact that the father of 
Publius, the governor of the island, was miraculously 
healed by St. Paul. 

It is impossible not to notice that the earliest docu- 
ments accepted by the Christian community are treated 
to-day by historical critics without the prejudices of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century rationalism, accord- 
ing to which the presence of any element of the mi- 
raculous was sufficient in itself to eliminate the author 
in question as a reliable witness. It is a curious piece, 
therefore, of reactionary rationalism to find such a 
statement as the following in Reinach's ''Orpheus," a 
popular summary of the history of religion, "that the 
Gospels are documents that cannot possibly be used 
for the history of the real Hfe of Jesus." This trench- 
ant phraseology is entirely opposed to the accepted 
principles of scientific historical writers today. The 
modern historian rejects nothing that can possibly 
throw any light, direct or indirect, on the age whose 
events he is examining, or on the personalities whose 
characters he may be analyzing. Monumental sculp- 
ture, casual inscriptions on stone or plaster, officially 



220 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

inscribed records in marble or bronze, coins, fragments 
of papyrus containing personal letters, tax receipts, 
or items of personal expenditure, bits of pottery with 
scrawled inscriptions, all are grist for the mill of the 
modern historian. He rejects nothing, and is willing 
to apply the test of historical research to any kind of 
evidence that comes to him from past ages. Indeed, 
in order to control the statements of recognized his- 
torical narrative, it is often necessary to draw from a 
variety of sources. Good examples of this kind of 
research are seen in the work of Professor Ramsey, 
where he traces in elaborate detail the connection be- 
tween the secular and religious history of the Roman 
Empire in the early years of the Church. 

The first place in the recognized scale of document- 
ary proof is conventionally assigned to the eye-witness, 
but even the eye-witness may, under certain conditions 
of prejudice or of training, be no more valuable than 
a writer who is separated from the events he is nar- 
rating by the lapse of a considerable number of years. 
The commentaries of Julius Caesar are from the very 
fact of the point of view adopted, and the desired ef- 
fect intended to be produced often not higher sources 
than the work of Tacitus. Yet Caesar relates his cam- 
paigns as an eye-witness, while Tacitus frequently is 
separated by as much as seventy-five years from some 
of the important events contained in his Annals, and 
was, therefore, obliged to use the works of preceding 
historians, and even sometimes to appeal to unwritten 
oral tradition. Yet Tacitus does not cease to be a ve- 
racious historian simply because he was not an eye- 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 111 

witness of the events he records, and JuHus Caesar is 
not elevated beyond the reach of criticism because he 
writes history as a contemporary. 

A narrative can be true even if it is not the work 
of an eye-witness. Even granting a comparatively 
late editorial revision of the first Gospel, there is no 
reason why the Synoptic Gospels as a whole should be 
placed as to historical value below the work of Tacitus, 
who, probably in no was writing the history of 
the reign of the Emperior Tiberius, in whose period 
falls the public ministry of Our Lord. And there is 
reason to believe that there is embedded in the texts 
of the Gospels, written as they were many years before 
the Annals of Tacitus, connected narratives in frag- 
ments, coming down from the reign of the Emperor 
Tiberius in a much less altered shape than the matter 
which had been worked over by the experienced lit- 
erary hand of the Roman historian. 

It must be remembered that the Gospels have an 
historical value, even if they are not composed as rec- 
ognized historical documents, and are devoid of the 
traditional literary form common to historical writers. 
As the title indicates, all of the Gospels were written 
with the view of the needs and organization of the 
early Christian community. While Tacitus wrote for 
the study or the lecture-room, St. Luke and St. Mark 
put down in writing the forms of Christian teaching 
that were used for the purpose of oral instruction 
given to the converts who were brought under the in- 
fluence of Christian missionaries. The preaching of 
the Apostles, though no one need expect an exact sten- 



222 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

ographic report of their words, is without doubt sub- 
stantially presented in the Synoptic Gospels, and, as in 
this preaching the Apostles were witnesses of the min- 
istry of Jesus, the contents of the Gospels have an his- 
torical character. 

When one considers the general literary standards 
of the authors of the Gospels, it is nothing short of 
grotesque to attribute to them either the ability or the 
wish to construct out of their own inner consciousness 
a narrative whose chief figure had no more reality 
than the creations of Shakespeare's plays. The extra- 
ordinary lengths to which this kind of criticism may 
go may be illustrated in the claim of a recent critic, 
who, in discussing the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, 
"If Taine had been born at that particular time and 
in that particular country, and supposing that he was a 
Christian, it perhaps would not have been impossible 
for him to have conceived and composed the history 
of Jesus in a way not very different from that fol- 
lowed by St. Matthew." 

In this statement it seems almost unnecessary to 
call attention to the host of risky hypotheses behind 
the analogy. The authors of the Gospels show little 
or no familiarity with the rules of classical historical 
writing. They are devoid of the common rhetorical 
finish and form. They are indifferent to any system- 
atic chronological indications by which the various 
portions of their narrative might be woven into some 
sort of a consistent whole. There are no fixed dates 
in the life of Our Lord, but equally obscure chrono- 
logically is the history of the primitive Christian com- 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 223 

munity at Jerusalem, and also the details of the early 
journeys of evangelists in Judea. Yet with all this 
neglect of the machinery and technique of historical 
writing, the Evangelists evidently tried to get at the 
truth and reproduce in writing the actual effects which 
brought about conviction to the minds of those who 
first heard the message of Jesus. 

The very lapses and inperfections in the Gospels 
considered as historical narratives are so many ev- 
idences of their close touch with reality. If they had 
gone through a systematic doctoring process they 
would lend themselves to those schemes of harmo- 
nization which have been for so long the despair of the 
traditional expositions of Christ's life and teaching. 
If the Gospel text had been in the hands of a group of 
trained literary experts of the first century, it is not 
easy to see how the common prediliction of the first 
age of the Church for St. Matthew's Gospel could 
have had any other result than the ultimate disappear- 
ance of St. Mark's Gospel and the complete retouching 
of the text of St. Luke, either by way of alteration or 
suppression, in order to bring it into harmony with 
St. Matthew. But this natural development was ar- 
rested from the very first. The desire for consistency 
was less supreme than the reverence which inspired 
the preservation of the actual words of Jesus, even at 
the expense of producing varieties of interpretation of 
those words. 

It is possible to say with emphasis that writings so 
widely diffused as the Gospels have not suffered the 
fate of interpolation. Probably no text in the world 



224 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

has been submitted to such careful examination by 
such a large number of trained experts as the text of 
the New Testament. The history of variations, great 
and small, is intimately known, and the reasons for 
the changes, apart from the mere accidents of the 
copyists, can be determined with great accuracy. For- 
tunately the hand of the harmonist was not allowed 
to interfere with the integrity of the original text. 
There is no trace of those artifices by which the first 
three Gospels were to be forced always to tell the 
same story in the same way. Marcion, the celebrated 
Gnostic teacher, proposed to combine in one text a 
harmonized statement of Our Lord's ministry. It 
was perhaps due to the feeling against him that the 
Catholic Church of the second century hesitated to 
conduct its conflict with the Gnostics with such ques- 
tionable weapons as a text of the Gospels that had 
been tampered with for doctrinal purposes. 

It may be said, even allowing that the tendency 
to put back the dates of the composition of the Gospels 
to a period not long after the middle of the first cen- 
tury be accepted as legitimate, is it not true that dur- 
ing a period of thirty to forty years of oral tradition 
the faith of the early community may have radically 
altered. But it is to be noted here that even such crit- 
ics as Julicher, who in his Introduction to the New 
Testament postulates a series of dates for the Gospels 
which would extend the interval of composition far 
longer than that given by Harnack, speaks of the Syn- 
optic Gospels as having a supreme value, not only as 
books of religious edification, but also as sources for 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE ITS 

the history of the life of Jesus : "The special merits of 
the Synoptists is precisely that they did not repaint 
but preserve the image of the historical Christ." 

Whatever may be urged against the historicity of 
the miracle narratives in contrast with the logia of 
Jesus, it still remains true that Jesus did acts which 
were judged to be miraculous by those who witnessed 
them. In other words, the witnesses of His ministry 
not only heard sayings which have come down to us in 
the text of the Gospels substantially as they were spok- 
en, but that they also saw deeds done by Him, reported 
in the Gospels substantially after the manner in which 
they were originally witnessed. A narrative of mi- 
raculous healing, such as that contained in St. Mark's 
Gospel, where the Aramaic phrase Talitha Koumi is not 
due to the poetic fancy of the Evangelist. The Jewish 
picture of the Messias did not contain such details as 
the night passed in the Garden of Gethsemane, and a 
Messias, standing out as the chief figure in such a 
mighty tragedy of realism, cannot have been the prod- 
uct of an idealizing imagination. The subordinate 
figures in the life of Jesus have the same convincing 
reality as the chief one. The denial of Peter is as 
convincingly real as the Passion of Jesus. 

If the figure of Jesus, as found in the Synoptics, 
though the subordinate details may differ in the in- 
dividual evangelists, is one harmonious whole, the 
total harmony comes from the reality of the character 
and not from any special literary skill on the part of 
the writers of the Gospel. Nothing is clearer, as Jul- 
icher says, than the fact that the writers of the Gospel 
i6 



226 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

went through a process of self-effacement. They sub- 
ordinated their own personahties and took as their 
guide when they traced the figure of their Master, the 
accepted tradition of the Christian communities for 
whom they wrote^ and who found in their description 
such details as were recognized to be faithful to the 
original. Such faith might reconstruct a faithful 
image of Him without drawing upon either reflection 
or criticism. Some details it forgets ; some others it in- 
troduces. But after all, in spite of there being some 
evidence of failure or arbitrariness, the accuracy of 
the portrait is such that a first-class historian, pro- 
vided with all the aids of science and equipped with 
all the technique of his art, could not have done better 
for the original. Such an advanced critic as Johannes 
Weiss is even emphatic as to the historical value of 
the subordinate details in the Gospel narrative, and he 
mentions as an illustration of this veracity, the care- 
ful, yet spontaneous way in which the figure of John 
the Baptist is drawn by the Evangelists. As to the 
presentation of Jesus in their narrative, he calls atten- 
tion to the forceful traits in which the character of 
Jesus is depicted, mentioning especially how He stands 
out in contrast to those who surround Him, whether 
they be friends or foes, and he asks, "If this image 
were only the expression of a common ideal, that of 
the first generation of Christians, we have a right to 
ask how is it that these men who, in the Acts and 
in the Epistles belong to the common type of humanity, 
produce such a unique expression of their dreams. If 
their work is only the result of imagination we feel 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 227 

bound to say that collective faith has created a per- 
sonage of far greater proportions than its horizon." 
No literary theory which divorces personality from 
reality can account for the figure of Jesus as He ap- 
pears on the canvas of Gospel history. 

Those, too, who attempt to separate the supernatural 
from the natural factors in the Gospels have before 
them a hard task. The line of division between the 
two is, after all, purely a matter of convention, for 
what appears to one age as supernatural might be in- 
terpreted by another age as the expression of what is 
purely natural. One of the favorite methods adopted 
in eliminating the supernatural is the contention that 
statements or passages in the New Testament purport- 
ing to be historical were really suggested by the Mes- 
sianic prophecies of the Old Testament. Readers of 
the Acts will recall how frequently the Messiasship of 
Jesus is based upon appeals to the Old Testament. 
The same method is used frequently in St. Matthew's 
Gospel, where the reader is constantly told that such 
and such an event in the ministry of Jesus is the ac- 
complishment of a corresponding prediction in the 
Old Testament scripture. 

This recourse to what is called typology was popular 
in the early Christian community, and Professor Stan- 
ton, among others, holds that a regular catena of 
such texts in the Aramaic language was prepared and 
circulated for early Christian use. The theory, there- 
fore, is that the Gospel tradition was influenced by this 
prevalent typology, that is, in many cases, the Old 
Testament prediction was not so much a comment on 



228 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

the passage in the New as the direct source from which 
it was drawn. The EvangeHst came to beUeve that 
what he interpreted as a prophecy actually took place. 
This supposed construction, which indicates the aban- 
donment of the imaginative hypothesis, can, of course, 
not have a very wide application. It would concern 
not the whole of the Gospel narrative but a few pas- 
sages, more particularly those in the infancy sections 
and in the details of the crucifixion. But even 
the somewhat fanciful use of these Old Testament 
prophecies by such a writer as the final editor of St. 
Matthew's Gospel, does not prove that the main fig- 
ures or the main elements in his narrative are fictitious. 
He constantly adopts a certain process of selection in 
the Old Testament passages which he incorporates in 
his narrative, and if he had not had real facts to guide 
him, it is not easy to see how he happened to suppress 
some details of the early prophecies and preserved 
others intact. The objection against this procedure is 
put with characteristic clarity and vigor by Professor 
Loisy in his destructive notice of Reinach's book that 
appeared recently in the Revue Historique. **If," 
he says, ''the crucifixion of Jesus was not attested by 
contemporaries but only by texts far after the event, 
the psalm might have been the origin of the tradition 
in question. But in the state of the witnesses it is idle 
to raise such a hypothesis. It would be just as profit- 
able to deny as a whole the authenticity of the evan- 
gelic parables because it pleased St. Matthew to see 
in parabolic teaching the fulfilment of the Seventy- 
eighth Psalm." 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 229 

Another favorite way of eliminating the miraculous 
is to reject all of those passages which do not relate to 
acts of physical healing, and to justify the elimination 
by saying that these so-called miracles are nothing 
more than parables which the evangelists have mis- 
taken for narratives of actual events. That there is 
some justification for this point of view may be seen 
in the explanation of the Temptation of Jesus, an 
event which the disciples could only have known from 
the lips of the Master Himself. It may well be that in 
recounting this period of His life He spoke of this pe- 
riod of test under the forms of a parable, and it is 
recalled, too, how He spoke on one occasion of seeing 
Satan fall from Heaven as a thunderbolt. It would 
be interesting to follow this method of exegesis in its 
various applications, for example, the miraculous draft 
of fishes is said to be really a parable of apostolic 
preaching, while the calming of the tempest refers to 
the persecutions of the Church, and the multiplication 
of the loaves and fishes was originally nothing more 
than eucharistic teaching under the form of a parable. 
It is impossible to deny that symbolism is latent in the 
Synoptic Gospels, and becomes a directive principle 
in the Fourth Gospel, but it requires some stretch of 
the imagination to figure how, without a precedent act 
or action, symbolism could come into being. It would 
be like the rope of the Eastern fakir, suspended in the 
air without attachment from above or below. 

To construct the life of Jesus on a purely natural- 
istic hypothesis, that is, such an attempt as was made 
by Renan two generations ago, leads to such a forced 



230 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

interpretation of texts and passages that no historical 
critic of repute would dare adopt it if he were dealing 
with documents and sources relating to the same pe- 
riod of history or relating to a personality of any 
other period of history, the events of whose life were 
at all analogous to those of the life of Jesus. The 
historian who fastens his chariot to the star of com- 
mon sense will make a lamentable failure if he treats 
the first age of Christianity as if it were the age of 
Rousseau or Voltaire, and the genesis of Christianity 
is more of an enigma without the miraculous than it 
is if this factor be allowed to enter with the signifi- 
cance attached to it by the earliest Christian religious 
consciousness. 

A further method of reducing the uniqueness of the 
Gospel records to some sort of common level with 
that of other forms of religious belief, is to apply to 
it the inductions of comparative religion. Such a 
method of study has its specific value. Considerable 
light, for example, can be thrown upon many phases 
of the teaching of Jesus by comparing it with the 
forms of rabbinical learning. No one would be foolish 
enough to undervalue the information made accessible 
to the New Testament scholar by such work as may be 
found in Schiirer's History of the Jewish People in 
New Testament Times, and it is worth while recalling 
the fact that an Anglican investigater, Dr. Light foot, 
two centuries ago, was one of the first to draw 
upon the rich stores of traditional Jewish teaching to 
illustrate the text of the New Testament. The last 
word has not yet been said in this department of re- 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 231 

search, and just as the Jewish environment of the 
origins of Christianity may be traced, so the methods 
of thought, the reHgious phraseology, and the general 
orientation of the Greek-speaking portion of the Ro- 
man Empire, may be made to answer many of the un- 
solved problems of New Testament criticism. It is 
only necessary to refer to Deissman's book, ''Light 
from the East," as a general indication of the fruitful- 
ness of this type of study. 

Yet the result of the study of comparative religion, 
however applied in any of its various spheres, has not 
succeeded in demonstrating that Christianity is a mere 
syncretism. Indeed, without the personality of Jesus, 
the Christian religion is more of an enigma than ever 
before. It is nothing short of childish to reduce the 
Christian faith to a combination of Hellenic, Egyptian, 
Persian, Babylonian elements. Any such natural his- 
tory of Christianity is as futile as the attempt to re- 
duce the vital forces of the protoplasm to its constit- 
uent chemical elements. But among the hosts of hy- 
potheses, all tending to cast a doubt on the historicity 
of Jesus, Pan-Babylonianism has its votaries just as 
enthusiastic as the votaries of Panhellenism. 

The catalogue of naturalistic exegesis is not even yet 
exhausted. There must be added the anthropological 
school, the specialists on the myths and rituals of all 
peoples and of all ages, the school, one of whose rep- 
resentative works may be found in Professor Eraser's 
''Golden Bough." Following the anthropological line 
of argument, the crucifixion is denied ever to have 
taken place, and is presented simply as a myth whose 



232 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

principal figure is analogous to that of Mithras or Attis. 
In view of this bold attempt to eliminate altogether 
the historical character of the life of Jesus, it is hardly 
necessary to refer to similar lines of argument directed 
against the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. The 
interest in the attempt lies in the fact that the school 
of anthropologists seem to realize, with a consistency 
denied to other schools of naturalistic criticism, that in 
order to get rid of the supernatural factor in the Gos- 
pels one must succeed in wiping off the canvas of New 
Testament history its central figure. 

Those who wish to follow in detail and in a popular 
form the strange gymnastics of this most modern and 
most ultra form of criticism need only refer to the un- 
consciously humorous pages of Reinach's "Orpheus." 
And 'X is not unfair to call the reader's attention to 
the fact that if this unquestioned and most erudite au- 
thority on comparative religion had applied to Juda- 
ism, to Buddhism, to Islam, to Hinduism, the kind of 
reasoning that he employs in his survey of Christian 
origins. Mother Goose might become a serious text- 
book as compared with his own volume. As a matter 
of fact, the charming tales of the anthropological 
school are so far removed from the ordinary type of 
religious conviction, either in its strongest or weakest 
content, that its influence can hardly become extensive. 

More important and more cautions are the contribu- 
tions offered by the historians of dogma, who, apply- 
ing the formula of evolution, declare that all of the 
distinguishing marks of the Christian faith and the 
Christian organization come from a later period than 



HISTORICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRA TIVE 233 

the life of Jesus. This school pictures His ministry 
as the short life-work of one who was a humble Jew- 
ish rabbi of most limited horizon and devoid of any 
original ideas. It is said that the Messiasship of Je- 
sus and His identity with God are due to the teaching 
of the Fourth Gospel, but that Jesus Himself taught no 
dogma and instituted nothing resembling the sacra- 
ments of the Catholic Church. It is also affirmed that 
the idea of redemption comes from Pauline influence 
and has no other source. To test such statements as 
these one must make a collection of the logia found 
in the first three Gospels. Here, though there is none 
of the systematic development found in the Pauline 
writing or the Johannine writings, there is enough to 
show that Jesus Himself made statements that prove 
His consciousness of a transcendent personality. 

The germ of Johannine speculative theology may 
be found in the Second Gospel, and as to the sacra- 
mental teaching of the Church strong enough support 
can be found for its primitive origin in the celebrated 
passage on the Eucharist in the first espistle to the 
Corinthians. To derive this passage or the passage in- 
corporating the original Christian mission, "All au- 
thority hath been given unto me in heaven and on 
earth. Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the 
nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father 
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," from the 
evolution of the consciousness of the primitive Chris- 
tian community apart from the creative personality 
of its Founder, would be as incomprehensible, not 
to say as paralyzing, to the intellectual presuppo- 



234 HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS 

sitions of mankind, as it would be to derive the char- 
acter of Hamlet from the collective consciousness 
of a group of London straying players in the Eliza- 
bethan Age. In other words, Christianity without the 
historical Christ is an enigma. To account for it with- 
out His personality would mean such a negation of 
the laboriously constructed intellectual hypotheses of 
many generations of civilized life, it would be neces- 
sary for mankind to start afresh and create a science 
of history entirely unlike any conceived of before. 
The commonly accepted theories of human action 
would have to be neglected, and with such a mass of 
indefiniteness and uncertainty, not a single historical 
source could be quoted as authoritative. It is well 
therefore, to appreciate the implications of radical 
criticism, for they cannot be isolated. They involve 
more than the investigation of special texts or 
individual documents; extended beyond the plane of 
their usual application, they imply a destructive pro- 
cess that would reduce to nothingness many of the 
acquisitions of man's intellectual and cultural life. 
Just as the tendency of Nihilism would disintegrate 
the social order, that wonderful product of the hopes 
and the sufferings of man through unnumbered ages, 
so this light-hearted effort to cut away the structure of 
man's religious convictions would do away with the 
significance of education, and would bring to a stand- 
still all expectations of progress in the various depart- 
ments of human energy. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 235 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR HISTORICAL APOLOGETICS. 

The following books are recommended for collateral read- 
ing in Historical Apologetics : 

Zahn, T. — "Introduction to the New Testament." 
Stanton, V. H. — "The Gospels as Historical Documents," 
Burkitt, F. C. — "The Gospel History and Its Transmission." 
Swete, H. B. — "Cambridge Biblical Essays," 
Lock, W,, and Sanday W, — "Miracles," Papers and Ser- 
mons contributed to The Guardian in 191 1. 
Wendland, J. — "Miracles and Christianity," 
Bruce, A. B. — "The Miraculous Element in the Gospels," 
Simpson, W. J, S, — "Our Lord's Resurrection." 
Ramsay, W. — "Was Christ Born in Bethlehem?" 
Briggs, C A. — "The Incarnation of the Lord," 
Allan, W.— "The Virgin Birth of Christ." 
Sanday, W.— "An Outline of the Life of Christ." 
Sanday, W., and others. — "Oxford Studies in the Synoptic 
Problem." 
Gregory, R. — "The Canon of the New Testament." 
Harnack, A. — "The Acts of the Apostles." 
Harnack, A. — "Luke the Physician." 

Harnack, A,—" The Date of the Acts and the Synoptic 
Gospels," 
Harnack, A. — "The Sayings of Our Lord." 
Pfleiderer, W. — "Primitive Christianity." 
Delitzsch, F.— "Babel and Bible." 

"Jesus or Christ?" — Hibbert Journal Supplement, 1909. 
Scott, E, F, — "The Apologetic of the New Testament," 



APPENDIX. 

Baron F. von Hvigel submits the following list of twenty- 
five books in Religious Philosophy, Christian Origins and 
Church Development, recommended for Apologetic work : 

I. RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY. 

1. Edward Caird. — "The Evolution of Theology in the 
Greek Philosophers." James MacLehose. Glasgow. 
1904. 2 vols. 

2. James Adam. — "The Vitality of Platonism," and other 
essays. Cambridge University Press. 191 1. i vol. 

3. W. Warde Fowler. — "The Religious Experiences of the 
Roman People." Macmillan. 191 1. i vol. 

4. S. S. Laurie. — "Synthetica." Longmans. 1906. 2 vols. 

5. *James Ward. — "The Realm of Ends." Cambridge Uni- 

versity Press, 1911. I vol. 

6. Clement C. J. Webb. — "Problems in the Relations of 
God and Man." James Nisbet. 191 1. i vol. 

7. Emile Boutroux. — "De la Contingence des Lois de la 
Nature." Felix Alcan, ed. 1908. i vol. 

8. Emile Boutroux. — "Science et Religion, dans la Philos- 
ophic Contemporaine." E. Flammarion. 1908. i vol. 

9. Broder Christiansen. — "Kritik der Kantischen Erkennt- 
nisslehre." Clauss & Feddersen. Hanau. 191 1. i vol. 

10. *H. A. Prichard.— "Kant's Theory of Knowledge." Ox- 

ford; Clarendon Press. 1909. i vol. 

11. *Johannes Volkelt. — "Die Quellen der Menschlichen 

Gewissheit." Miinchen. C. H. Beck. 1906. i vol. 

12. Johannes Volkelt. — "Arthur Schopenhauer." Stuttgart. 
Fr. Frommanns Verlag (E. Hanff). 1900. i vol. 

13. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. — "The Philosophical Radicals, 
and Other Essays." Blackwood. MCMVIL i vol. 

14. Harry Jones. — "Browning as a Philosopher and Religious 
Teacher." James MacLehose. Glasgow. 1902. i vol. 



APPENDIX 237 

II. CHRISTIAN ORIGINS. 

15. Hermann Gunkel. — "Die Urgeschichte und die Patriarch- 
en. Gottingen. Daudenhoed u. Ruprecht. 1911. i vol. 

16. *Paul Wendland. — "Handbuch zum Neuen Testament." 

Erster Band : Zweiter Teil. "Die Hellenistisch-Romische 
Kultur." Tiibingen. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
1907. I vol. 

17. *Heinrich Julius Holtzmann. — "Lehrbuch der Neutesta- 

mentlichen Theologie." Same publisher. 191 1. 2 vols. 
2nd Edition. Cr. 

18. Percy Gardner. — "The Religious Experience of St. 
Paul." Williams & Norgate. 1911. 

19. Ernest F. Scott. — "The Fourth Gospel." Edinburgh. 
T. & T. Clark. 1906. 

III. CHURCH DEVELOPMENT. 

20. *Rudolph Sohm. — "Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizis- 

mus." XXVII Band No. X Leipzig. Teubner. 1909. 
Cy. 

21. Mother Juliana. — "Revelation of Divine Love." Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Triibner. 1902. i vol. 

22. *Ernst Troeltsch.— "Protestantisches Christentum und 

Kirche in der Neuzeit." "Geschichte der Christlichen 
Religion." ("Kulter der Gegenwart.") Teubner. 1909. 
Cr. 

23. G. F. Lipps. — "Weltanschaung und Bildungsideal." 
Teubner. 191 1. 

24. *Ernst Troeltsch.— "Die Bedeutung der GeschichtHchkeit 

Jesu." Tiibingen. Mohr. 1911. 

25. Edmond J. A. Holmes.— "What Is and What Might Be." 
Constable. 191 1. i vol. Cr. 

N. B. — The books considered to require considerable crit- 
icism and debate are marked Cr. ; the books found to be 
especially original and stimulating are marked with an aster- 
isk. 



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